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Preface
The principal objectives of the AICPA’s September 20—21, 1982, Small
Business Tax Equity Conference were to call attention to significant
aspects of our federal tax system that adversely affect small business
and to develop constructive alternatives. By doing this we hoped to
stimulate changes that will create an economic environment in which
small business can prosper.
Our major premise is not that legislators have consciously discrimi
nated against small business. Instead it is, first, that there are some
important business tax provisions—most of which were designed to
provide justifiable incentives to certain courses of action—that, in
effect, give large corporations an economic advantage over the small
businessman; and second, that there are certain inherent characteristics
of small businesses that make it impractical for them to take advantage
of tax benefits that are more readily available to larger corporations,
sometimes merely because of the cost and complexity of doing so.
Small businesses, many of which are unincorporated, are typically
labor intensive, closely held, and owner-managed. Their access to
outside sources of capital is limited. For most, the sophisticated strategies
needed to take full advantage of potential tax savings are just not
practicable, due in part to the inordinate complexity of many tax
provisions.
The conference focused on three major areas: jobs tax incentives for
small business, financing the enterprise, and retirement and fringe
benefits equity. Papers on specific subjects within each of these broad
areas were distributed to conference participants before the meeting.
The authors summarized their papers briefly and discussed them with
designated panelists and other conference registrants.
All the papers are included in these Proceedings, and each is
summarized in the Introduction, which also includes a general com
mentary.
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Both the conference and this publication were produced through the
efforts of a large number of dedicated professionals, all of whom are
identified on the following pages. It is appropriate, however, that this
preface give special recognition to William T. Diss, who chaired the
task force that planned and organized the conference; J. F. Kubik, who
served as moderator; Donald H. Skadden, whose summary of the
conference and introduction to these Proceedings added perspective for
both registrants and readers; and William R. Stromsem, the conference
administrator. In addition, we are grateful to Congressman Sam Gibbons
and to David Glickman of the Treasury Department for their challenging
and informative luncheon addresses, which are not reproduced in these
Proceedings.
William L. Raby, Chairman
Federal Taxation Executive
Committee

Ivan Bull, Chairman
Committee on Small Business
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Introduction
by Donald H. Skadden, CPA,

Associate Dean, Graduate School of

Business, University of Michigan

It has been widely recognized for many years that tax laws in the United
States are becoming increasingly more complex. Recently it has been
alleged that accounting standards and other pronouncements are also
becoming overly complex. The complexity of both tax rules and
accounting standards impose a special hardship on small business.
*
Some contend that financial statements and auditing standards for small
business must satisfy a different set of investors and creditors than those
of the widely held corporation, and therefore small business should not
be subject to all the same accounting standards as large business. It
has also been suggested that small business should not have to apply
many of the more complex tax rules.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants is concerned
with the problems of small business. For many years the AICPA Federal
Taxation Division had a Small Business Task Force reporting to the

* In its Tax Recommendations to Aid Small Business, the AICPA Federal Taxation
Division contended that there is no single definition of small business upon which
everyone will agree. The division offered, however, a useful working definition, in
which it suggested that all small businesses have two primary characteristics: (1) an
entrepreneurial flavor (ownership and management of an operating business are
substantially identical) and (2) an absence of access to capital markets. AICPA Federal
Taxation Division, Tax Recommendations to Aid Small Business (New York: AICPA,
1980), 4.
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Subcommittee on Special Entities and Industries. In 1978, this Task
Force published a Proposal for Complete Revision of Subchapter S
Corporation Provisions, which became the primary background for the
sub S legislation that was adopted in 1982. In 1979, The Small Business
Task Force was elevated to subcommittee status. In 1980, the AICPA
Board of Directors created a new Small Business Committee, reporting
directly to the board, with this objective:
To monitor all Institute activities that are directed toward assisting small
business; recommend and, where appropriate, carry out programs to
promote the success of small business; and generally represent the
Institute in matters affecting small business.
Also, there is a Division for CPA Firms within the AICPA, and one
of its two sections is the Private Companies Practice Section. Through
this section, the thousands of AICPA members who are auditors and
consultants for small business entities are gaining a more influential
voice in the Institute’s activities.
The first major project of the Federal Taxation Division’s Small
Business Taxation Subcommittee was the Tax Recommendations to Aid
Small Business, which was published in 1980. In this publication, the
division recommended that small businesses be aided in several ways.
(1) To promote capital formation, the subcommittee suggested that
section 1244 of the Internal Revenue Code be broadened to include
stockholder direct loans and guarantee losses, that certain changes be
made in the ERISA provisions regarding fund investment, and that
small business participating debentures (SBPDs) be created. (2) Upon
the sale of 80 percent control in a small business, the long-term capital
gain should be deferred if the business continues as a small business
firm or if the selling investor rolls over the proceeds into another
qualifying small business. This provision would put small businesses
on equal footing with the tax-free reorganization permitted for large,
public corporations. (3) Continuity of ownership would be supported by
eliminating liquidity problems faced by heirs when the business forms
a large portion of the owner’s estate. The subcommittee suggested that
estate tax be paid in installments and stock attribution rules be changed.
(4) Finally, in order to gain greater neutrality (equity), it recommended
simplifications of both LIFO inventory and depreciation. The 1981
(Economic Recovery Tax Act) and 1982 (Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act) tax laws have responded, at least partially, to these
last suggestions. These suggestions are reflected also in the papers
presented at this conference.
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Other 1982 tax legislation resulted in significant reforms in the
subchapter S provisions. The maximum number of shareholders has
been increased to thirty-five, different voting rights of common stock
will not disqualify a corporation under the one-class-of-stock rule,
retirement plan contribution limits on shareholder-employees will be
repealed as of 1984, the passive receipts rules have been modified,
unused shareholders’ basis can now be carried over, and the earnings
and profits rules will no longer be applicable during sub S years. This
sub S legislation should be of significant benefit to small business and
resulted directly from a cooperative effort of the AICPA Tax Division,
the ABA Tax Section, and the staff of the congressional Joint Committee
on Taxation.
This AICPA Small Business Tax Equity Conference addressed several
inequitable aspects in the application of the tax law to small business.
The papers highlight these inequities and propose solutions. The
conference focused on several topics, which can be divided into the
following three areas:
1. Jobs formation in the small business sector—incentives and
reasons for failure
2. Financing the enterprise—the debt-equity problems, limitations
on deductions of loan and guarantee losses and excess investment
expense, and limitations on investment of ERISA funds
3. Equity issues in retirement and fringe benefits plan provisions
The conference was sponsored jointly by the AICPA Small Business
Committee and the AICPA Federal Taxation Division Small Business
Taxation Subcommittee.

Jobs Formation Through Small Business
Incentives
The jobs tax credit was the principal topic of three of the papers, and
consequently was the focus of most of the discussion. The several
attempts, past and present, to spur employment through general and
targeted new jobs credits generated some interesting controversy among
the speakers and in the group discussion.

Why Jobs Tax Credits Have Failed
In his paper, Marvin J. Dickman identifies several reasons for the
ineffectiveness of the jobs tax credits. The confusion surrounding the
3

credits and their poor administration were largely to blame for their
failure. Employers in small businesses were not informed of the provisions
in a timely manner. The simultaneous existence of the Work Incentive
(WIN) credit and the New Jobs Tax Credit was confusing, and the
provisions themselves were complex. The most recent credit, the Targeted
Jobs Tax Credit, failed in reaching the important goal of an employment
tax credit—it did not generate enough tax savings to make it worthwhile
for eligible businesses to alter their hiring practices. Furthermore, costs
of compliance with the provisions were perceived by businesses as too
high, and they feared the inherent increased contact with the government
and possible tax audits. The complex administration of the Targeted
Jobs Tax Credit and its inadequate marketing by the agencies also
diminished its potential impact.
The inequity of the New Jobs Tax Credit to small business is evidenced
by the fact that only 6.6 percent of the corporations with assets totalling
less than $250,000 claimed the credit although such corporations
constitute 69 percent of all corporate taxpayers. On the other hand,
43.4 percent of the corporations with assets in excess of $250 million
claimed the credit.

The Economics of an Effective Jobs Tax Credit
Economist Robert Eisner points out that an effective jobs tax credit,
unlike investment credits and accelerated capital cost recovery systems,
will tend to help small business, which is relatively labor intensive,
more than large business, which tends to be capital intensive. The
social benefit of increasing employment while lowering its cost—through
the tax credit—may increase current productivity and build a base for
future productivity. Eisner suggests that some type of employment credit
is needed to balance the investment tax credit, which benefits capitalintensive firms.
However, Eisner recognizes that targeted subsidies are likely to be
ineffective and possibly counterproductive. Small groups of workers are
expensive to seek out and may be stigmatized. In addition, employment
in the targeted group may be substituted for employment in other groups.
The goal is to create jobs. Therefore, the credit should apply not only
to small businesses but to all businesses, although small business, as
labor intensive as it is, may benefit most.
Eisner proposes several specific provisions to make an employment
subsidy more effective. In particular, he feels the tax credit should be
available on payroll taxes rather than corporate or individual income
4

taxes. This would make the credit available to companies that have
little or no income tax liability and to the many tax-exempt organizations.
Both employ millions of workers and should be eligible for any incentive
that is intended to create jobs.

A Small Business Jobs Tax Credit
Frank S. Swain and George Guttman, from the Small Business Admin
istration, emphasize the role small business plays in training and
providing early work experience for the entire labor force. The goal of
a jobs credit must be to increase incremental employment instead of to
subsidize base level employment. To give a business the incentives “to
invest in human rather than capital assets,” the employer’s initial labor
costs must be lowered. To encourage business to provide job training,
the credit may have to serve as a temporary wage subsidy that will
narrow the gap between an unskilled worker’s wage rate and his
productivity level.
Swain and Guttman claim that the administration of such a credit
will be simplified by tying the credit to the FUTA tax base. The credit
could be used by an employer to offset FICA and FUTA tax liabilities.
Any remaining credit would be refundable, so an employer is assured
of receiving his full benefit. Limits on the credit and retention of
employee rules would prevent abuse of the credit. Inasmuch as the
credit is tied to the FUTA base and thus reduces labor costs proportionally
more for the lower paid than for higher paid skilled workers, it is not
necessary to target the credit toward any particular group. However,
the employer must still track the specific new hires into the two
subsequent years.

Financing the Small Business Enterprise
Debt-Equity Problems for Small Business
John Harrington examines the potential tax traps faced by small business
because of the complexity of the proposed debt-equity regulations.
These regulations may make it more difficult for small businesses to
acquire equity capital and to obtain loans. Since legislative history
indicates the purpose of section 385 of the Internal Revenue Code is
to discourage the use of hybrid instruments in the acquisition of other
5

businesses, one wonders why that intent has been expanded through
the proposed regulations to deal with “abuses” on the part of privately
held corporations.
Harrington contends that mechanisms should be provided to remove
the average small business from the impact of section 385 for the
following reasons: (1) Complexity of the regulations is more than the
small businessman should have to contend with. (2) Reclassification of
debt and equity may have a severe effect on the small business.
Uncertainty under section 385 may deter venture capitalists, who acquire
a combination of debt and equity. (3) Section 303 redemptions may be
impeded by section 385, and the use of this type of estate planning
could be adversely affected. (4) In a small business, it is more difficult
to differentiate between the key shareholder’s role as creditor, as
employee, and as stockholder, making compliance with the section 385
regulations difficult. (5) Industry requirements are not provided for
under the proposed regulations.
Harrington suggests that section 385 rules should be elective if
combined debt is $5 million or less. Correction periods to conform
transactions to the regulations should be extended. Regulations should
not apply to subchapter S loans for determining whether the corporation
has more than one class of stock. Ratios should be computed on either
the fair market value or the tax basis of the assets, at the taxpayer’s
election. The Treasury needs to recognize and clarify how section 385
relates to provisions of section 303, Employee Stock Ownership Plans
(ESOPs), and the needs of specialized industries.

Limitations on Direct Loans and Guarantee Losses
and on Investment Interest
The availability of debt to small businesses is affected not only by
section 385 regulations but also through the deductions allowed or not
allowed for bad debts. Loans and guarantee losses are treated as ordinary
deductions by a widely held corporation when made for its wholly owned
subsidiary but are considered a nonbusiness bad debt short-term capital
loss when made for a privately held corporation by a sole individual
shareholder. A payment by a father under his guaranty on a business
loan to his son is treated as a “gift,” and a payment on a guaranty is
not treated the same as a payment made for the release from a guaranty.
Thomas E. Huntzinger believes that these inequities would be rectified
if the section 1244 loss provisions were expanded to include losses from
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direct loans or guaranties. This proposal was included in the AICPA
1980 recommendations.
Investment interest is fully deductible by a corporation but limited
for individuals borrowing to invest in an incorporated business. The tax
benefits from net lease activity are also restricted. A safe harbor covering
anyone lending to or investing in a qualified small business could
alleviate these limitations on deductibility of investment interest and
loan losses. Otherwise, it will be very difficult to get venture capital to
many new, young businesses.

What Is an SBPD?
In this paper, Ronald B. Cohen illustrates how small business partici
pating debentures (SBPDs) provide a means of attracting institutional
and individual investors to the small business capital market. Low-risk
investors can receive a stated rate of return and a contractual share of
the profits. If a business is successful, the profits will exceed the stated
interest rate, and the income in excess of the stated interest would be
taxed as a long-term capital gain. The company would have an ordinary
deduction for both the interest and the share of earnings; the investor
would treat losses as ordinary losses. The security and yield potential
of a note are combined with the appreciation, profit-sharing, and tax
attributes of stock.
Cohen feels that serious consideration should be given to allowing
the founding shareholders to buy the SBPDs as part of their investment
in the company. Capital infusion should be encouraged from owners as
well as from outside investors. The change in tax revenue may very
well be positive if the additional capital provided small business generates
jobs in new and expanding enterprises. H.R. 4015, which is included
as Appendix A to this paper, currently proposes that SBPDs be recognized
by the Internal Revenue Code and treated as recommended above. This
was one of the proposals in the 1980 AICPA Tax Recommendations to
Aid Small Business.

Limitation on Investment of ERISA Funds
Paul H. Jackson scrutinizes the investment restrictions contained in
ERISA and concludes that Congress’s approach of imposing requirements
on all who operate tax-qualified programs places an unreasonable burden
on small business.
7

He contends that the prudent man rule has confined funds to big
banks, big insurance companies, and top-tier securities because in
vestment in other areas would not be “prudent.” As a result, small
business is losing funds that had previously been available from locally
controlled pension funds. The prohibited transactions and other restric
tions of ERISA are so numerous that the Department of Labor has
issued exemptions generally freeing insurance companies and agents,
qualifying banks, and security dealers from the regulations. The small
businessman, however, is still subject to these rules.
Jackson feels that the repeal of a substantial number of these ERISA
restrictions is necessary. Prohibiting every transaction and then ex
empting most is intellectually dishonest.
Appendix A, submitted by Paul Antsen, is a reprint of a booklet
published by the Department of Labor that describes the provisions of
the prudence rule and discusses its relation to the investment of pension
plan assets.
Appendix B, prepared by Mark Rollinson, is a guide for the conference
discussion. The following modifications in the current tax treatment of
retirement plans were suggested:

1. Defined benefit plans should be regulated as if they were insurance
companies, since the employer acts as an insurer and the actuarial
liability to fulfill obligations is the key concern.
2. ERISA regulations of defined contribution annuities are unnec
essary.
3. Group defined contribution plans should continue to be governed
by “prudence,” which mandates a “diversified risk” policy.
4. Regulations of individual defined contribution plans are also
unnecessary, since the corpus is never large enough to permit
diversification of investment.

Prudent investment requirements should be compatible with venture
capital investment. Otherwise, resources will be allocated away from
small enterprises to their large competitors. A 2 percent tax could be
levied on the corpus of all plans, with a credit for 10 percent of corpus
invested in small business and 10 percent invested in medium-size
business. However, such investment should not be allowed to disrupt
the effective operation of the business.

8

Fringe and Retirement Benefits Equity
Retirement Benefits Equity
John S. Nolan reviews the changes in retirement benefits equity brought
about by TEFRA. The discrimination found in the tax treatment of plans
for self-employed persons has been alleviated significantly. The tax
benefits of a retirement plan will now be evaluated by the benefits given
to key employees—the top-heavy plan—rather than the form of the
business organization the plan serves. Generally, loans from any qualified
employer plan are now taxable distributions to the borrower. Advantages
of incorporation will be reduced when TEFRA provisions go into effect,
since H.R. 10 provisions have been equalized to more closely approx
imate corporate plan provisions. Owner-employee restrictions have been
generalized to corporate plans that favor key employees.
While the new top-heavy plan rules impose more onerous regulations
on plans for both small and large businesses, they will have a heavier
impact on small business. The implications for equity are not yet
clarified, and there will be major costs of compliance. Plans for small
employers may no longer be worthwhile. In correcting for discrimination
against the self-employed and professional corporations (based on the
type of business organization the plan serves), the distinctions will now
be based predominantly on the size of the business, which seems equally
inappropriate and unjustified.
Certain fringe benefits, social security taxes, and liability for mal
practice affect the decision to incorporate. Professional corporations
and partnerships of incorporated professionals still face several potential
tax problems, such as reallocation of income, reasonableness of com
pensation, treatment as a sham corporation, personal holding company
status, and the accumulated earnings tax.

Fringe Benefits Equity
According to Thomas P. Brock, the discrimination against small
businesses in the fringe benefit area is a direct result of the distinction
made between incorporated and unincorporated businesses. He presents
statistics on those small businesses affected and interprets their impor
tance to the economy. Brock also reviews the specific differences in tax
treatment of the major types of statutory benefits. His conclusion is that
there is no fundamental justification for the differences. However, the
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degree of control over the provision of the benefit to selected recipients
may provoke suspicion of the motives of sole proprietors. In the case
of a sole proprietorship, it is difficult to separate the owner from the
business entity and therefore difficult to identify the income and expense
related to each.
Brock proposes that percentage limitations be eliminated and any
abuses curbed using the language precluding discrimination in favor of
key persons. The provision of fringe benefit equity would provide a
targeted reduction in income taxes that would significantly help the
small business sector and promote the extension of benefits to small
business employees not currently receiving them. These employees need
such benefits more than most to compensate for the lower wage rates
received by the marginal workers hired by this type of business.

Commentary
The theme for this entire conference was tax equity for small business.
The proposition throughout has been that the tax law treats small
businesses inequitably in comparison to large businesses. The jobs tax
credit papers stress the fact that small business is generally labor
intensive and therefore does not benefit proportionally from capital
investment incentives such as the investment tax credit or rapid capital
recovery schemes. Consequently, they conclude that some form of labor
incentive is needed to offset the impact of the capital incentives. This
seems to be indicative of a common assumption among many econo
mists—and in Congress—that the answer to every problem is for the
government to “do more. ” Society, especially the small business segment,
may be saying that perhaps the government should “do less.” If the
investment tax credit is inequitable, the answer is to provide a jobs tax
credit to offset the inequity. This rationale ignores the fact that the
inequity could be addressed by reducing or eliminating the investment
tax credit. In the political arena it always seems easier to grant new
benefits rather than discontinue old benefits. For many years, more and
more of these new benefits have been provided through the tax law.
This philosophy inevitably leads to more complicated tax laws and
greater government interference in the marketplace.
Two of the groups targeted for assistance are teenagers and the
unskilled. Some view the jobs tax credit primarily as a vehicle for
employee training. Again, the government could provide incentives by
“doing less.” There would be more jobs for youth, and consequently
more training, if the government removed some of the present impedi
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ments to employment. For example, instead of setting an artificial
minimum wage and then allowing a credit to reduce the employer’s cost
below that minimum, the minimum wage could be reduced or eliminated
for teenagers. Also, social security contributions could be waived for
employees below the age of twenty. Such changes would assist small
business and would simplify rather than complicate the paperwork
burden. This would also reduce the inflationary pressures from the
artificial wage structure forced upon employers.
Professor Eisner suggests that the investment tax credit is inflationary
because a $10 million credit motivates a company to pay $100 million
for equipment that may be worth only $95 million. He does not explain
why it is not also inflationary when a $2,000 credit motivates an
employer to pay $10,000 for a worker who is worth only $9,000.
There is little doubt that training is important for the young worker,
and, as Congressman Gibbons pointed out, on-the-job training is often
one of the most effective ways to teach the new worker. Small business
has long accepted its role in providing on-the-job training, but there
are serious questions as to whether the jobs tax credit is an appropriate
incentive. On-the-job training may be viable when the unskilled trainee
is compensated according to the trainee’s value, but it can disrupt
employee morale when senior workers see the new trainee being paid
more than is justified in the market place. Also, there are different
types of training needed. Training in the necessary job skills is quite
different from the equally necessary education in good work habits.
Small business may well be willing to provide training (and retraining)
in the specific job skills needed in the particular firm. However, given
that most new jobs are now provided by small businesses, it seems
inequitable for society, through a targeted jobs tax credit, to impose on
small business the responsibility for instilling in youth the ideas that
workers are expected to show up every day, show up on time, and even
work during the hunting or skiing season.
The three speakers on the jobs tax credit did not agree on some of
the specific features of incentives, such as—
•
•
•
•

Should
Should
Should
Should
tax?

the incentive be targeted or general?
there be a maximum credit for each employer?
it be refundable?
the credit be taken against the income tax or the payroll

Congress is also divided on these same issues. The underlying issue
seems to be whether the purpose of the credit is simply to create jobs
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or to assist particular groups of unemployed people. If the purpose is
to create as many jobs as possible, the credit would be general, without
a maximum, deducted from the payroll tax, and refundable. However,
it was suggested from the audience that the small business community
would really prefer simply abolishing the whole idea of a jobs tax credit.
It is entirely possible that more jobs would be created if Congress
removed some of the obstacles such as the minimum wage and
employment taxes instead of providing complex, illogical assistance to
overcome the obstacles.
The same sentiment was expressed in the discussion of the availability
of capital to small businesses. Tax laws today create obstacles for small
business and also for those doing business with small businesses. If
venture capital is to be available to small business, some of those
barriers discussed by Huntzinger and Harrington should be removed
for both the lender (the investor) and the borrower (the entrepreneur).
The time has come to try the SBPD, which would be an important aid
to small businesses seeking access to venture capital. Hopefully, it can
be structured in such a way as not to be overly complex. This was
included in the 1980 AICPA recommendations and was introduced into
Congress by Congressman Eckart on June 25, 1981, as H.R. 4015.
Tax equity, the central theme of the conference, was emphasized in
the discussions of retirement and other fringe benefits. John Nolan
pointed out that TEFRA will eliminate most of the inequities between
corporate and noncorporate retirement plans, but many of the other
benefits are still much more attractive in the corporate setting than in
the proprietorship or partnership. It is clear that restoration of equity
in the retirement area can be achieved primarily by restricting the
benefits for big business rather than by increasing the benefits for small
business. The small business community must realize that its desire for
equity in other areas may also be met without gains for small business,
but by losses for big business. However, small business and society
may be better off in the long run if that is the result.
The enormous complexity of the tax laws was also emphasized in all
three areas of discussion. While small business has been affected, many
of the tax incentives that gave rise to these complexities have not been
particularly helpful to small business. It has been suggested that the
tax law should be used to benefit small business more than it has in
the past. Many speakers and members of the audience stated that the
present stage of complexity has had—or is likely to have—serious
implications. Small businesses, and most other taxpayers, want both
simplicity and equity. Tax theorists have long held that equity and
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simplicity are not always compatible. It is true that some of the
complexity in our tax law is intended to provide greater equity; however,
much of the complexity today is a result of the many economic and
social incentives and disincentives Congress has built into the tax
structure, which many taxpayers do not view as equitable.
No matter how desirable the investment goal, if Congress elects to
achieve that goal by providing a tax benefit as an incentive for investors,
it is inevitable that wealthy taxpayers who have the most money to
invest will be able to avail themselves of that benefit more than the
middle- or low-income taxpayers. The general public, with substantial
help from the media, is likely to view this as “inequitable.” Elimination
of some of the incentives and disincentives could bring both simplicity
and equity.
Furthermore, the extreme degree of complexity in itself breeds a
feeling of inequity. When a taxpayer does not understand a tax law, it
is easy to assume that others are getting unfair advantages. This can
lead to a lack of confidence in and bitterness toward government and
can motivate taxpayers, including many small entrepreneurs, to either
ignore the law or move into the underground economy to evade the law.
If excessive government involvement saps the vitality of the small
business community or drives it underground, it could seriously impair
our economic and political structures.
In addition to the tax law’s complexity, its continual change is another
serious problem for the small business community. Given time, the
economy, including small business, can adjust to almost any tax law—
even bad law. What presents a greater hardship is the annual (or more
frequent) revisions of the law. Stability in the tax law could be a
worthwhile surrogate for simplification. Congress should realize that
instability can do a great deal to negate the very incentives it is trying
to provide. Many of the investments Congress is attempting to encourage
require time to plan and implement. The incentive to undertake such
an investment is diminished if it is not certain that the incentive will
still be there when the investment is finalized.
While simplifying the tax law is a popular theme both in Congress
and in the small business community, such a goal is not easily achieved.
In almost every instance, there is a strong constituency behind each
major tax provision. Many are eager to simplify the tax law by eliminating
all provisions that do not pertain to them.
There are other, perhaps more formidable, obstacles to simplifying
the tax law. The structure of Congress and the path that a tax bill must
follow before it becomes law make it extremely difficult to get a simple
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tax law. A fairly straightforward bill may be introduced, but by the time
it is modified by the House Ways and Means Committee, the full House,
the Senate Finance Committee, the full Senate, and the Conference
Committee, it is no longer simple and sometimes not even recognizable
as the same bill that started the process. In the case of TEFRA, entirely
new ideas were still being added to the bill even at the Conference
Committee level.

Conclusion
This conference on small business tax equity addressed three important
areas: jobs, venture capital, and retirement and other benefits. Through
out, there were comments on the need for equity between large and
small businesses and between corporations and partnerships and pro
prietorships. There were also several references to the administrative
burden placed on small businesses and the need to exclude smaller
entities from some of the more complex provisions that are relevant
primarily to larger units. Many of the ideas expressed in these papers
provide worthwhile suggestions to aid the AICPA Small Business
Committee and the Federal Taxation Division in their future endeavors.
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KEYNOTE
Conference Address

by George D. Anderson, CPA, Anderson, ZurMuehlen & Co.

I would like to welcome all of you to this conference focusing on the
particular tax problems of small businesses. On September 13, 1982,
an article appeared in The Wall Street Journal entitled “Tax Changes
Could Create Problems for Owners of Small Business/Small Concerns.”
What disturbed me most as I read the article was that this situation is
not a new one. As we have witnessed in the past, authors of tax bills
have been unaware of the effects of tax laws on small business.
This conference is designed to examine possible changes that will
make tax laws more equitable for small business, to explore some of
the problem areas, and to consider alternative policies that might be
implemented. Although interest in small business has increased over
the last few years, in the past, small business as a national group has
been somewhat disorganized. Individual businesses have never been
able to unite and establish common goals, and, thus, have found it
impossible to build a strong organization to represent their interests.
Just a few years ago, we finally realized that 97 percent of the
enterprises in this country are small businesses. They produce 43
percent of the gross national product, employ about 55 percent of the
private work force, and are one of the major sources of new jobs in the
U.S. economy. Small businesses are one of the primary sources of
innovation and invention; huge conglomerates that fund so much research
and development aren’t the only sources of social and technological
advances.
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As these facts became more apparent, many of the small business
associations became more important than they had been in the past.
They acquired more members and more resources. In so doing, they
obtained representation in Congress and in state legislatures, and their
voices finally started to reach the ears of administrators. This culminated
in President Carter’s White House Conference on Small Business, which
brought to Washington representatives of small businesses from all over
the United States. Once the small business people were gathered
together, they realized that many of them shared the same problems
and that if they set common goals and organized their efforts, they
would have a better chance of being heard.
Most of the recommendations of that conference dealt with taxes.
Over one hundred initial recommendations were pared down to fifteen
particular proposals, twelve or thirteen of which pertained to taxes.
While there were also recommendations to design other laws to encourage
small business, the chief concerns were to reduce taxes and to simplify
the tax laws for small business.
The AICPA had already begun to focus interest on small business
before the White House conference. Our membership is made up of
188,000 CPAs throughout the United States: one half in public practice,
the other in industry—including government, education, and many
small businesses. Among CPAs in public practice, small businesses
constitute the bulk of clients. Also, of the 17,000 public practice units
that the AICPA represents, perhaps only between fifty and seventy of
the largest would not themselves be classified as small businesses. Thus,
there is growing interest at the AICPA in helping members in their
practices and in helping them advise their own small business clients.
The AICPA Federal Taxation Division has formed committees to work
on these particular areas. One such group has cosponsored this Small
Business Tax Equity Conference, the Small Business Taxation Subcom
mittee, chaired by William Diss, with the AICPA Small Business
Committee, chaired by Ivan Bull.
Much of the Federal Taxation Division’s committee work has concen
trated on attempting to simplify the Internal Revenue Code. Some of
this effort has come to fruition; recently Congress approved a bill to
simplify the provisions that apply to subchapter S corporations. The
Federal Taxation Division’s committees have done considerable work
in the area of partnership taxation, and, in 1979, the division published
Tax Recommendations to Aid Small Business.
The tax code has been used for two particular purposes: one is, of
course, to raise revenue, the other is to remedy the economic and social
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ills of the nation and sometimes, it seems, of the world. If we were to
concentrate on revenue alone, it would probably be easy. A flat tax, a
sales tax, or a value-added tax would all easily raise revenue. These
particular taxes, however, do not lend themselves to solving social and
economic problems.
When Congress and the administration use tax laws to address
somewhat nebulous social and economic problems, the laws become
very complicated. Complex mechanisms to hit these particular targets
tend to be more theoretical than practical. In addition, many political
considerations enter into the writing of tax legislation. When those who
write laws start thinking about economics and sociology and compound
their strategies with political concerns, they fail to recognize the practical
problems that will occur when the law is applied to real business
situations.
Although in many cases the law may offer advantages to business,
generally it may be too complicated for small business to understand
and comply with. Big businesses, on the other hand, have people on
their staffs who work on nothing but complex areas of the tax law, and
they are capable of taking advantage of the breaks that are written into
the law. For the most part, small businesses must rely on outside
consultants, and consultants are expensive. Furthermore, in less service
intensive areas such as my own state of Montana, experts are sometimes
unobtainable. As a result, the small businessman looks for part-time
experts and utilizes part-time help to solve what is probably a full-time
problem.
One overall solution as far as the small business person and the
country are concerned would be to repeal all business taxes, tax only
individuals and consumers, and permit businesses to retain earnings
that they need for regular operations and expansion. However, I am not
so naive as to think that this could come about politically. We will
probably keep the present tax system because government has no more
efficient tool to simultaneously raise revenue and deal with social and
economic problems.
Through conferences such as this, I hope that we will stimulate small
business to address some of these problems themselves as well as press
for legislative assistance and simplication of tax laws.
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Jobs Formation
Through
Small Business
Incentives

WHY JOBS TAX
CREDITS HAVE FAILED
by Marvin J. Dickman, CPA, Arthur Andersen & Co.

High unemployment rates have troubled Congress for years, and in its
attempts to reduce unemployment, the federal government has often
utilized the tax law. Several provisions in the Internal Revenue Code
have provided for tax credits to employers who increase their work
force. In 1971, the Work Incentive (WIN) credit was enacted to provide
tax relief for employers who hired members of families receiving Aid
for Dependent Children or persons in training under a WIN program.
The New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC), which came into existence in 1977,
allowed a tax break for employers who hired any new employee. One
year later, the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) was enacted to provide
a tax credit to employers who hired members of certain hard-to-employ
groups.
To date, none of the three tax credits has been particularly successful
for a variety of reasons. The WIN credit was not used by employers
largely because they did not know of it, and those employers who had
knowledge of the credit were confused by the simultaneous existence
of the NJTC. The NJTC was unsuccessful because of a lack of awareness
by employers as well as the complexity of the provisions. Even those
employers who were aware of the credit made little or no conscious
effort to change their employment policies. Finally, the TJTC, as it
existed between 1978 and 1981, failed for three reasons. First, the tax
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savings generated from the credit were not large enough to induce
employers to alter their hiring practices. Second, employers perceived
as too high the costs of screening applicants for the credit, training
targeted-group members, and defending themselves against potential
discrimination charges. Third, and most important, employers feared
government contact. They feared potential tax audits and government
“red tape” and generally felt reluctant to become involved with the
government.
The discussion that follows explores the reasons for the failure of the
NJTC and the TJTC. To be successful in reducing unemployment, a
credit must be structured and administered in such a way as to directly
affect the hiring patterns of employers. Neither credit accomplished this
because neither successfully dealt with either the actual or perceived
difficulties listed above.

Background and Purpose of Employment
Tax Credits
Before the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977 was enacted
in May of that year, the Senate Select Committee on Small Business
held public hearings. Various speakers outlined what they felt were
changes necessary to help small businesses and to reduce unemployment.
The Carter administration had proposed an increase in the investment
tax credit or a rebate of 4 percent of an employer’s share of FICA taxes.
Small business organizations thought that neither of these proposals
would have a significant impact on unemployment nor help small
businesses. Bruce Fielding of the National Federation of Independent
Business noted that small companies accounted for over 95 percent of
all businesses in the United States and that generally these small
businesses were labor intensive. Accordingly, his organization preferred
the creation of an employment tax credit that would provide a large
enough incentive to encourage small employers to hire and that would
ease the cash flow problems of small firms.1 Large firms, which were
generally capital intensive, were deemed to be the primary beneficiaries
of the investment tax credit. Additional investment tax credits would
be of little benefit to small businesses. According to Mr. Fielding the
investment tax credit would have to be graduated in order to have any
effect on small businesses. In his opinion, such an alternative was less
favorable than an employment tax credit.
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Milton Stewart, president of the National Small Business Association,
generally concurred with Fielding. He advocated an experiment using
an employment tax credit to create jobs directly, rather than indirectly
by capital formation.2
Prior to the enactment of the NJTC, the only other tax provision
designed specifically to stimulate increased employment had been the
WIN credit. Because of lack of knowledge of the program, low availability
of qualified workers among the target population, and strict “recapture”
rules, very few employers had utilized the WIN credit.3 The NJTC was
added by the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977 to directly
confront the problem of the high unemployment rate.
This credit amounted to 50 percent of the increase in each employer’s
wage base (as determined by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act) above
102 percent of the wage base in the previous year. No deduction was
allowed for the portion of wages claimed as a credit. In addition to
several adjustments to the definition of “wages” for purposes of the
credit, there were five other limitations that might have applied before
a taxpayer could determine the amount of the credit he could claim.
1. The maximum credit any taxpayer could claim in a calendar year
was $100,000. For partners, subchapter S corporation sharehold
ers, and beneficiaries of trusts or estates, the limitations applied
twice, first to the entity and then to the taxpayer.4
2. The credit could not exceed the difference between the total
current-year wages and 105 percent of the total wages paid during
the preceding year.
3. All members of a controlled group were treated as a single
employer.

4. The credit was limited to tax liability reduced by most other
credits.
5. When the credit was “passed through” to a taxpayer, another
limitation was imposed and another calculation was necessary.
Congress, believing that the unemployment rate had declined suffi
ciently, decided that it was appropriate to focus employment incentives
on those individuals who had high unemployment rates even when the
national unemployment rate was low and on other employment groups
with special employment needs. Congress therefore decided to allow
the NJTC to expire as scheduled at the end of 1978 and to design a
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new provision as an incentive to private employers to hire individuals
in seven target groups, which consisted of—
1. Vocational rehabilitation referrals—persons who had a physical
or mental disability and were enrolled in rehabilitation programs.
2. Economically disadvantaged youths between eighteen and twentyfive years of age who were members of economically disadvantaged
families.
3. Economically disadvantaged Vietnam veterans.
4. Individuals who received supplementary security benefits.

5. General assistance recipients.
6. Cooperative education students between sixteen and twenty years
of age who had not graduated from high school and were members
of economically disadvantaged families. (This incorporates a
change made by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 [ERTA].)
7. Economically disadvantaged ex-convicts.
Because Congress believed that the TJTC had been sufficiently
promising, ERTA extended the credit, which was due to expire at the
end of 1981. In addition, ERTA added two new targeted groups:
involuntarily terminated CETA employees and WIN employees. These
groups were added because the CETA program had been terminated
and the WIN credit had been eliminated.

Evaluation of the NJTC
The new NJTC and the TJTC had been designed to alleviate the
unemployment problem. The NJTC was intended to promote employment
of all groups, whereas the TJTC was intended to promote employment
among specific groups.
As mentioned, there were several limitations on the amount that
could be claimed under the NJTC. Taken separately, the limits seemed
generally reasonable. For instance, the 8100,000 limit on the credit
assured that large businesses with the ability and resources to train new
employees did not benefit “excessively” from the credit. The limit of
the increase of the current year’s wages over 105 percent of the prior
year’s wages assured that employers would not convert year-round
employees to seasonal workers. The apportionment of the credit between
members of a controlled group prevented multiple corporations under
common control from circumventing the other limitations. But the
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limitations, when taken as a whole, resulted in a complicated set of
rules that were difficult for employers to understand and administer.
The difficulties employers had with the rules were recognized by
various commentators. One concluded, “Undoubtedly, Congress in
tended the various restrictions on its use as a means of limiting its
applicability as well as its abuse; what is unclear is the extent to which
the limitations and restrictions on the availability of the credit defeat
the use of the credit as an employment incentive.”5
In a written statement to the Senate Finance Committee, Emil Sunley,
deputy assistant secretary of the Treasury for tax policy, mentioned the
complexity of the law. “Each of the quantitative tests that are in the
present credit has a defensible purpose . . . but taken together, the
complexities of the present credit and the consequent uncertainties and
compliance burdens have resulted in what appears to be a very ineffective
jobs stimulus program.”6
Another problem that decreased the effectiveness of the NJTC was
the fact that most employers did not know about the credit. Addressing
the lack of employer awareness, Mr. Sunley went on to say that “most
employers were not aware of the jobs credit even after its first full year
had passed. Most who were aware of the credit and thought they were
qualified, reported that they had made no conscious effort to change
their employment policy because of the credit.”7 (emphasis added)
This contention was supported empirically in a study done by Jeffrey
Perloff and Michael Wachter of the University of Pennsylvania.8 These
researchers found that relatively few businesses knew about and
responded to the NJTC. Only 27.3 percent of the companies with nine
or less employees knew about the credit compared with 89.1 percent
of the companies with over 500 employees. Furthermore, of those who
knew about the credit, only 6.1 percent said they made a conscious
effort to increase employment, and 5 percent said that the credit was
“too troublesome to pursue.” The Treasury Department’s own statistics
supported these opinions.
The following table indicates that small corporations (those with assets
of less than $250,000) accounted for over 69 percent of corporate
taxpayers, but only 6.6 percent of these businesses took advantage of
the credit. However, 43.4 percent of corporations with assets over $250
million claimed the credit.
In testimony presented on behalf of the AICPA, William T. Diss
noted several problems resulting from the use of a tax credit mechanism.9
Among these, the hiring incentive to a prospective employer was
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regressive: the higher the marginal tax bracket, the lower the benefit of
the credit. Additionally, artificial state taxable income was created for
employers in states where taxable income is defined by reference to the
Internal Revenue Code.

Evaluation of the TJTC
The TJTC, enacted in 1978 and implemented in 1979, provided a 50
percent reduction in after-tax costs of the first $6,000 of wages paid to
target group employees in the first year of employment regardless of the
employer’s tax bracket, so long as the employer had sufficient taxable
income to use the credit. In the second year of employment the credit
provided a 25 percent reduction in after-tax costs of the first $6,000 of
qualified wages. Unused credits could be carried back three years and
forward seven (now fifteen) years.
The groups eligible for the TJTC have changed over time. In 1981
the targeted groups were expanded by adding recipients of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), registrants under the WIN
program, and CETA workers whose jobs had been terminated by recent
budget cuts. ERTA also restricted the eligibility of cooperative education
students to those who are economically disadvantaged. Until 1981,
retroactive certification of existing employees was permitted. Retroactive
certification was eliminated because it permitted employers to file for
the credit long after hiring a particular employee.
The TJTC was intended to achieve a number of goals by providing a
financial incentive for employers to hire individuals from groups that
were at a competitive disadvantage on the labor market because of
limited work experience, poverty backgrounds, physical handicaps, or
other factors that tended to put them low among employer hiring
preferences.10 Ideally, the tax credit should have enhanced the ability
of employment agencies to place target group members in jobs, and it
should have induced some employers to expand employment.11 Since
little money was available for the program’s administration (Congress
appropriated no funds and only $14 million in Title III discretionary
funds were made available for the fiscal year 1980) the workload was
spread across a number of government agencies.12 In addition to issuing
all certifications, the Employment Service was to play a central
coordinating role, encouraging other vouchering agencies to participate.13
At the same time, the Employment Service and CETA Prime Sponsors
were to increase their cooperative efforts in vouchering and marketing
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to develop a unified marketing strategy.14 The process of implementing
the TJTC required cooperation between a variety of local agencies that
had worked together only occasionally and sometimes had faced each
other with hostility and suspicion.15
Several studies have been undertaken to evaluate the effectiveness
of the TJTC. The Mershon Center at Ohio State University issued a
four-part report entitled The Implementation of the Targeted Jobs Tax
Credit, which covered the period from July 1980 to July 1981. It found
that the success of the TJTC was inhibited by employers’ attitudes and
problems in the administration of the credit program.

Employers’ Attitudes
Two prevailing attitudes worked together to dissuade employers from
availing themselves of the credit: the tax savings were not large enough
to induce employers to alter their hiring practices, and employers
perceived that the cost of hiring target group members was very high.16
Objectively, the tax benefits received from the TJTC decreased as the
taxpayer moved into higher tax brackets because the deductible wages
had to be reduced by the amount of the credit. This fact, coupled with
the employers’ perception of decreased rather than increased produc
tivity, made the credit appear not worthwhile in terms of a cost-benefit
analysis.
Another factor that prevented employers from using the credit was
the lack of tax liability.17 If a firm had a small liability, it may not have
wanted to bother with the TJTC program. Further, since the TJTC
reduced tax liability after almost all other credits were applied, there
may have been no tax liability and, thus, no tax savings. Although the
credit was available for carryforward, employers with low profit or loss
projections for the near future may have been hesitant to avail themselves
of the credit.
According to the Mershon Center study, however, both employers
and TJTC implementors agreed that the single most important reason
why many employers refused to participate in the TJTC was “fear” of
the government.18 This finding was further supported by the California
Employment Development Department’s survey of its employer adviser
groups. The fear of government was expressed in various ways: fear of
“red tape,” fear of government intrusion into hiring decisions, fear of
IRS audits, and fear of being treated like a federal contractor. This was
a major barrier to generating employer participation in TJTC. These
qualitative fears interacted with the quantitative facts of particular
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situations, making employers believe that the costs of hiring the targeted
groups far exceeded the potential tax savings.19 Even if an employer
has little fear of the government, he may feel that the cost of inefficient
contact with the government necessary to claim the credit exceeds the
value of the credit.20
A third problem employers faced in implementing the TJTC was the
difficulty of altering hiring practices.21 Employers reported to the Mershon
Center researchers that, from their perspective, screening job applicants
for TJTC eligibility may have been a violation of fair hiring practices
and could have exposed them to lawsuits from disappointed applicants.
Furthermore, screening applicants for eligibility required an understand
ing of the TJTC and a commitment from personnel people.22
The problem of screening applicants and employees for TJTC eligibility
has been turned over to separate firms who sell this service to employers.
But, employers have some problems with this method. Many do not
want their hiring practices influenced by a tax credit, and paying for
the screening service added additional costs.23

Agency Attitudes
The administration of the TJTC has also deterred its effectiveness. The
responsibility for successful operation of the credit was spread among
various administering agencies, and one obstacle preventing effective
operation has been confusion among these agencies.24
The administrative burden placed on agencies responsible for suc
cessful implementation of the TJTC was extremely heavy. The agencies
had to locate eligible persons and document their eligibility. Documen
tation of the “economically disadvantaged” groups was particularly
difficult for the agencies.25 The vouchering and certification process
also took time. Most important, employers had to be made aware of the
benefits of the credit through marketing efforts. The TJTC implementors
have judged that mass marketing has not been very effective and have
turned to time-consuming, face-to-face marketing efforts.26
Furthermore, the availability of the credit has not necessarily increased
the productivity of the placement agencies. Most employers have wanted
their current employees certified retroactively as permitted prior to
ERTA.27 This was time-consuming and did not make the agency look
more productive in helping applicants find work. Because of the various
time costs associated with the TJTC, some agencies minimized their
efforts in making it work.28
Other problems in the system established to implement the TJTC
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included the number of agencies involved, the confusion of agency
responsibility, and the variation in vouchering procedures among
agencies.29 The Employment Service was given responsibility for coor
dinating the marketing and implementation of the credit, but it was not
given the authority necessary to carry out this responsibility.30 The
administrative structure to implement the credit was poorly designed.
Local Employment Service offices could try to coordinate the efforts of
the other vouchering agencies in their area, but because the other
agencies reported to offices above them in their own organizations and
not to the Employment Service, the authority was reduced.31 Even when
state Employment Service offices negotiated cooperative arrangements
with the other vouchering agencies at the state level, the arrangements
were usually too vague to have much meaning at the local level.32 All
this resulted in confusion among the organizations.
The Mershon Center concluded that the uncoordinated nature of the
TJTC delivery system had at least two consequences. First, there was
not much sense of responsibility for the TJTC on the part of the various
vouchering agencies because it was not clear who was in charge. Second,
vouchering procedures varied across the designated agencies, and
employers were faced with what they perceived to be a complicated
array of forms. Employers were then forced to combine the forms and
develop their own questionnaire for screening applicants.33
Failure to provide significant funding for implementation of the TJTC
reflected an underestimation of the extent to which bureaucracies resist
change.34 The Mershon Center found that TJTC managers in the
vouchering agencies supported the credit and wanted to see it imple
mented, expecting at least some increase in placements, but at the level
where vouchering and job development were carried out, support for
TJTC was almost totally absent. For the lower levels, the vouchering
process was just additional work for which they received no reward.35
Job developers were not motivated because most of the certifications
were retroactive.
Several other findings regarding the TJTC should be noted.
The design for the administration of the credit provided that workers
were to receive vouchers once an agency had determined a worker’s
eligibility as a targeted-group member. When the vouchered worker
sought work, he could show his voucher to the employer and, assumedly,
enhance his chances of being hired. Once hired, the employer was to
complete the voucher and send it to the state Employment Service
Agency. The agency would send back a certification, which verified the
employer’s right to claim the credit.
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What happened in practice (before the ERTA changes) was that a
firm asked the Employment Service to determine the eligibility of the
firm’s current work force and to provide the necessary certification. This
resulted in what might be termed “windfalls” to employers who, without
altering employment patterns, claimed the TJTC. Mershon found that
approximately two-thirds of all certifications were retroactive.36 The
later enactment of ERTA eliminated retroactive certification.
Second, most vouchering and certifying was concentrated in the two
youth target groups: economically disadvantaged youths and students
in cooperative education. Those groups accounted for approximately
four-fifths of all certifications.37
A third finding was that marketing activity for the credit had been
decreasing, mainly because the funds were not available. Also, the
effectiveness of marketing efforts was questioned.38

Summary
None of the three employment tax credits has been particularly
successful. Employers generally did not know about the existence of
the WIN credit, and those who were aware of it were confused by the
simultaneous existence of the NJTC. The complexity of the provisions
of the NJTC made it difficult to work with, and again employers were
generally unaware of its existence. Those employers who were aware of
the credit did not change their employment policies. The TJTC has also
failed because it did not achieve any of the three objectives of an
employment credit. It did not provide adequate financial incentive to
employers to alter their hiring patterns. It did not have the attribute of
simple administration. Finally, it did not permit the employer to obtain
its benefits without an increase, or a potential increase, in his contact
with government agencies.
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THE ECONOMICS OF AN
EFFECTIVE JOBS TAX
CREDIT
by Robert Eisner, Ph.D.,

William R. Kenan Professor of Economics,

Northwestern University

My interests in employment tax credits, I confess, stem from my
jaundiced view of tax subsidies to business investments, which are
difficult to support on grounds of economic efficiency or equity. They
distort the allocation of resources, inducing business investment for tax
benefits where it would not be justified by real economic advantage.
And tax subsidies to business investments offer their major, overwhelm
ing advantage to capital-intensive, big business.
Subsidies to employment should offer quite a different picture to the
objective analyst. There may be no good reason to give a business a
$10 million tax credit to induce it to spend $100 million on new
equipment that would be worth only $95 million without the tax
advantage. However, there may be good reason for the government to
encourage businesses to hire more workers. The difference between
employment incentives and investment incentives pertains to the essen
tial nature of labor markets, which are far from perfect. Until recently,
most economists have paid too little attention to those imperfections.
One must focus on our currently high unemployment rate, now at
peaks unmatched since the Great Depression of the 1930s. I trust that
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by now those who would view unemployment as somehow the “natural”
outcome of free choice in a situation of general equilibrium have
abandoned their position or have been thoroughly discredited. A great
deal of the current unemployment is clearly the result of a general
deficiency of aggregate demand, the Keynesian unemployment that so
many had wished to call dead along with its namesake.
This Keynesian unemployment should hardly come as a surprise. It
is the direct result of government policies—unwise in my opinion—that
have been directed at reducing inflation by creating slack in the
economy. Rigid restriction of growth rates of monetary reserves has
brought on extremely high real rates of interest. Fiscal policy, as
appropriately measured in terms of an adjusted high employment budget,
has actually been tighter than realized, despite large and growing current
budget deficits. These factors and the recession they have generated
have greatly depressed both investment and employment.
Measured unemployment, now almost 10 percent of the labor force,
understates substantially the economically relevant nonemployment in
our economy. Nonemployment must include much of another 5 percent
part-time for economic reasons, those who have dropped out of the labor
force as “discouraged workers,” and those who have not entered the
labor force because the prospects of satisfactory jobs appear too slim.
Increasing aggregate effective demand for goods and services would
bring about a major reduction in current rates of unemployment. But
long before such increases eliminated unemployment, they would
generate increasing rates of inflation, which would widely be viewed as
unacceptable. Economists have searched for a “non-accelerating inflation
rate of unemployment” (NAIRU), in the notion that reduction of
unemployment below such a rate would generate increasing inflation.
Getting unemployment below this rate, which many economists put as
high as 6 and even 7 percent, would require measures that go beyond
general, expansionary fiscal and monetary policy, such as employment
tax credits and subsidies.

General Principles and Rationale of an
Employment Credit
If labor markets were all perfect and labor were homogeneous, we could
imagine one supply curve for all of labor in which the supply of workers
was a function of the real wage and the demand for workers a function
of the marginal productivity of labor. There would be no involuntarily
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unemployed in the sense that those not working would consist exclusively
of individuals who had decided that they preferred not to work, in view
of their own personal preferences and the general productivity of labor,
which determines the real wage.
In the real world, labor is quite heterogeneous. Individuals of different
ages, sexes, races, education, training, and experience, as well as
different location and selling power, appear to employers to have
different potential values and find quite different and frequently variable
prospects for employment. Many individuals, indeed millions, do not
appear to potential employers to be of sufficient value to warrant payment
of wages as high as customary rates of pay, minimum wage rates,
alternatives available on “welfare” or unemployment benefits, or what
would be necessary to induce potential workers to give up their
alternatives to employment.
At any moment of time there are millions not employed because they
literally cannot “find” a job where employers consider them worth
hiring. Likewise, employers who might consider them worth hiring
cannot find them. Much of the problem relates to uncertainty caused
by a lack of information. A prospective employee might turn out to be
worth hiring, but the potential employer does not know or cannot be
sure. Furthermore, if the youngster with no significant previous expe
rience turns out, once he is trained, to be worthwhile, there is nothing
to stop him from taking his new experience and ability to another
employer. The first employer meets the break-in costs but does not
secure the benefits even when the gamble pays off.
Thus, we have a clear divergence between the individual self-interest,
which must guide a competitive firm, and the interests of all firms in
general or of society, which is to see people in productive labor of their
choice rather than idle or on “welfare.”
An employment tax credit or subsidy can bridge the gap between
what the potential labor of the unemployed is worth to society and what
it is worth to individual employers. That gap is made all the more
substantial by our welfare programs. It is worthwhile for society to pay
$6,000 in subsidies or tax credits to induce gainful employment rather
than pay the same amount in welfare aid or unemployment benefits.
The beauty of employment subsidies is that they offer the promise of
increasing employment while lowering costs and stemming inflation.
Raising employment by increasing Pentagon purchases of goods and
services or by cutting income taxes to increase private purchases will,
under certain circumstances, raise prices and inflation. But inducing
increases in employment by lowering labor costs will reduce upward
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pressure on prices. Relative effects upon employment, output, wages,
and prices will indeed depend upon shapes of supply and demand
functions and the productivity of labor, but, with plausible assumptions,
employment subsidies offer the opportunity to increase employment
while reducing inflation.
Just how much may be accomplished will depend on both these
relevant supply and demand functions and the particular forms taken
by the employment subsidies. It is important that programs be devised
and policies be adopted that will do more than chum unemployment.
It is hardly optimal to give jobs to some at the expense of others. Nor
do we wish to increase employment in one period at the expense of
more unemployment in another. We wish to expand employment and
output. No programs and policies are foolproof, and measures to increase
employment will prove to be no exception. But there are policies that
can and will work, which, indeed, in some instances have worked. It
is to their consideration and analysis we shall now turn.
It is easy to see the gains from an effective jobs tax credit in terms
of tax savings to firms and income to new workers. From society’s point
of view, the net social benefit is the added market output resulting from
higher employment minus the value of whatever leisure or nonmarket
production is lost as a consequence of additional time spent working.
This, however, is only one dimension. An added dimension is the future
output that may be produced out of the human capital achieved by job
experience and the opening of future opportunities. Of course, if
alternatives to work involve crime, illness, or other consequences costly
to society, the benefits of additional employment are greater still.
Effective job tax credits, unlike investment credits and accelerated
capital cost recovery systems, will tend to help small business, which
is generally relatively labor intensive, more than large business, which
tends to be capital intensive. The social cost of unemployment is such,
however, that our dominant purpose in devising a jobs tax credit should
be to increase employment, not to help any particular set of firms or
groups within the economy other than the unemployed themselves. Jobs
tax credits, therefore, should in no way be restricted to small business,
although small business would inevitably be a major beneficiary of
effective credits.
Similarly, unemployment is proportionately greater among the poor,
the young, blacks, and women. Effective measures to increase employ
ment will inevitably favor these groups, but I would not restrict
employment-increasing measures to those groups that have been hardest
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hit in the past. Again, I would increase employment and reduce
unemployment wherever possible.
Given fiscal limitations as well as the public’s sense of equity, jobs
tax credits should be devised to have maximum “bang for the buck,”
to focus on incentive effects rather than reductions in total tax payments.
With these considerations in mind, there is much to be said for a
marginal tax credit such as that in the New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) in
effect in 1977 and 1978. The restriction to a base as high as 102
percent of previous employment is, however, too high. It makes immune
to the incentives very many businesses, particularly in a recession
period, that can have no reasonable hope of reaching the threshold at
which the credit would become effective. A high threshold tied to
previous employment offers the further danger of encouraging variation
in employment rather than long-term increases; employers might be
encouraged merely to reduce employment every other year in order to
increase it each following year.
Narrow targeting of jobs tax credits may be ineffective if not
counterproductive over a considerable period of time. If those in targeted
groups, collectively and individually, form only small portions of the
labor force, actual or potential, it is likely to prove inordinately costly
for employers to seek them out. To the extent such groups are stigmatized,
potential employers may be even less willing to hire individuals who
belong to them.

Previous Attempts to Subsidize
Employment
There have been many scattered and sometimes abortive efforts in the
United States to subsidize employment; their record confirms these
analytical considerations and shows us how best to proceed.
First, a number of studies suggested that the NJTC, despite its
limitations, did significantly increase employment. A major problem
during its short life was the lack of information about its existence.
Perhaps out of the Carter administration’s hostility—it was pushed
through Congress over the administration’s opposition—or perhaps due
to the improbability of expecting the Treasury to push a campaign to
show business how to use a provision of the tax code to reduce taxes,
many businesses never learned of the credit or learned of it only after
the period of employment it was intended to stimulate. Since studies
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suggest a significant impact among those businesses that knew of the
credit in time, one may conjecture that the stimulus would have been
all the greater with properly devised, permanent legislation, of which
employers would have become informed.
The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) had funds for providing publicity
to employers, but the nine groups targeted until 1982, with one
conspicuous exception, were too narrow, too unappealing, or too difficult
to reach to generate much employer recruitment. That major exception
was economically disadvantaged youth between the ages of sixteen and
nineteen participating in cooperative education programs. The active
participation of schools and the joint undertaking of responsibility in
the recruitment of student-worker participants has apparently proved
effective and successful. The TJTC will probably also prove to be
effective for the new target group of “summer youth”—that is, those
economically disadvantaged who are sixteen or seventeen years of age
working during any ninety-day period between May 1 and September
15. This credit would appear indeed to be surprisingly generous—85
percent of up to $3,000 of wages paid for services during this period.
To the extent that narrow targeting can be effective in stimulating
employment within the targeted groups, it runs a particular risk of
substituting employment in the targeted groups for employment of others.
Where a major criterion of group membership is, as under the targeted
employment tax credit, household income “less than 70 percent of the
applicable regional lower income standard,” there is further danger that
the credit will contribute to a lowering of household income. Existing
income earners may be encouraged to leave the household or to quit
their jobs to make others in the household subject to the credit.

An Illustrative Employment Subsidy
Program
Strong economic arguments can be made for a jobs tax credit more
broadly targeted at all of those who want jobs. This might have some
special focus on youth, where unemployment is most widespread, and
on others where special assistance seems warranted. The following
package illustrates some underlying principles for a new employment
subsidy program.

1. For net additions to employment beyond 95 percent of employment
in 1981, offer a 50 percent tax credit of up to the amount of
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average unemployment insurance benefits (currently $116 per
week) for—
•
•

•

Those unemployed five weeks or more.
Those under the age of twenty without jobs and less than one
year of prior employment.
Those seeking employment after being out of the labor market
due to child-rearing.

• Those seeking civilian employment after being out of the
civilian labor force due to military service.

2. For all others, offer a similar credit, modelled after the NJTC,
for increases in employment over that in 1981. (Unlike with the
NJTC, there would be no limitation of $100,000 or any other
amount for the credit to be received by each individual employer.)
3. Have the Treasury pay payroll taxes out of general revenues for
those under the age of twenty.
4. Relate the tax credit to the payroll tax rather than corporate or
individual income taxes. Have the Treasury make contributions
to the social security funds corresponding to the credits.

The threshold of 95 percent of 1981 employment for employer
eligibility for the credit for workers in special categories would focus
on these targeted groups. The general eligibility pertaining to employment
beyond 100 percent of 1981 figures would mitigate the danger of
increasing employment within the special groups at the expense of
others.
The targeting of those unemployed for five weeks or more has some
special appeal as well as some obvious dangers. By focusing directly
on those suffering significantly more than frictional unemployment, it
offers the promise of a direct cure, similar to heat-seeking missiles or
drugs designed to find and destroy cancer cells while leaving the rest
of the body undamaged.
However, one must recognize the danger of “moral hazard,” partic
ularly the possibility that workers will find it appealing to enjoy brief
periods of unemployment that will in turn make them more attractive
to employers. Similarly, under my proposal employers may contribute
to short-term unemployment by spuming those unemployed less than
five weeks. I am not convinced that these difficulties are overwhelming.
For most workers, unemployment benefits would not be a preferred
substitute to available employment. Most employers would prefer the
efficiency of having long-term employees as opposed to regularly
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substituting them with the short-term unemployed. And various admin
istrative safeguards might well be introduced to reduce cheating and
undesirable fallout from this provision.
Elimination of social security payroll taxes for teenagers may well be
justified on grounds of equity as well as encouraging the employment
of youth. Under our current social security laws, contributions by the
young most certainly entail a singularly poor benefit-contribution ratio.
Even with greater longevity, disproportionately fewer numbers of those
who will begin work at an early age live long enough to receive major
portions of their benefits. And the present value of expected future
benefits for a teenager must in any event be very low.
Tying the tax credit to the payroll tax would make it effective for the
very large numbers of small companies that do not have business income
tax liabilities. It would also make it effective for nonprofit institutions
and ideally, as well, state and local government bodies and school
districts that participate in the social security system. Our purpose, we
must recall, is to increase employment, not to help any particular group
of employers. Nonprofit institutions such as schools, colleges, univer
sities, and hospitals as well as governmental units can prove to be
particularly flexible employers, less pressed by cyclical profit concerns.
Generally, tying the tax credit to payroll taxes rather than to business
income taxes will offer a better opportunity for the direct reduction of
labor costs, which can make jobs tax credits an ideal tool for combating
both unemployment and inflation.

Qualifications
A number of side effects must be recognized in any sober consideration
of jobs tax credits. First, they can be expected to have some effects
upon wages. Specifically, wage rates of target groups should rise. This
in itself is probably a desired boon to the predominantly lower-income
individuals where the incidence of unemployment is greatest. Where
the minimum wage proves a barrier to employment, employment subsidies
can neatly finesse the issue by keeping marginal labor costs to the
employer below the minimum wage while raising the return to the worker
above it.
For those outside of a target group eligible for the credit, however,
wages may fall. The demand for the services of nontargeted workers
may be reduced as employers direct themselves to workers for whom
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they can receive the subsidies. The consequences may well include
reduced employment among the nontarget groups.
It is therefore important that any system of jobs tax credits be
accompanied by a general policy of maintaining employment. Significant
credits focussed on target groups should be complemented with some
incentives to prevent nontarget groups from falling back. Also, it would
be dangerous for jobs tax credits to be accompanied by higher taxes
elsewhere or by tight money policies that will reduce overall demand
and contribute to general unemployment, or both.
A second side effect of an effective jobs tax credit may be increased
employment through increases in the labor force rather than reductions
in unemployment. The employment subsidies may induce some youth
to quit school in order to take jobs now available. They may induce
some women to leave home and nonmarket activity to work in the
marketplace. Since neither youth in school nor women working at home
are counted as unemployed, the job subsidies may increase employment
more than they decrease unemployment, and the increases in employment
may be accompanied by reductions in other useful activities as well as
leisure.
Third, increases in employment generated by jobs subsidies will
increase aggregate demand, output, saving and investment, tax revenues,
and other employment. New workers will spend much of their additional
income, thus contributing to purchasing power for other output as well
as their own. This will stimulate employment generally and tend to
reduce the adverse side effects on other employment and wages suggested
above.
Fourth, effective jobs subsidies may increase employment and output
but raise output less than employment, thereby reducing labor produc
tivity, particularly at the margin. There is, after all, some presumption
that workers hired because of a subsidy are less productive; otherwise
they would have been hired without the subsidy. With higher long-run
employment and a higher labor-to-capital ratio, we may expect produc
tivity per worker to be lower. The bottom line, however, should be
recognized as output per capita and not output per worker. In that
sense, despite any decline in measured productivity, we will all generally
be better off.
Fifth, there are a number of long-run consequences of employment
subsidies. If they are limited in time, as in the TJTC, or related to
increases in employment, as in the NJTC, a number of questions arise.
What do we do for an encore? What happens to workers after their
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eligibility expires? What happens when a firm reaches the limit of its
expansion capabilities? The answer must lie in the not unrealistic
expectation that workers initially hired on the basis of tax credits will
in a reasonable period of time acquire the job experience, skills,
motivation, and human capital that make them desirable employees at
prevailing wages without the subsidies. There can be no guarantee that
this will always be true, but if it is true for a significant portion of those
affected, the benefits of well-devised employment subsidies will be long
term indeed.
Sixth, any system of jobs tax credits, however well devised, must
inevitably involve significant amounts of leakage and waste. Employers
will take advantage of the credit to hire workers that they would have
hired anyway. Workers will find themselves in greater demand and with
higher wages, as the result of the credit, for jobs that they would have
been offered and would have accepted at lower wages without the credit.
It is important that the public accept these consequences, whether they
find them desirable or not, and recognize the net benefit of the increased
employment and output, now and in the future, which results.

Conclusion
While the possibility of devising and implementing effective employment
subsidies is enormously appealing, it would be foolish to oversell them.
They are no panacea. They present a number of difficulties in imple
mentation and administration. Much of hard core unemployment and
nonparticipation of the labor force, will require more far-reaching
intervention. There are many who lack the skills, ability, education and
training, ambition, and motivation that would make them employable
even at credits of 100 percent and more. Employers will essentially not
want them at any price.
Solutions here must be found in terms of comprehensive training,
counselling, family support, and provision of new living arrangements
where households have ceased to function in any acceptable fashion. If
the armed forces can recruit two million youth, cannot the government
institute a complementary nonmilitary program that would combine
training and preparation for private and public employment?
Reducing the scourge of unemployment must be a joint undertaking
of government and of the private sector, where the great bulk of
employment in our economy is to be found. In that undertaking, a wellconceived, far-reaching, and ambitious program of employment subsidies
can play a major role.
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A SMALL BUSINESS
JOBS TAX CREDIT
by Frank S. Swain, Esq.,

Chief Counsel for Advocacy, Small Business

Administration, and

George Guttman, Esq., Formerly Counsel for Tax Analysis, Office of
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration

When one looks at the small business sector, a characteristic that is
immediately apparent is the degree to which it is labor intensive. Small
business uses in abundance our nation’s most precious resource, our
people—their ideas and skills.1 Studies have indicated that small
businesses account for a significant amount of training for the unskilled
and those newly entering the job force.
In his study, “Human Capital Transfer From Small to Large Business,”
Bradley R. Schiller explores the extent to which small businesses
provide early work experience and training opportunities—67 percent
of all male workers get their first steady job in companies with fewer
than 100 employees. While small companies pay lower initial wages,
they offer faster wage growth, which helps to reduce the pay gap over
time. When workers move from small companies to larger ones they get
substantial first-year pay increases (an average of 23 percent). These
pay premiums partially reflect the skills development provided by the
initial small employer.2

The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Reagan
administration or those of the Small Business Administration.
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Alternatively, when one looks closely at the Internal Revenue Code,
one sees that it strongly emphasizes providing incentives for capital
investments. Legislation in past years has continued this bias by
strengthening existing provisions and creating new ones that provide
additional incentives for capital investments, such as the safe-harbor
leasing provision enacted by section 201 of the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 (ERTA).3 To the extent that small businesses engage in
capital investments, they also receive regular and special benefits, such
as immediate expensing of some capital expenditures. However, ex
penditures for labor inputs are a significantly greater factor for small
businesses than are capital investments.
In 1976, as part of the planning for an economic stimulus package,
a tax credit to encourage employers to hire additional workers was being
actively considered by the Treasury Department. At the time, some
administrative economic policymakers felt that prior stimulative efforts
to recover from the 1974 recession were not working adequately, and
high unemployment, with its serious social and economic consequences,
was a pressing concern. Additional incentives for capital investments
were rejected as providing uncertain relief in general and too little real
relief for small businesses and labor-intensive industries. Passage of a
jobs tax credit, on the other hand, would have the dual advantage of
being anti-inflationary and a direct stimulus to increased employment.
A jobs credit would immediately reduce labor costs over a significant
range of inputs. Also, a jobs credit, while reducing labor costs to
businesses, does not reduce labor income to employees, an added plus.
The only prior experience the United States has had with jobs tax credits
was the Work Incentive (WIN) credit enacted in 1971. It was not used
by many employers because of the low availability of qualified workers
among its target population and the strict recapture rules on its use.4
The new proposed credit was enacted as the New Jobs Tax Credit
(NJTC) by section 202 of the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of
1977,5 with numerous technical restrictions6 to reduce its overall cost,
to curb real and imagined abuses, and to better target the credit.
The effectiveness of a tax provision of this nature can only be measured
by reference to its margin of elasticity. There are some companies that
will receive a windfall by claiming the credit for workers they would
have hired whether or not the credit was in effect. Some employers will
not hire new workers even with the benefits of the credit. The cost
effectiveness of the credit is determined by how many employees are
hired by employers who did so because of the added tax incentives to
do so. Thus, this credit aims to maximize this margin.
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However, the credit was seen as a temporary measure with only a
two-year life, and it was only one provision within a tax package that
had numerous other, more newsworthy components, such as a refundable
fifty dollar tax credit for most taxpayers. As a result, by the time a
significant number of small businesses became aware of the NJTC, it
was due to expire.
A type of jobs tax credit was reenacted and extended for another two
years by section 321 of the Revenue Act of 1978.7 However, the 1978
credit was enacted in a form substantially different from the 1977 NJTC.
The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) was a narrow-based credit whose
scope, emphasis, and administration was different than the prior NJTC.
The targeted credit provided tax benefits to employers who hired
individuals from any of seven hard-to-employ groups of people, including
the handicapped, ex-convicts, and welfare recipients, among others.
In 1981, the TJTC was reenacted for one year with modifications
further limiting its applicability.8 It was recently reenacted with minor
changes until the end of 1984 by section 233 of the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA).9
Data indicates that a good part of the lack of success of the two-year
NJTC can be attributed to the limited awareness of the credit by
potential users. Knowledge of the NJTC diffused slowly among small
businesses because they did not have extensive information networks
to provide in-depth details of the complex legislation and its implementing
regulations. However, studies have shown that where knowledge of the
credit was available, the desired purpose was effectively served.
In one such study, Jeffrey Perloff and Michael Wachter found that
while many employers did not know of the credit, those who did were
able to increase employment 3.1 percent faster than those who did
not.10 Perloff and Wachter reexamined their study six months later for
the Department of Labor using another methodology and found the
correct percentage to be 3.4.11
With this opportunity to write on a clean slate, we will provide you
with our thoughts on how a jobs tax credit might look if the small
business community were charged with designing one.

Purpose of the Credit
In our view, a jobs tax credit should have three goals.
First, in a general sense, the credit should increase the incentives
for a business to invest in human rather than capital assets. Thus, to
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some extent the credit would offset some of the current bias in our tax
code towards capital investments by providing an additional incentive
for labor investments.
Second, the credit should specifically provide incentives for an
employer to hire individuals above traditional staffing and utilization
levels. The structure of the credit implicitly recognizes that product
demand and not wage level is the ultimate factor an employer uses in
determining if and when to hire additional employees. While it is well
and good that a business routinely hires new workers on a seasonal or
regular basis, this credit aims to increase the margin.12 Specifically,
the jobs credit should be designed to increase both the scope and
utilization level of human capital in a business. Thus, the credit should
encourage a company to consider hiring individuals to do functions that
a machine could do for about the same cost. The credit should act as
an incentive to new incremental employment rather than a subsidy to
base level employment.
Third, the credit should serve as an incentive to provide job training
to unskilled or semiskilled individuals and to give new entrants in the
job force real-world experience so they will be able to compete in the
job market in the future.13 The jobs tax credit in this instance would
be acting in the nature of a temporary wage subsidy to create jobs by
lessening or closing the gap between the nominal wage rate and the
productivity of the incremental labor. However, in no sense should the
jobs tax credit be looked on as a private sector type of CETA program
to create temporary make-work positions. It is hoped that the credit will
lead to a significant amount of hiring by employers who will provide
training and experience in jobs that meet future technology needs.
When, as mandated by our proposal, the Treasury Department reviews
the effectiveness of the credit after five years, we expect that this
question will be examined in detail.

Structure of the Credit
The proposed jobs tax credit is structured to be flexible, but stresses
private initiatives and relies on market forces rather than government
directives to make the program work. All three goals set forth above
can be achieved by lowering the initial cost of labor to an employer.
One aspect of a successful credit is its ease of use. This is especially
important for small businesses that have a limited ability to deal with
complex provisions, extensive record-keeping, certification problems,
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and the like. Thus, we propose to calculate the credit based on the
current FUTA (Federal Unemployment Tax Act)14 tax base of an
employer. For ease of calculation purposes and simplicity, let us assume
that each employee will earn at least $7,000 per year or $140 per week.
It is not realistic to use the salary or the FICA (Federal Insurance
Contributions Act)15 base because inflation and normal wage increases
would distort calculations to determine the actual jobs tax credit.
Under FUTA rules, an employer must pay a tax of 3.4 percent on
the first $6,000 of wages of each employee. In light of the changes of
the recently enacted tax bill,16 the FUTA base will rise to 3.5 percent
of the first $7,000 of wages of each employee in 1983. For purposes of
this jobs tax credit proposal, we will use the 1983 figures in our
calculations and illustration.
The amount of jobs tax credits that an employer can earn in a given
year would be 30 percent of the amount of the employer’s FUTA base
that exceeds 105 percent of the prior year’s FUTA tax liability.17 Thus,
if the employer’s FUTA base was $100,000 in 1982, and the credit
takes effect January 1983, 30 percent of 1983 FUTA tax liability over
$105,000 could be earned as a jobs tax credit by the employer. This
amount shall be known as the “FUTA sum.” If the 1983 FUTA base of
the employer is $128,000, the employer’s maximum jobs tax credit for
1983 could be $6,900 (30 percent of $23,000). If the 1983 FUTA base
is $104,000, no new credits would be earned in that year.
The amount of the FUTA sum (here $23,000) would then be tagged
to the eligible employees hired in 1983 that earned them. For future
years (in this example after 1983) these tagged employees would be
eligible to earn jobs tax credits within the next twenty-four months
regardless of future changes in the FUTA sum. The maximum amount
of jobs tax credits that an employer will be able to use to offset tax
liability, and subject to refundability, would be $42,000.
During each of the first twelve months that the tagged employee works
for the employer, 30 percent of his or her actual monthly wages, here
up to $584 of wages ($7,000 ÷ 12 = $583.33), would be eligible for
a 30 percent jobs tax credit. This is necessary, for second-year credit
and third-year employment purposes, to identify the workers whose
wages are earning jobs tax credits. During the second twelve months,
the credit would be 15 percent of his or her actual monthly wages. The
higher the jobs tax credit, the greater the incentive of an employer to
substitute labor for capital investments. However, too high a credit
would be both expensive and lead to a perception that the credit is in
reality direct funding for jobs, a result we wish to avoid.
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Each year the designation process would begin again without regard
to how many employees were eligible for, or actually earned, jobs tax
credits in past years.
This formula is being used because the credit, while flowing to the
employer, will be based on the actual work cycle and earnings of
individuals. Also, employers will have specific obligations to the
employees hired who earn jobs tax credits. Thus, the credit covers a
twenty-four-month wage cycle for each designated employee, at 30
percent for the first twelve months up to a $584 base per month and
15 percent for the next twelve months.
This tagging is necessary because even if the FUTA base does not
rise to 105 percent of the prior-year FUTA base in later years, or the
FUTA base shrinks, the designated employees would still be eligible
for credits for the full twenty-four-month cycle. The incentive to hire
and use the human capital assets would not be lost once he or she is
tagged as eligible. This would prevent the last-hired-first-fired rule from
negating the effects of the jobs tax credit. Accordingly, the next year
the employer would begin the same designation process again if there
were any FUTA sums available.
Unlike the NJTC, the amount of the credit taken would not have to
be used to reduce deductible wage expenses. The jobs credit would be
permanent and not have an expiration date. Thus, employers could plan
for the long term and begin to impute jobs tax credit considerations in
hiring practices. However, as indicated above, the proposal mandates
that the Treasury Department review the effectiveness of the credit after
five years.

Administration of the Credit
As almost all businesses file yearly tax returns and submit information
or withholding reports to the federal government on a regular basis
(usually quarterly), it would be cost-effective to piggyback the proposed
credit to the existing tax system, and this proposal adopts this approach.
It will minimize paperwork costs for the employer and administrative
costs for the government. Consistent with this approach, administration
of the credit will consist of a few additional lines on the employer’s
yearly tax return. Depending on the type of business, changes will be
made to either Form 1040 for sole proprietors, Form 1120 for corpo
rations, or Form 1120S for subchapter S corporations. This is preferable
to creating a new bureaucracy to deal with jobs creation.
All benefits of a jobs tax credit program should go to jobs credit
payouts rather than overhead and administrative expenses. For this
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reason, a tax credit is preferred over a deduction from income as a
means for providing jobs incentives because the value of a tax deduction
is dependent on the business’s effective rate of taxation and makes no
sense unless there is actual income to offset. Otherwise, one cannot
translate the value of a deduction into actual cash benefits. With a tax
credit the employer immediately knows the value of the subsidy, and
with refundability he is sure of actually receiving that amount. In
contrast with the TJTC, this program would not require prior certifications
or vouchers to be issued by the state employment service for each
eligible employer.

Publicity
Experience with the NJTC shows that knowledge of the credit was slow
to diffuse among small businesses. To avoid this problem, a brochure
would be sent to all FUTA tax payers by the Internal Revenue
Service. The brochure would contain a simplified explanation of the
credit, provide numerous examples, and give a telephone number where
an employer can receive additional information and answers to specific
questions.

Limits on the Credit
The maximum credit an employer could earn in a given year would be
$42,000. This limit is imposed because the credit aims to work as an
incentive to hire workers above traditional levels, but not above levels
that would provide an excessive windfall for planned expansions. With
a $42,000 limit, up to twenty full-time or full-time-equivalent workers
could earn credits in the first year of the credit, and thirty in the second
year of the credit.
No family member or relative of the employer would be eligible for
the jobs tax credit. Temporary help agencies who hire out employees
for short periods would not be eligible for the credit.
The employer would be required to keep the employee for at least
one year after the twenty-four-month credit period if he desires to stay.
If the business is sold, the new owner will inherit the FUTA base. A
given employee could only be eligible once for the two-year credit. If
an employee who is receiving a credit is fired or quits after twelve
months, his replacement is not eligible for jobs tax credits. However,
no recapture of credits would occur if the dismissal or resignation occurs
in the first twelve months.
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The credit would be available on a per-tax-return rather than a per
plant basis. Credits granted that are forfeited are subject to recapture
after the end of the tax year in which a disqualifying act occurs, such
as dismissing an employee after the second year. Recapture means that
the dollar amounts of credits taken would have to be repaid to the
government in the form of an added tax liability.
Retention rules will be as follows:
1. If the employer takes two years of credits on an employee, he is
bound to offer the employee a third year of employment.
2. If the employee quits or is fired within the first year, there would
be no recapture of credits unless the employee was fired so another
employee could be hired in his place.
These issues would not be addressed except as part of a regular IRS
audit of an employee’s tax return.

Refundability
Under this proposal, the jobs tax credit would be refundable. Under
present rules, jobs tax credits earned can only be used to offset the
income tax liability of the employer. This offset is allowed only after
all the nonrefundable tax credits are first used to offset up to 90 percent
of current tax liability. Under TEFRA, tax credits can only be used to
offset up to 85 percent of current tax liability after 1982. Any currently
unusable credits can be carried back three years and forward fifteen
years.
As the credit is based on a percentage of the wages of a worker up
to $7,000, the credit reduces the labor costs for lower paid, probably
unskilled, workers more than for higher paid, skilled workers, since
the per-worker credit represents a higher proportion of the wages of
low-paid workers. This stimulates employment of the young, women,
minorities, and others who compose a major portion of marginally skilled
workers and a disproportionate share of the unemployed in periods of
declining business activity. Thus, there is no real need for the jobs tax
credit to have a targeting feature; coupled with market demand, it will
help groups that are now deemed to need a targeted-type credit.
Since many small businesses have little or no federal income tax
liability in a given year, the credit is of limited current use. For each
employee hired in 1983, the employer has FICA or social security tax
liability of 6.7 percent of each dollar of wages, up to $32,400, and
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additional tax liability of 3.5 percent against the first $7,000 of wages
for FUTA or unemployment tax purposes. Thus, for the jobs tax credit
to be useful for small businesses, the credit can be used to offset FICA
and FUTA tax liabilities. Any remaining credit would be refundable.
This is especially important for small businesses because many have
cash flow problems, and refundability would be a capital-retentive
benefit. The employer who has income tax liability will be able to offset
it with jobs tax credits and receive credit benefits immediately by having
to pay less estimated tax payments to the government. If there is no
expected tax liability for a given year, refundability of credit benefits
would be available within approximately six weeks of filing the yearly
business tax return.
Possible abuse of this refundability feature would be limited by
restrictions on the amount of the jobs tax credits that an employer would
be eligible to obtain in a given year. Also, refundability would be
limited to small businesses, for example, companies with assets under
$10 million. Thus, the restriction would help assure the jobs tax credit
program’s usefulness, since big businesses that are already planning to
hire employees as part of an expansionary move would receive only
limited windfall benefits. Refundability would make tax credit ordering,
limits on tax credit offset, and carryover considerations irrelevant for
small businesses. These rules limit complexity and administrative
burdens and assure that benefits flow to the intended recipients.
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17. The use of the 105 percent of the FUTA base figure is meant to incorporate into
the calculations a normal growth rate assumption. Thus, companies that do not hire
additional employees or shrink their work force would not be eligible for job tax credits.

52

Financing
the Smail Business
Enterprise

DEBT-EQUITY
PROBLEMS FOR SMALL
BUSINESS
by John H. Harrington, CPA,

Price Waterhouse

Ever since the corporate income tax was instituted, there has been much
uncertainty whether capital provided by outsiders is debt or equity.
Payments for the use of capital treated as debt are interest on
indebtedness, while distributions to owners are dividends. The impli
cations of this characterization are far reaching. The most obvious is
that the corporation receives a deduction for interest payments but
generally does not receive a deduction for dividends, thereby directly
affecting the taxable income of the corporation. Of course, the recipient
is normally subject to tax in either case. Repayments of debt principal
do not result in income to the holder, whereas any distribution of capital
will generally result in taxable income to the “shareholder” provided
the corporation has current or accumulated taxable earnings and profits.
This affects taxable and nontaxable reorganizations, liquidations, stock
redemptions, and a long list of other areas.
The issue is not confined to corporations; the characterization as
debt or equity for a partnership or other entity can have a number of
implications. For example, while a partnership is not subject to income
tax, the characterization of capital provided by outsiders can affect the
tax basis of the interests of the partners and timing of deductions for
expenses and receipt of income.
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Commonly, small businesses have been started by the capital being
provided by owners who are active in the business. Frequently, additional
investments are made by other friends or acquaintances or, if things go
well, a venture capital firm. Sometimes a business is so successful that
it is able to go directly from the original owners to the public market.
Many firms never go public because either they do not wish to be
burdened with the expense and inconvenience associated with being
public or they fail to achieve the necessary success. However, irre
spective of the sequence of events, the providers of capital frequently
wish to make their investments in the form of both loans and stock,
with debt instruments often playing an important role. This is because
(1) debt instruments may have greater rights in liquidation in the event
the business is unsuccessful, (2) the corporation can obtain a tax
deduction for payments of interest, and (3) debt instruments enable the
owners to get their capital back without paying income tax on the
“principal” portion. It is very important in the evolution of a business
for it to be able to design its capital structure in such a way as to
maximize the opportunity for investors who must be induced to provide
capital for expansion of the business.
Since the debt-equity question has many tax implications for small
business, I will not touch on all aspects of the issue. This paper will
be primarily concerned with the future characterization of the capital
provided by outsiders to a corporation in light of the Treasury’s intent
to finalize regulations under section 385 of the Internal Revenue Code,
which was enacted in 1969. The section and the related regulations are
designed to provide specific criteria for determining whether capital is
to be characterized as debt or as equity. Clearly, the Treasury is
empowered to issue regulations to apply section 385. These were
originally proposed in 1980 and have been modified several times since.
Presently they are scheduled to become effective ninety days after the
final revisions are published in the Federal Register but in no event
earlier than April 1, 1983.
These proposed regulations have caused considerable controversy,
and many groups, including the AICPA, have objected to numerous
aspects. Principally the objections concern the potential negative impact
on the ability of small business to raise equity capital and borrow
money, the complexity of the proposed regulations, and the many
potential tax traps for the small businessman who is unfamiliar with
their application.
After many years of experience in working with privately held
businesses, it is my view that tax rules that are too complex or too
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difficult to understand tend to be ignored by taxpayers. Such provisions
encourage noncompliance by taxpayers in other areas of the tax law
because they develop a disdain for the entire law. Furthermore, IRS
agents may not be qualified or have the time to properly enforce unduly
complex provisions, thereby discouraging self assessment, which is
fundamental to our tax system.

History of the Debt-Equity Tax Area
The question of characterization of capital as debt or equity has resulted
in frequent litigation between taxpayers and taxing authorities over the
years. The determination generally has been based upon the facts and
circumstances of each case, although certain general principles have
evolved. Taxpayers were in a far stronger position to have an investment
treated as debt if it was evidenced in writing, it carried a reasonable
rate of interest, regular payments were made, it had a definite due date,
and the debtor could demonstrate an intent to ultimately pay off the
entire principal. In addition, the ratio of a corporation’s debt to equity
is a factor in deciding some of these cases, although a fairly wide variety
of debt-to-equity ratios has been allowed. In Revenue Ruling 68-54,
the IRS approved a debt-to-equity ratio of 20 to 1 as long as capital is
sufficient for normal business operations.
In fact I can only recall one instance in my entire experience when
an actual assessment of tax was paid because of a recharacterization of
debt to equity. This is not to say that the issue is unimportant but
reflects my view that taxpayers who have taken reasonable steps to
comply with the guidelines outlined above have been successful in
having the debt treated as they had intended.
In the late 1960s the executive and legislative branches of the U.S.
government became very concerned over the merger wave that was
underway at that time. It was felt that large corporations (commonly
called conglomerates) were acquiring too many of the businesses in
America, resulting in an undue concentration of financial power and
business interests. In addition, it was felt that certain provisions of the
tax laws encouraged these kinds of acquisitions and that some revisions
were needed. This resulted in a series of legislative proposals, some of
which were ultimately enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
These changes disallowed a deduction for interest on certain acqui
sition indebtedness in excess of $5 million (section 279), strengthened
the original issue discount rules under section 1232, prohibited install
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ment reporting of income when the consideration was readily marketable
(section 453), and added section 385. In reviewing the legislative history
of section 385, it is clear that the genesis of this section arose from the
concern over the conglomerate wave. Both Treasury testimony and the
legislative history indicated that the purpose in enacting this section
was to give the Treasury the power to determine what is debt and what
is equity in order to discourage the use of hybrid instruments to acquire
other businesses. Such hybrid instruments might contain elements of
both equity and debt, such as convertible debentures, debentures with
warrants attached, and debentures with equity kickers. There was
virtually no suggestion that this section was enacted to deal with
“abuses” or problems that existed with respect to privately held
businesses.
Needless to say, because section 385 gives the Treasury authority to
determine what is debt and equity in the case of any corporation, it
may have a broad range of influence. This section does not apply to
noncorporate entities such as partnerships, individuals, and trusts.
Moreover, it does not apply to money loaned by the corporation to
shareholders, employees, or others, but rather only to money loaned or
invested in the corporation, that is, money coming from the providers
of capital.
The congressional intent of the section has been expanded through
the proposed regulations. By way of background, the Treasury originally
issued proposed regulations under section 385 in March 1980, over ten
years after the enactment of the section. These proposals have been
modified and delayed several times.
The Treasury has substantially altered the original intent of section
385 by failing to provide mechanisms whereby the average small
business will not be adversely affected by the section. If the congressional
intent was to have section 385 discourage corporate takeovers by
conglomerates, then the rules should be structured in a manner that is
directed towards these kinds of transactions with minimal effect on
entities such as small businesses that apparently were not the subject
of congressional concern.
The Treasury has had considerable difficulty with the question of
debt vs. equity over the years, and it welcomes the opportunity to
acquire the authority to apply specific rules so it can make this
determination. Clearly it is using section 385 to accomplish this.
Moreover, from a taxpayer’s point of view, there probably are benefits
from having a more specific set of rules to operate under, provided they
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are not unduly complex. However, the proposed regulations do contain
a number of problems, and they should be substantially modified.
A number of business groups and individuals, including the AICPA,
have invested a substantial amount of time in analyzing the proposed
regulations and providing very valuable input to the Treasury, which
has adopted a number of the suggested changes. These comments are
still being developed. While many significant improvements have
resulted, additional revision is necessary. Therefore, the following
discussion outlines some suggestions concerning further modification of
the proposed regulations that would provide a more workable environment
for small business. However, it will not cover the international aspects
of section 385.

General Structure of Proposed
Regulations Under Section 385
The proposed regulations under section 385 attempt to treat insiders
and outsiders differently, which is logical. In general, insiders are those
that hold a significant equity interest in the corporation, while outsiders
are those that hold minor amounts or no equity in the corporation. This
leads to the so-called proportionality issue, in which debt that is roughly
proportional to stockholdings is subject to stricter standards.
There are five general categories of transactions that the Treasury is
concerned with and has attempted to deal with, which include—

1. Hybrid instruments, which contain elements of both debt and
equity. Perhaps the most common example is a convertible
debenture in which interest is regularly paid at a specified rate
and principal is ultimately due, but that can be converted into a
certain number of shares of stock at the option of the holder. If
over one-half of the value is attributable to the equity feature, a
hybrid instrument is automatically deemed to be stock.
2. Debt not evidenced by a formal negotiable instrument or other
written instrument.
3. Debt that does not bear interest at a reasonable rate, including
demand and term loans.
4. Excessive debt. In general this is debt where the debt-to-equity
ratio of the corporation exceeds a certain amount. The proposed
regulations operate under the presumption that if certain specified
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ratios are not met, the corporation is undercapitalized unless a
lender could qualify as an independent creditor. The ratios are 3
to 1 for insiders and 10 to 1 for outsiders. These are calculated
on a tax basis (not book or fair market value).
5. Failure to pay interest or principal on a timely basis as specified
by the instrument.
If under any of these rules the instrument is treated as equity rather
than debt, it is deemed to be equity forever. Thus, where an IRS agent
examining a tax return that was filed three years ago successfully asserts
that a debt instrument is equity, it will result in a disallowance of tax
deductions for all intervening years without the taxpayer being able to
take any corrective or offsetting action for the intervening years. While
limited time periods are allowed after the end of the year to take
corrective action, these are, generally, 120 days in the case of unwritten
advances and 90 days for the payment of interest.
Interest rates that are deemed to be reasonable can be based upon
several standards including section 482 rates, the interest rate on federal
tax assessments, rates paid by unrelated debtors, and the prime rate at
a local commercial bank. But, in no event can the rate be less than the
rate on U.S. obligations of comparable maturity.
Because of the difference in 10 to 1 and 3 to 1 debt-to-equity ratios
for outsiders and insiders, it is important to be able to determine whether
debt is proportional to stock holdings. In general, where there is a 50
percent overlap between stock holdings and debt holdings, the debt is
deemed to be proportional.
For example, in the following case the overlap factor is 40 percent,
and instruments are deemed to be held non-pro-rata to stock. Constructive
ownership rules apply for determining holdings.

B
A
C
D
Stock
40%
10%
50%
0%
60%
Instruments
20%
10%
10%
(Overlap = 20% + 10% + 10% + 0%)

The proposed regulations are extremely complex and difficult to
understand. Even with my background as a tax partner with Price
Waterhouse, I have found that it required considerable effort to interpret
and understand them. I probably still do not have a full understanding
of their provisions and impact. Rules such as these, which could apply
to thousands or millions of businesses, should be structured in a manner
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that is understandable and subject to easy interpretation with reasonable
effort. The proposed regulations do not meet this standard.
Many of these provisions will have an impact that taxpayers may be
totally unaware of and may have very adverse tax consequences even
though the taxpayer was not engaging in a transaction that was intended
to result in any tax reduction or tax avoidance. Given the extensive tax
rules and regulatory rules that the average small business and its
advisers must cope with, it seems to be an unreasonable request to
have small business interpret the proposed regulations as presently
structured.
In addition, because many other sections of the tax law are dependent
upon whether capital is treated as loans or equity, other transactions in
other sections of the Internal Revenue Code are affected. The proposed
regulations fail to provide adequate guidance as to their effect on other
sections.
One of the more thorny areas that has been reserved presently, but
ultimately needs clarification, is the question of whether section 385
will determine if a loan to a subchapter S corporation (a corporation
where the income is generally taxed to the shareholders without corporate
tax) will be characterized under the section 385 rules for determining
whether the corporation has two classes of stock, which is prohibited
under the subchapter S rules. In the past, the Treasury has been
successful in treating certain loans as a second class of stock. Therefore,
application of the proposed rules could substantially increase the risk
of a termination of subchapter S status.
There are several provisions in the proposed regulations that provide
for corrections within 90 to 120 days after the end of the year. It is my
belief that this is too short a period of time. Frequently the analysis of
transactions necessary to determine what corrective action may be
required is not completed until very close to the time the tax return is
due, thus allowing the business virtually no time to raise money to
repay loans or take other corrective action that may be required.
Finally, the IRS will have difficulty examining and enforcing this
section because of the need to educate its own agents concerning the
complexity of the application. The tax law should be structured so it
can be enforced in an equitable and efficient manner. We all recognize
that many provisions of the tax law are complex, but many of the most
complex rules apply to a relatively small number of taxpayers who can
afford professional advice necessary to interpret them. The section 385
provisions have such wide application that they should be less complex.
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Inequities and Negative Effects of the
Proposed Regulations
The proposed regulations cause a variety of negative effects and result
in a number of inequities, which are discussed below.
Section 385 applies to investments in a corporation but not other
forms of businesses. This causes an inequitable result inasmuch as the
whole section could be avoided by operating in partnership form,
although admittedly this may not be desirable for other reasons.
The amount of record-keeping and paperwork that will be required
is substantial. Although the preamble to the proposed regulations
specifies that no additional record-keeping is required, I simply cannot
agree with this statement given some of the tests that must be met in
order to come within the provisions of the regulations. The calculation
of debt-to-equity ratios is perhaps the best example of the requirement
for additional record-keeping. Normally, a corporation’s books and
records are not kept on a tax basis, so almost every corporation would
have to make numerous adjustments to determine the tax basis of its
assets.
The complexities set traps for many. It is true that every new tax
legislation takes years in order to have the tax practitioners, taxpayers,
and Treasury officials digest the provision. However, this area will take
longer than most.
Today many real estate financing transactions involve some kind of
equity participation. This enables a lender to participate in the gross
or net income of the project, gain on sale, and so on. These transactions
may be adversely affected by these regulations as they will probably
constitute hybrid instruments.
It is not unusual nowadays to have what is called a leveraged buy
out, particularly by employee groups including the use of Employee
Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). There have been a number of instances
whereby corporations in financial trouble have been bought by the
employees on a highly leveraged basis, since employees normally do
not possess a substantial amount of capital to invest. The proposed
regulations could adversely affect this kind of transaction. Presumably
such a transaction is in the best interests of the country if it enables a
business to survive and keep the people employed.
Under supply side economics a number of measures (both tax and
otherwise) have been undertaken in order to encourage business
investments. These proposed regulations discourage venture capital
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from making certain investments in businesses. Venture capital com
panies generally hope to achieve a rate of return of 25 to 40 percent in
today’s environment for making venture capital investments. It is virtually
impossible to achieve this by straight debt, so the venture capitalist
will usually acquire a combination of debt and equity. The venture
capitalists are usually looking for some current income and want some
preference in liquidation, thus, they are often not satisfied to accept
only stock for their investment. Furthermore, the venture capitalist does
not like uncertainty or complication, so these rules may prove to be a
psychological barrier. Since over $1 billion was invested by venture
capitalists in 1981, it is obvious that it is important to encourage this
kind of investment.
Under section 303 of the code, a corporation can redeem its stock to
enable the deceased shareholder’s estate to pay estate taxes and
administration expenses. Compliance with section 303 permits this
without dividend income to the estate. The obligations incurred in these
situations would be subject to section 385. Since these obligations can
go as long as a period of fifteen years in order to enable an estate to
take advantage of the ability to defer the payment of estate tax over a
period of fifteen years permitted under section 6166, section 385 could
very adversely affect the ability to use section 303 as Congress had
intended. This would occur because an estate may be an “insider” and
the debt may exceed the 3 to 1 ratio test and be considered “excessive
debt.” It is very likely that such debt could not meet the independent
creditor tests. Perhaps this is unintended, but it is an example of what
results from pervasive rules such as these.
Today many lenders require key shareholders to guarantee debt of
the corporation. The application of section 385 to guaranteed debt or
situations where shareholders pledge other assets remains unclear.
Initially the Treasury wanted to effectively treat such debt as debt or
stock of the shareholders.
In general, the proposed regulations fail to make provisions for
industries that have significantly different financial structures. For
example, the leasing industry and the real estate industry typically are
very highly leveraged. When debt-equity was determined under court
authority or administrative decisions, financing arrangements that were
common or normal for any particular industry were acceptable. These
rigid rules eliminate this flexibility.
A corporation with very little net worth on a tax basis could incur
virtually no debt except from independent creditors because the 10 to
1 and 3 to 1 ratios would be very low. For example, the corporation
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might possess valuable assets such as intangibles or appreciated property
with a low tax basis, which would justify obtaining loans. If the ratios
could be calculated on the fair market value, the true economics could
be recognized.
Under the proposed regulations a creditor-shareholder must enforce
its rights as an independent party would. This occurs when the debtor
corporation is unable to make scheduled payments. This is an unrea
sonable standard because a shareholder (at least an insider) often stands
to benefit economically as an employee, director, and/or lessor as well
as a creditor. Thus, the creditor may forego collection proceeds on a
loan because of the need for employment. It is going to be very difficult
to separate these roles in order to prove that as required, the creditor
“exercised the ordinary diligence of an independent creditor.”

Proposed Solutions
Some of my proposed changes may seem radical in light of the enormous
effort that has been put into attempting to modify these rules, but I will
still put them forth. Also, there are a number of suggestions that I have
not included, as I have confined my remarks to the major issues. On
August 5, 1982, the Chamber of Commerce together with other interested
organizations issued a letter to the Treasury that incorporates a number
of very constructive suggestions, such as—
• The inclusion of a $1 million (inside) exemption.
•

A provision for a five-year hiatus for new businesses.

•
•

A provision for a 5 to 1 inside debt-to-equity ratio.
A provision for using fair market value as a means for determining
net assets and the ratio of debt to equity.
A provision for a separate rule for venture capital transactions
because of their unique situation.

•

I support these but suggest they be modified as follows.
First of all, the only way to equitably apply section 385 is to raise
the exemption for small business to a very large dollar amount. Perhaps
it should apply only to corporations with total borrowings (exclusive of
trade payables, etc.) in excess of $5 million as was incorporated in
section 279 having to do with the disallowance of interest on corporate
acquisition indebtedness. These sections were enacted in tandem in
1969.
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Furthermore, the Treasury should allow any corporation to utilize the
section 385 guidelines by electing to have them apply. Presumably this
could be done so the election would be on a semi-permanent basis and
not a year-by-year decision. However, for any corporation (or affiliated
group) with a combined debt in excess of $5 million, the rules could
be applied at the Treasury’s election. Under this approach, those
businesses wishing to take advantage of the rules in order to have
precise guidance concerning their debt instruments could elect to apply
the rules. On the other hand, small businesses not being aware of the
rules or those lacking sophisticated advice necessary to apply them
would not be caught in the trap of having the Treasury apply the rules
on examination. I recognize that as businesses get larger it is reasonable
to expect that they become subject to stricter rules. Therefore, at some
point (my suggestion being $5 million) it would be reasonable to expect
them to be subject to mandatory application of the rules. This would
exempt many small businesses, although many small businesses would
still be subject to section 385.
In addition, I have the following other suggestions:
1. The correction period for the repayment of undocumented advances
or the documenting of advances, and payment of satisfactory
amounts of interest should be extended to thirty days after the
tax return is due in order to enable taxpayers to have time to
accomplish the transactions necessary to comply with the regu
lations. To assist with compliance the required actions could be
subject to return disclosure.
2. The regulations should not apply to loans to subchapter S
corporations for purposes of determining whether the subchapter
S has one or more classes of stock.
3. For calculating ratios for insiders and outsiders (the 10 to 1 and
3 to 1 ratios) the taxpayer should have the option of using either
the fair market value of the assets or the tax basis of the assets.
4. The regulations should exempt redemptions to pay estate taxes
that comply with the provisions of section 303.
5. Special rules for selected industries such as real estate and leasing
should be developed.
6. Transactions involving ESOPs and employee acquisitions should
be exempted or have special rules.

7. The application to other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
should be clarified. Since this is a highly technical area, the best
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result would be to make section 385 only applicable to those
provisions necessary to carry out congressional intent.
8. The regulations should be changed to reflect changes of a technical
or practical nature to deal with concerns not covered by the
preceding.
If these or other changes necessary to accomplish our goals of making
section 385 workable are unacceptable to the Treasury, legislation may
have to be pursued in order to accomplish our goals. Hopefully, the
Treasury will take an approach that will substantially modify these rules
in order to avoid the problems outlined herein. However, if the results
are unsatisfactory, I think that this area should be added to the legislative
list. There has been an increasing trend in recent years to have
legislation override the Treasury in areas that are considered especially
troublesome to a wide variety of taxpayers and involve substantial
changes in existing practice. I believe the debt-equity area qualifies on
both points.
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LIMITATIONS
ON DIRECT LOANS
AND GUARANTEE LOSSES
AND ON INVESTMENT
INTEREST
by Thomas E. Huntzinger, CPA,

Huntzinger, Miller & Associates

Aside from interest rates, the availability of and access to capital rank
as premium problems for the small business community. These problems
are complex and are not the direct subjects of this paper. However, the
discussions that follow will highlight the fact that the Internal Revenue
Code creates obstacles for small businesses and those entering into
transactions with small businesses when it comes to the creation of
debt, its continuance, or the deductibility of the related interest expense.
It is significant to note that large corporations do not face the same
problems with the code. Therein lies a great inequity.
The intent of this paper is to illustrate inequities that small businesses
face and discuss how to correct the situation. Some general solutions
are presented for your review. However, the real purpose here is to
generate an awareness that problems do exist, inequities do exist, and
that Congress and the Treasury have done little or nothing to correct
the problems.
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Deductions for Direct Loans and
Guarantee Losses
John Q. Public, Jr. is interested in buying a small business. He goes
to his bank, and the loan officer is convinced that the deal looks good
and informs John that the bank will approve the loan if John Q. Public,
Sr. guarantees it. After all, young John is only starting out in life, and
John Sr. has a nice comfortable farm with no record of debt.
Everything goes along fine until the recession of 1980—82 comes
along and John cannot meet his debt requirements. The bank calls John
Sr. and asks for and receives payment in full, but only after John Sr.
takes out a mortgage on the homestead. The following April, John Sr.
tells his CPA that he had to pay $50,000 to make good on his guarantee
at the bank. The CPA tells him what a nice “gift” he gave his son and
it’s a shame that he can’t take a tax deduction for the “gift.”
In 1980, Conglomerate Corporation guaranteed the loans of one of
its wholly owned subsidiaries, which in turn went under in 1982.
Conglomerate Corporation took an ordinary deduction for the amount
paid to the bank.
In 1980, Mary Peoples, the sole shareholder of Small People
Corporation, arranged a working capital loan for her company at a local
bank. Again, along comes the recession, she can’t clear out the loan,
and the bank informs her that it wants her to pay the loan. She sells
her few shares of bank stock, cashes in her IRA, and pays off the loan.
She has just made a contribution to the capital of the corporation.
(Remember, Conglomerate Corporation took an ordinary loss deduction.)
George Nice has had some successful business ventures during his
career and now he’s semi-retired. He’s very impressed with two local
young businessmen, both of whom are undercapitalized and in need of
financing. Mr. Nice talks to both of them and says he’ll guarantee up
to $50,000 in loans from their local bank. Harry Unger, a bright, young
sole proprietor, and Carl Korp, owner of a growing corporation, accept
his offer with the utmost gratitude.
They both run into tough financial straits, and Mr. Nice is liable for
$100,000. For his trouble, Mr. Nice is able to take a “business bad
debt” deduction of $50,000 relating to his dealings with Mr. Unger,
but he’s having a problem convincing the IRS agent that he should be
allowed a $3,000 yearly deduction for his “nonbusiness bad debt” with
Mr. Korp. So much for simplicity (let alone equity) of the Internal
Revenue Code.
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The foregoing illustrations are simplistic, but they do serve to highlight
some problems that exist for small business people in the area of loan
and guarantee losses that, with few exceptions, do not exist for the
corporate giants. Before we try to figure out why this condition is allowed
to exist, we should deal with some of the important underlying principles
and definitions involved.
First of all, the distinction between business and nonbusiness bad
debts generally does not come into play for corporations. Business bad
debts are fully deductible against ordinary income, and nonbusiness
bad debts are treated as short-term capital losses. A nonbusiness bad
debt is a loss that is not connected with one’s own trade or business.
Deductions, when allowed, must be taken in the year that the loan
becomes “worthless” (except in the case of certain business bad debts).
The Tax Court has defined a “worthless” debt as “having no value,
valueless, useless.” Losses arising from the guarantee of loans are
normally handled in the same fashion as losses from direct loans.
However, losses resulting from the guarantee of a loan must be from
transactions in one’s own trade or business or a “transaction entered
into for profit.” The definition of this last “transaction” is not precise
in that it need not necessarily have to be shown that direct monetary
consideration was received if there were an otherwise “bona fide business
purpose” behind the transaction. A definition of “bona fide” rests in
the eyes of the beholder, and, thus, the burden of proof is on the
guarantor claiming the deduction.
The nebulous statutory and regulatory guidance and lack of clear
definitions have caused the nonbusiness bad debt area to be one of
much litigation. Therefore, adequate tax planning can only be achieved
through the careful, lengthy research of appropriate cases that may
contain similar facts and circumstances to your own.
Where does this leave the owner of a small business? Frankly, way
out on a limb because he is the very person who borrows money to
capitalize his business; he is the one who guarantees his corporation’s
loan or needs a guarantor to obtain a loan; he is the one who borrows
money from his relatives; he is the one who can least afford the level
of tax and legal advice that is required in this area.
Why then is our small business person placed in such jeopardy by
the Internal Revenue Code? Congress and the Treasury obviously feel
that loans and guarantees made by family members constitute “gifts”
and therefore deserve no income tax deduction benefit. They feel that
to openly allow deduction status to such transactions is to create a
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climate for abuse. Likewise, the distinction between business and
nonbusiness treatment exists so as to justly allow losses from transactions
involving one’s own trade or business and give such situations greater
range than those transactions that are of a more personal nature. While
these premises would appear to be valid, the results show that the small
businessman can be made to suffer dire tax consequences that do not
exist for his large corporate brothers.
So where do we go from here? There are few specific recommendations
that can be made because of the complexity of the issue and the interplay
among several sections of the code. However, one recommendation has
already been put forth in this area. In April 1980, the Federal Taxation
Division of the AICPA suggested that “the small business stock concept
should be expanded to include losses from direct loans to, or guaranty
losses upon, a small business enterprise ...” (section 1244 treatment).
The Institute suggested the establishment of an upper limit of $150,000.
This recommendation should be seriously considered because it would
create a “safe harbor” in which small business could operate without
regard to all of the definitional and interpretive problems that have been
illustrated here.
A piecemeal approach to the problems would entrench the parties in
the morass of code sections and tax cases on the subject and would
thus prolong any improvement. The section 1244 safe-harbor approach
could be done with little damage to the existing sections of the code.
This issue should be dealt with in the near future, since loan and
guarantee losses are a daily occurrence.

Excess Investment Interest Expense
Investment interest is “interest paid or accrued on indebtedness incurred
or continued to purchase or carry property held for investment.” On the
surface such a definition sounds simple and quite harmless, but you
can have too much of it, at least as far as the Internal Revenue Code
is concerned. If you are not a corporation, there are limits beyond which
you cannot deduct interest on debt that is not incurred in your trade or
business. The application of the limits applies to partnerships at the
partner level and subchapter S corporations at the shareholder level.
Once again—as long as you are a large corporation you don’t have this
problem.
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Congress decided that individual taxpayers should not be allowed to
have interest expense deductions substantially in excess of the income
that the resultant investment earns. Congress found that a “significant
number” of nontaxable high income returns claimed deductions for
interest other than home mortgages or business purposes. Thus, late in
1969 the investment interest limitation was born.
Joe Luck and his two nephews agree to buy Old Corporation for
$500,000. Joe is to buy 50 percent of the stock and Jeff and Jim will
buy 25 percent each. They borrow the money at 15 percent payable
over five years. In the first year, Joe incurs $35,000 in interest expense,
and Jeff and Jim each incur $17,500. Joe can deduct $25,000, his
nephews $10,000 each. Why only those amounts? Because that’s what
the law says.
Now Joe and his nephews can form a new corporation (let’s call it
Luck Corporation) to buy Old Corporation and have Luck Corporation
borrow the money from a bank. Luck Corporation can then file a
consolidated return with Old Corporation and claim the $70,000 interest
deduction. However, if they have to personally guarantee the loan and
the venture fails, it will be treated as a contribution to corporate capital.
A major problem encountered in the investment interest area is the
lack of regulatory guidance from the Treasury. As a result there tends
to be a general lack of awareness that the problem even exists. Some
business people are aware of investment interest but are under the
misconception that it only involves money borrowed for the purchase of
publicly traded stocks and bonds. In fact, it involves the purchase of
one’s own company, real estate, and equipment.
Property subject to a “net lease” is not regarded as property used in
a trade or business. If the lessor’s deductions under section 162
(management, repairs, supplies, insurance, commissions, and the like)
are less than 15 percent of rental income, he has a “net lease.” If the
lessor is guaranteed a specific return or is guaranteed against loss of
income, he has a “net lease.” Let’s look at the impact on the small
business community.
Noah Howe has been negotiating for the purchase of a business for
some time. He has a general knowledge of the legal advantages of using
a corporate structure to operate his business and of the “tax advantages”
of owning the real estate from which the business operates. Noah has
a limited amount of capital, so he needs some help. A local real estate
broker feels he has a potential buyer (U. N. Aware) for the real estate
who would lease it to Noah on a net lease basis. Noah can now proceed
with the purchase of the business.
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Mr. Aware is pleased to be able to purchase the property with a
built-in tenant. The real estate cost $600,000 ($50,000 land, $550,000
building), and he is able to mortgage $550,000 of it at 15 percent over
fifteen years. For 1983, he charges $95,000 in rent and has debt service
of $92,000, which is not a great cash yield, but let’s look at what Mr.
Aware thought his tax deductions would be. Under an accelerated cost
recovery system he can take $55,000 in depreciation and he has interest
expense of $82,000, so he foresees a tax loss of $42,000, which will
save him $21,000 in federal income taxes. Or will it?
First of all, the base amount allowable is $10,000. Then we can add
the amount of net investment income of $40,000 ($95,000 of rent less
depreciation of $55,000) to get a total allowable interest deduction of
$50,000 ($10,000 plus $40,000). Mr. Aware actually incurred $82,000
in interest expense, and therefore $32,000 must be carried over to
future years when it may be deducted, depending upon the circum
stances. Thus, U. N. Aware did not receive $16,000 of the $21,000 in
tax savings that he anticipated. The only way he can increase the
allowable deduction is to elect straight-line cost recovery. In that way,
he would only lose approximately $14,000 in interest deductions in
1983. In any event, had Mr. Aware been aware of the tax consequences
he probably would not have gone into the deal to begin with, and Noah
Howe would not have been able to buy his business.
Had Mr. Aware formed a corporation he would not have had the
deductibility problems we have seen. However, there would be no
current tax benefit, since subchapter S status is not currently available
under the circumstances, and in the long run he could have personal
holding company problems with a “regular” corporation. Why bother?
Could it be that Congress’s attempt to stem potential tax shelter
abuses actually impedes capital formation in the small business sector?
We have just seen how the purchase of a business, related real estate,
and equipment can create tax problems for the small businessman or
someone doing business with him, unless that someone is a large
corporation.
One approach to possibly remedy the situation is to provide a safe
harbor for individuals or entities engaging in transactions with “small
business enterprises” (SBEs). I would once again refer the reader to
Tax Recommendations to Aid Small Business published by the AICPA
in April 1980. An SBE would be an operating company within the
meaning of the section 1244 regulations and would meet certain size
and ownership tests, such as assets under $10 million and 50 percent
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or more ownership by direct investors and/or people active in the
business. Thus, anyone doing business with a qualifying SBE would
escape the investment interest limitations.
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WHAT IS AN SBPD?
by Ronald B. Cohen, CPA,

Cohen & Company

The small business participating debenture (SBPD) is a hybrid security
issued by a qualifying small business that—

•
•

Becomes a general obligation of the company.
Bears a stated rate of interest not less than a standard imputed
interest rate specified by the secretary of the Treasury.

•
•
•

Has a fixed maturity date.
Grants no voting or conversion rights in the company.

•

Provides for the payment to the investor of a share of the company’s
total earnings.
Provides an ordinary deduction to the company of both the interest
and share of earnings.

The stated interest received is taxable to the investor as ordinary
income. However, amounts paid as a distribution of the share of the
company’s earnings are taxable to the investor at the preferential long
term capital gains rate. An individual investor would generally treat
losses on SBPDs as ordinary losses.
The specified terms of the SBPD, such as the interest rate, maturity
date, and share of earnings, are negotiated at arm’s length between the
company and the investor with no government involvement.
An SBPD could only be issued by a domestic trade or business,
whether or not incorporated, that has a net equity of less than $10
million. Only companies that do not have securities outstanding that
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are subject to SEC regulation are eligible to use SBPDs. Additionally,
no company may have issued and outstanding, at one time, SBPDs with
a face value in excess of $1 million.

Why It Is Needed
America became great because of the foresight and courage of two very
different segments of our economy. One was represented by the hard
working, innovative entrepreneur and the other by his partner, the
wealthy individual or financial institution that supplied funds for new
and expanding enterprises. Today we have plenty of small business
owners who can fill the first role as well as ever, but, unfortunately,
there are few financial risk-takers willing to support their ventures. The
following discussion deals with some of the reasons.
The most common source of funds in the past has been commercial
banks, but with the gradual disappearance of the small, locally owned
and managed bank, these funds have become less available. Large,
structured banks are far less likely to finance closely held companies
than were their owner-managed predecessors.
More and more of the nation’s wealth is being accumulated by
insurance companies, pension benefit trusts, and other similar institu
tions. Regulations and traditional investment habits prevent these funds
from being directed toward risk situations. In fact, even low risk
situations, if they involve small businesses, are generally not accepted
in the institutional market place.
The motivation for an individual investor to direct his funds toward
small business has virtually disappeared. If he wants to become a
lender, he would have to charge an incredibly high interest rate to
warrant the additional risk he would be taking compared to money
market funds or similar investments. Whatever interest rate he earns,
however, will be subject to ordinary tax rates and, if the investment is
bad, he will incur a capital loss, having relatively little tax benefit to
offset the economic loss. On the other hand, should he turn to a purchase
of equity, there is no way to realize either return of or return on the
investment without either selling the holdings or being penalized by the
prohibitive second tax on dividends.
There are a limited number of private venture capitalists. Those that
do commit capital to emerging businesses traditionally finance only risk
situations with a potential for extraordinary growth, not traditional
expansion. In many instances, a substantial amount of equity and
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control must be given to the venture capitalist in order to secure this
financing. Many firms find these conditions unacceptable.

Is It Really the Answer?
Knowledgeable small businessmen, their advisers, and sophisticated
investors believe that the SBPD will finally provide the much needed
new source of capital for small businesses. It appears to solve many of
the problems mentioned above. An SBPD offers to the small business
capital without giving up equity or having to tap existing sources of
debt financing, which, if available, are often unaffordable. For the
investor, an SBPD offers a stated rate of return, plus a negotiated share
of the profits for a limited period of time.
The SBPD should attract new investors because it will offer an
opportunity to share in the fruits of a potentially flourishing business,
virtually unlimited profits in addition to a stated interest rate, tax
treatment of those profits at the capital gains rate and limited downside
risk (a loss minimized by a tax write-off).
An investor could be anyone who wants to invest in the future of
America through small business, provided the tax attributes of the
investment are compatible. For example, individuals who have confi
dence in a particular entrepreneur would no longer need to be reluctant
to risk their capital in his venture. Banks and insurance companies
would be motivated to allocate some of their monies into this exciting
segment of the economy. Finally, even the small investor could
participate through investment partnerships that would probably spring
up. These partnerships, mostly sponsored by stock brokerage firms,
might sell their units for as low as $5,000. Each partnership would
then make many investments, thereby reducing investor risk through
diversification. Naturally, the tax attributes of the investments would
pass through to the individual partners.
The investor will find that new or expanding businesses will become
one of the best places for his money, rather than one of the worst. He
will have the benefit of realizing the appreciation of his investment at
capital gains rates without having to dispose of it. The potential gain
on a successful investment would certainly warrant the risk. In summary,
he will have an investment with the security and yield potential of a
note, with the upside potential and tax attributes of stock.
For the entrepreneur, SBPDs will make available funds desperately
needed for product development, market development, or physical
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expansion. The typical small businessman will not mind generously
sharing his profit, as long as he knows that he is in control of his
company and that there is a predetermined method for him to pay off
his partner when his business can obtain conventional financing.
An additional advantage is the probability that there would be no
actual cost to the Treasury. The more likely result would be that such
investment would begin a cycle of activity that would generate capital
investment and new jobs, thereby creating more federal revenues.

Current Status
Various forms of the SBPD have been proposed from time to time in
both houses of Congress. The AICPA, in its Tax Recommendations to
Aid Small Business, and Small Business United, in its Washington
Presentation, strongly endorsed the SBPD concept. Currently, H.R.
4015, which follows in Appendix A, seems to be the most promising
attempt to adopt SBPD legislation.
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APPENDIX A
H.R. 4015
97th Congress, 1st Session. In the House of Representatives, June 25, 1981, Mr. Eckart
introduced the following bill, which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means.
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide long-term capital gain
treatment for distribution of earnings with respect to certain small business
participating debentures.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That (a) part IV of subchapter P of chapter
1 (relating to special rules for determining capital gain and loss) is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

“SEC. 1256. EARNINGS DISTRIBUTIONS UNDER SMALL
BUSINESS PARTICIPATING DEBENTURES.
“(a) In General.—For purposes of this subtitle amounts actually paid
during the taxable year to a taxpayer in respect of a small business participating
debenture which constitute the distribution of a share of the earnings of the
issuer, shall be treated as long-term capital gain.
“(b) Special Rules for Payments.—For purposes of this section and
section 163(e)—
“(1) Time for payment.—Payments under subsection (a) shall be deemed
to have been made on the last day of a taxable year if the payment is on
account of such taxable year and is made not later than the time prescribed
by law for the filing of the return for such taxable year (including extensions
thereof).
“(2) Order of payments.—Any payment in respect of a small business
participating debenture shall be treated first as a payment of interest until
all interest required to be paid under the debenture for such taxable year
and preceding taxable years is paid and then as a payment of earnings.

“(c) Small Business Participating Debenture Defined.—
“(1) In GENERAL.—The term ‘small business participating debenture’
means a written debt instrument issued by a qualified small business which—
“(A) is a general obligation of the qualified small business,
“(B) bears interest at a rate not less than the rate prescribed by the
Secretary under section 483(c)(1)(B),

“(C) has a fixed maturity,
“(D) grants no voting or conversion rights in the qualified small business
to the purchaser, and
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“(E) provides for the payment of a share of the total earnings of the
issuer.
“(2) Qualified

small business.—

“(A) In GENERAL.—The term ‘qualified small business’ means any
domestic trade or business (whether or not incorporated)—
“(i) the equity capital of which does not exceed $10,000,000
immediately before the small business participating debenture is issued,
“(ii) with respect to which, at the time the small business participating
debenture is issued, the face value of all outstanding small business
participating debentures issued (including such debenture) does not
exceed $1,000,000, and
“(iii) which has no securities outstanding which are subject to
regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission at the time of
issuance of the small business participating debenture.
“(B) CONTROLLED GROUPS.—For purposes of determining under sub
paragraph (A) the equity capital and outstanding small business partici
pating debentures of—
“(i) a member of the same controlled group of corporations (within
the meaning of section 1563(a), except that ‘more than 50 percent’
shall be substituted for ‘at least 80 percent’ each place it appears in
section 1563(a)(1)), and

“(ii) a member of a group of trades or businesses (whether or not
incorporated) which are under common control, as determined under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary which are based on principles
similar to the principles which apply under clause (i),
the equity capital and outstanding debentures of all members of such
group shall be taken into account.

“(C) Equity

capital.—For

purposes of this paragraph—

“(i) Corporation.—In the case of a corporation, the term ‘equity
capital’ has the same meaning as such term is used in section 44F(c)(6).
“(ii) Noncorporate business.—In the case of a trade or business
which is not organized as a corporation, equity capital shall be
determined under regulations prescribed by the Secretary which are
based on principles similar to the principles which apply under clause

(i).

“(D) Security subject

to

regulation by the

securities and

EXCHANGE COMMISSION.—For purposes of this paragraph, a security

subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission is a
security—
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“(i) registered on a national securities exchange under section 12(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
“(ii) registered or required to be registered under section 12(g) of
such Act (or which would be required to be so registered except for
the exemptions in subparagraphs (B) through (H) of such section); or
“(iii) issued by a company subject to the reporting requirements of
section 15(d) of such Act.
“(d) Related Parties; Personal Holding Companies.—
“(1) Debentures issued by a related party.—Subsection (a) shall not
apply to amounts paid in respect of a small business participating debenture
issued by a small business in which the taxpayer has an interest.
“(2) Debentures
tures.—If—

issued

by

person

holding

taxpayer’s

deben

“(A) a taxpayer acquires a small business participating debenture from
a small business, and
“(B) such small business or a person with an interest in such small
business acquired, before the acquisition described in subparagraph (A),
any such debenture from the taxpayer or any small business in which the
taxpayer has an interest,
subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to any payment in respect of a
debenture or portion of a debenture which is equal to the amount of the
proceeds of any such debenture acquired from the taxpayer or the small
business in which the taxpayer has an interest.

“(3) Interested taxpayer.—For purposes of this subsection, a taxpayer
shall be considered as having an interest in the issuer of a small business
participating debenture if—
“(A) in the case of a small business participating debenture issued by
a corporation, the taxpayer is considered, under section 318, to own—
“(i) 10 percent or more in value of the stock, or
“(ii) stock which represents 10 percent or more of the voting rights,
in the corporation or in a corporation which is a member of the same
controlled group of corporations (within the meaning of section 1563(a)),
or

“(B) in the case of a small business participating debenture issued by
a small business not organized as a corporation, the taxpayer owns, or is
considered to own (under regulations prescribed by the Secretary similar
to the regulations prescribed under section 318), more than 10 percent
of the profits or capital in the business.”.
(b) Interest Deductible as Interest Expense.—Section 163 (relating to

80

interest) is amended by redesignating subsection (e) as (f) and by inserting
after subsection (d) the following new subsection:

“(e) Interest and Other Amounts Paid on Small Business Partici
Debenture.—For purposes of this section (other than subsection (d)),
amounts paid as interest, and amounts paid as a share of earnings, on a small
business participating debenture (as defined in section 1256(b)) shall be treated
as interest.”
pating

(c) Treatment of Original Issue Discount Interest.—Section 1232
(relating to bonds and other evidences of indebtedness) is amended by
redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e) and by adding after subsection
(d) the following new subsection:
“(e) Small Business Participating Debentures.—Any small business
participating debenture (as defined in section 1256(b)) issued by a trade or
business other than a corporation shall be treated, for purposes of this section,
as if it were issued by a corporation.”.
(d) Losses on Small Business Participating Debentures Treated as
Ordinary Loss.—Section 1244 (relating to losses on small business stock) is
amended by adding at the end of subsection (d) the following new paragraph:

“(5) Small business participating debentures treated same as
1244 stock.—For purposes of this section, any loss on a small
business participating debenture (as defined in section 1256(c)) issued to an
individual shall be treated as if it were a loss on section 1244 stock issued
to that individual.”.
section

(e) Clerical Amendment.—The table of sections for such part is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following new item:

“Sec. 1256. Earnings distributions under small business participating
debentures.”.
(f) Effective Date.—

(1) In general.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), the amendments
made by this section shall apply with respect to taxable years beginning
after December 31, 1980, and to small business participating debentures
acquired after the date of enactment of this Act.
(2) PROCEEDS used to REPAY loans.—The amendments made by this
section shall not apply to any small business participating debenture issued
before or during calendar year 1981 if the proceeds of such debenture are
used to repay any loan of the issuing small business other than a loan—

(A) with a stated rate of interest in excess of the prevailing rate of
interest for businesses in the area in which such small business is located,
and
(B) secured by the inventory or accounts receivable of such small
business.
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LIMITATION ON
INVESTMENT OF ERISA
FUNDS
by Paul H. Jackson, FSA,

The Wyatt Company

For many years prior to the passage of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), pension funds were invested in a largely
unregulated environment. Most funds were held by banks or insurance
companies and invested in marketable stocks and bonds. Some were
invested very conservatively in high-grade bonds with little or no equity
investment. At the other extreme, a few pension funds invested
substantial amounts in the common stock of the sponsoring employer
or in property operated by the employer. In a number of instances,
company contributions to pension funds were made in the form of notes,
securities, or real property. As might be expected with a broad range
of practices, certain abuses occurred. In a few instances, employers
sold property to pension plans at unreasonably high prices or leased
back property owned by the plans at unreasonably low rental rates. In
one widely publicized case, the assets of the plan were transported to
Liberia in a satchel and invested in real estate on the west coast of
Africa. After a lengthy review of the practices and the various abuses,
Congress passed ERISA in 1974.
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The ERISA Solution
If a few bad actors are taking advantage of a situation, Congress can
either pass a law punishing the bad actors or pass a law prohibiting the
entire class of actions that encompasses the wrongdoing. This latter
approach is considered to be more easily administrable by the government
agencies charged with that task. Anyway, rather than imposing penalties
on the individuals responsible for the abuses that led to the passage of
ERISA, Congress elected to take the approach of imposing requirements
on all who operate tax-qualified programs. The legislation passed by
the House generally approached the investment problems from the
standpoint of requiring fair value in the transactions, so that any
transaction with a pension fund at a value less than fair value might
result in a penalty or jail term on the part of the person responsible.
The Senate, however, felt that it would be impossible to tell whether or
not a price was a fair price and accordingly its bill prohibited certain
transactions entirely, and the final ERISA legislation followed the Senate
version.
The three chief investment restrictions contained in ERISA are the
prudent man rule imposed by section 404, the prohibited transactions
in section 406, and the limits on employer securities in section 407.

Prudent Man Rule
Section 404(a) of ERISA requires the person responsible for the
investment of pension funds to discharge his duties “solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries” and “with the care, skill,
prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man, acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters,
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with
like aims.” It is indeed surprising that so little of value has resulted
from the injection of such noble language into our statute books. The
actual effect of this provision is to put those responsible for the
investment of pension plans in a position where they are sure to be safe
if they hand the funds over to a big bank or a big insurance company
that is known to handle many other similar pension funds. Only then
can one be certain of acting as other prudent men act. Furthermore,
this rule has tended to drive the big banks and insurance companies to
invest in the same set of blue-chip, top-tier securities because any
unusual investment taken on by a single investor would clearly not meet
the test of prudence. So far as small and medium-sized businesses are
concerned, this has resulted in almost a complete drying up of the
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funds available for equity, real estate purchase, or loans that had
formerly been available from locally controlled pension funds.

Prohibited Transactions
Section 406 of ERISA prohibits the sale or exchange or leasing of any
property between the plan and a party in interest or the lending of
money or furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan
and the party in interest. The law specifically prohibits the transfer of
any assets of the plan to a party in interest, and thus it was necessary
in subsequent Department of Labor regulations to state that a plan was
not precluded from paying benefits to an employee of the plan sponsor.
This section of the law has even prevented a labor union from lending
money on an interest-free basis to a health insurance fund that was
running out of cash—a loan that was to be repaid following collective
bargaining of a new contract! Indeed, it prohibits so many transactions
that the Department of Labor has issued broad-based exemptions,
generally freeing insurance companies, insurance agents, qualifying
banks, and security dealers from the requirements of the law and
regulations. The small businessman who is trying to invest his own
pension fund assets, however, is still covered by all of these rules.

Limits on Employer Securities
Section 407 of ERISA limits the investment of a pension plan in
employer securities or real property to the extent of more than 10
percent of the fund. Qualifying marketable obligations are limited so
that not more than 25 percent of the aggregate amount can be held by
the plan and at least 50 percent of the aggregate amount must be held
by persons independent of the issuer, thus precluding small businesses
with small obligations from going to their pension funds for this purpose.
Similarly, qualifying real property requires the existence of “a substantial
number of parcels dispersed geographically”—again preventing the
small business with a single location from making use of pension funds
for this purpose. In the years following enactment of ERISA, the
Department of Labor has responded to pressure from major organizations
and has exempted most such large groups from the difficult obligations
imposed by section 407. However, small businesses have not been
successful in obtaining a single exemption.

Investments Outside the United States
Section 404(b) of ERISA imposed a direct prohibition of the investment
of any assets of a pension plan outside the jurisdiction of the United
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States. The Department of Labor, in issuing regulations, extended an
automatic exemption to banks with equity capital in excess of $1 million,
insurance companies having a net worth in excess of $1 million, or
investment advisors managing in excess of $50 million. Thus, a small
business with specific knowledge of an investment opportunity in a
foreign country would be precluded from taking advantage of it by
reason of this provision. Small banks, small insurance companies, and
small investment advisers are also precluded from investing abroad.
Size alone qualifies the investor as being responsible!

Trends Among Lenders
Over the past twenty years, entirely apart from ERISA and its devel
opments, there have been a number of notable trends taking place in
the investment community. There has been a strong tendency for banks,
insurance companies, brokerage houses, and the like to become bigger,
and merger has proven to be the fastest way to accomplish this. One
result of such growth is that the lending institutions operating at the
local level are swallowed up into a larger organization, centrally located,
with more sophisticated investment research facilities. Those responsible
for investment decisions are then responsible for very much larger
amounts, and as a result they tend to move away from small loans
because of the paper work and other administrative burdens involved.
One investment house does have an advertising campaign announcing
that it makes money the old fashioned way (“We earn it”), but the fact
remains that it is much more exotic to be a 10 percent participant in a
$1 billion loan to Poland or Brazil than to be involved in 2,000 loans
averaging $50,000 each. In addition, with as many as 2,000 separate
loans, some of them must go bad, and the lending officer responsible
loses his reputation needlessly. In any case, the drive toward bigness
has tended to move substantial pools of money further and further away
from the small business borrowers.

The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982
The pension and savings plans operated by small businesses were
handed another setback with the passage of the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act (TEFRA) in August 1982. The decrease in the
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overall limits on contributions and benefits will mean that those
responsible for the establishment of such plans in small businesses will
have less personal advantage to gain from them, and greater obligations
imposed in the form of withholding requirements, reporting procedures,
and loans to participants. Furthermore, the “top heavy rules” will serve
to impose much stricter limits on small businesses than those that apply
to large businesses. While the purpose of TEFRA may have been to
prevent doctors and lawyers from incorporating and taking advantage of
our tax laws, the congressional solution once again is to impose stiffer
requirements on small business than those that are imposed on big
business. Fewer small businesses will be inclined to maintain pension
plans under these new stiffer requirements. If so, perhaps the restrictions
that now prevent small businesses from making use of their pension
funds in real estate purchases, inventory financing, or direct loans will
apply to so few small employers (those who actually have pension plans)
that relief will be unnecessary.

Positive Changes
Despite the lofty goals of ERISA in protecting the earned pensions of
long-service employees, it is accepted as fact today that ERISA is not
balanced legislation. While many pension funds have been strengthened
through stronger vesting rules, better investment practices, faster
funding, and the like, it can be demonstrated statistically that in the
eight years since the passage of ERISA, more employees have lost
pension rights by reason of the termination of soundly financed pension
plans or the failure of their employers to establish pension plans than
ever lost pension rights in all of the years prior to ERISA. Indeed, an
estimated 200,000 pension plans are now “missing” statistically, and
some 4 million employees lack coverage that they would demonstrably
have had if ERISA had not been passed. Second, it is important to note
that ERISA guarantees benefits that are expressed in dollar terms at a
point in time when the dollar has a half life of perhaps six or seven
years. The guarantees are of short duration; the loss is more likely to
be long term. Finally, while ERISA imposes massive controls to protect
the rights of employees to their retirement benefits, it also denies their
employers the right to borrow from the funds or to terminate the funds
without liability, and therefore may actually deprive some active
employees of their jobs. Far greater balance is necessary in the protection
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of employment-related rights than a single-minded focus on a stream of
pension payments to be made some years in the future to the exclusion
of all else.
The substantial repeal of the prohibited transactions section of ERISA
and of a large number of the reporting requirements as well as a
substantial portion of the law and regulations relating to the determination
of service credits under these plans (an area that is almost totally
ignored in practice) is necessary if we are to have a law that operates
fairly and reasonably with consideration for the interests of all parties.
Each of these areas has been found to be unworkable in the original
ERISA form. Each has been the subject of hundreds of pages of
regulations, largely incomprehensible to the average businessman, and
each has been made more “practical” by exempting the most commonly
occurring transactions. Prohibiting every transaction and then exempting
most is intellectually dishonest. Fair value may not be precisely
administrable by the Department of Labor, but the one extreme case of
abuse could be punished in the courts without imposing unreasonable
burdens on the 999 cases where there was no real problem anyway.
Some of these changes are being considered currently in Congress.
Legislation introduced by Congressman Erlenborn and Senator Nickles
would actually make some minor changes for the better in each of these
troublesome areas. Unfortunately, mixed in with these salutory relief
measures in the current drafts are further Draconian provisions that
would impose greater liability on those who sponsor pension plans as
opposed to thrift and savings plans. For example, consideration is now
being given to making the small businessman who sponsors a pension
plan legally liable for the full value of vested benefits, and this suggests
the elimination of all investment restrictions, since enlightened self
interest on the part of the plan sponsor should preclude the unreasonable
wasting of assets. With federal insurance for the employees through the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the only loser in a bad
investment is the employer whose costs subsequently go up. In addition,
this new and helpful legislation may even make the small businessman
“contingently liable” for any loss to the PBGC that arises up to fifteen
years after he sells his business! And this new “responsibility” could
even reach past the grave and deprive his widow of her mite! Here
again, the small businessman can avoid the problem only by not having
a pension plan at all, and of course this may also mean by not having
a union either!
There are not very many people in Washington, D.C. looking after
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the interests of the small businessman. Our laws are becoming increas
ingly complex, and the legislative process now incorporates a major
input from the government agencies that will be responsible for the
administration of a statute. Most of the complexity is due to these
government administrators and their effort to patch up every imaginable
loophole to prevent abuse. With the legislative balance thus destroyed,
we are left with mountains of laws, more mountains of regulations, and
massive noncompliance. It has been observed that every small busi
nessman must, by the law of large numbers, break at least one federal
law or regulation every time he makes a business decision. Still, as
Abe Lincoln might have phrased it, “God must have loved small
businessmen because he made so many of them.”
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APPENDIX A
THE PRUDENCE RULE AND PENSION PLAN
INVESTMENTS UNDER ERISA
U.S. Department of Labor
Labor-Management Services Administration
Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs

Submitted by Paul Antsen, Office of Fiduciary Standards,
Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs, U.S. Department of Labor

INTRODUCTION
A final regulation issued by the U.S. Department of Labor on June 26, 1979,
describes the provisions of the prudence rule under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and its requirements concerning the
investment duties of a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan under ERISA.
To assist benefit plan administrators and practitioners in carrying out their
fiduciary responsibilities, this booklet contains a presentation by the Admin
istrator of the Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs discussing the prudence
rule and its relation to the investment of pension plan assets.
In addition, the booklet contains the complete regulation as published in
the Federal Register.

ERISA’S PRUDENCE RULE AND PENSION PLAN
INVESTMENTS
Presentation by the Administrator,
Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs,
Labor-Management Services Administration,
U.S. Department of Labor
The private pension system now promises about 40 million active and retired
workers that they will receive or will continue to receive benefits during their
retirement. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act does not require
that such promises be made, but it does assure that they be kept.
ERISA’s assurances are based on four basic concepts—that workers must
become eligible for benefits after a reasonable length of service, that adequate
funds be set aside to provide promised benefits, that those managing the plan
and its funds meet certain standards of conduct, and that sufficient information
be made available to determine if the law’s requirements are being met.
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The pool of funds set aside to meet pension plan obligations now totals about
$300 billion and that figure is sure to increase. Recognizing the purposes of
ERISA and the potential impact on capital markets and on the economy in
general of regulation of such a large amount of funds, the architects of ERISA
designed its fiduciary responsibility provisions to protect the interests of plan
participants and beneficiaries and at the same time to provide appropriate
flexibility for the management of funds.
Under ERISA section 404(a)(1), plan fiduciaries, including persons to whom
named fiduciaries delegate certain fiduciary responsibilities, must discharge
their duties solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and,
(1) for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits and defraying reasonable
administrative expenses;
(2) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character and
with like aims (the prudent man rule);
(3) by diversifying plan investments so as to minimize the risk of large
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
(4) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions
of title I of ERISA.

Intention of Congress
It was the intention of Congress in framing these rules that retirement income
security of plan participants and beneficiaries be maximized. Congress did not
consider the rules to be unnecessary or unreasonable.
However, the prudent man rule and its relation to the investment of pension
plan assets has been the subject of debate since the enactment of ERISA, with
some saying that the rule as stated in the act is an unreasonable standard.
The Labor Department believes, as did Congress, that ERISA’s prudent man
rule is necessary and reasonable. A final regulation issued by the Labor
Department June 26, 1979, concerning the investment duties of fiduciaries un
der the prudent man rule is designed to provide guidance to investment man
agers in this area without reducing the flexibility now embodied in the law.
The Department makes it clear in the preamble to the regulation that the
regulation is a “safe harbor” type of rule which describes a manner of satisfying
the requirements of ERISA’s prudence rule and that the regulation does not
necessarily constitute the exclusive method for satisfying the requirements of
the prudence rule. The Department will view fiduciaries who comply with the
provisions of the regulation as having satisfied the requirements of the prudence
rule. This means that those who do not comply with the specific provisions of
the regulation will not necessarily be in violation of ERISA’s prudent man
rule.
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It also is made clear that the relative riskiness of a specific investment or
investment course of action does not render such investment either per se
prudent or per se imprudent.
Some comments on the proposed regulation urged the Department to specify
the extent to which investment vehicles which traditionally are not viewed as
trust investments, such as objects of art, are permissible under the prudence
rule. The Department does not consider it appropriate to provide any list of
investments or techniques—such as trading in options—that might be permis
sible because no such list could be complete. However, the preamble does
state that the universe of investments permissible under the prudence rule is
not necessarily limited to those permitted at common law.

Appropriate Consideration
The final regulation states that a fiduciary will meet the requirements of
ERISA’s prudent man rule with regard to an investment or investment course
of action taken if he has given appropriate consideration to those facts and
circumstances that, given the scope of his investment duties, he knows or
should know are relevant to the particular investment or investment course of
action involved, including the role the investment or investment course of
action plays in that portion of the plan’s investment portfolio with respect to
which the fiduciary has investment duties.
This language differs from that of the proposed version in several respects.
Some interpreted the proposed language that appropriate consideration be given
to “all” relevant facts and circumstances as an unreasonable and impossible
standard. That language was changed, recognizing that a fiduciary should be
required neither to expend unreasonable efforts in discharging his duties nor
to consider matters outside the scope of those duties.
The new language also takes into consideration multiple manager situations
so that in considering the role of an investment in a portfolio, the fiduciary is
required to consider the role it plays only in that portion of the plan’s portfolio
for which he is responsible.
In addition, the Department makes it clear in the preamble to the regulation
that in stating that an investment should be judged on the basis of the role it
plays in the portfolio rather than standing alone, the Department is not
suggesting either that any relevant or material attributes of a contemplated
investment may properly be disregarded, or that a particular plan investment
should be deemed to be prudent solely by reason of the propriety of the
aggregate risk-return characteristics of the plan’s portfolio.
The section of the regulation listing the factors involved in appropriate
consideration also was changed. The changes make it clear that the word
“diversification” is to be given its customary meaning as a mechanism for
reducing the risk of large losses, that the Department is not suggesting that
only certain portfolio management techniques are appropriate, and that liquidity
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needs involve all anticipated cash requirements of a plan and not just those
involving benefit payments.
Under the final regulation, “appropriate consideration” shall include but not
necessarily be limited to:
(1) a determination by the fiduciary that the particular investment or
investment course of action is reasonably designed, as part of the portfolio (or,
where applicable, that portion of the plan portfolio with respect to which the
fiduciary has investment duties), to further the purposes of the plan, taking
into consideration the risk of loss and the opportunity for gain (or other return)
associated with the investment or investment course of action, and
(2) consideration of the following factors as they relate to such portion of
the portfolio:
(i) the composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification;
(ii) the liquidity and current return of the portfolio relative to the anticipated
cash flow requirements of the plan; and
(iii) the projected return of the portfolio relative to the funding objectives
of the plan.

Investment Decisions
A new section was added to the final regulation in response to comments that,
in recognition of ERISA’s provisions permitting delegation and allocation of
investment duties, the Department regulation should specifically permit a
fiduciary who is responsible for the management of plan assets to rely on
information supplied by appropriate other plan fiduciaries, and to act in
accordance with policies and instructions supplied by those persons in making
investment decisions.
However, the Department does not agree with commentators who state that
a fiduciary is entitled blindly to rely on instructions or policies established by
other plan fiduciaries. While the primary responsibility for determining that a
delegation of authority to an investment manager is appropriate rests with the
named fiduciary effecting the delegation, the Department considers that the
prudent man rule includes a duty not to act in accordance with a delegation
of plan investment duties to the extent that the manager either knows or should
know that the delegation involves a breach of fiduciary responsibility.
Since information pertaining to a particular plan is, generally, peculiarly
within the knowledge of the persons responsible for administering that plan,
the regulation provides that a plan manager may rely on information provided
to him by appropriate plan fiduciaries if he neither knows nor should know
that the information is incorrect.
Similarly, the regulation does not state, as requested in one comment, that
the assets of a pooled investment fund may be invested in accordance with its
published investment objectives and policies without requiring that consider
ation be given to the particular needs of any individual plan that has an interest
in the fund.

92

I would like to point out that investment managers, as fiduciaries, are subject
not just to the prudent man rule but to all requirements of section 404(a)(1)
which I outlined earlier, including that they discharge their duties solely in
the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose
of providing benefits, diversifying investments, and in accordance with plan
documents and instruments insofar as the documents and instruments are
consistent with title I of ERISA.
As fiduciaries, they would be liable for a breach by a cofiduciary if they
know of a breach and do not make reasonable efforts to remedy it or if they
enable a cofiduciary to commit a breach by failing to comply with the above
mentioned provisions of section 404(a)(1) of ERISA.
The regulation I have outlined is designed to ensure that both the protections
of the interests of participants and beneficiaries and the flexibility in the area
of investment management which were provided by Congress in ERISA are
maintained and preserved.

RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR FIDUCIARY
RESPONSIBILITY; INVESTMENT OF PLAN ASSETS
UNDER THE “PRUDENCE ” RULE
Agency: Department of Labor.
Action: Final Regulation.
Summary: This document contains a final regulation relating to the investment
duties of a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (the Act). The regulation is relevant to the
investment of assets of employee benefit plans for which fiduciaries have
investment duties, and, therefore, it affects participants, beneficiaries and
fiduciaries of all such plans.
Effective Date: July 23, 1979.
For further information contact: Paul R. Antsen, Office of Fiduciary
Standards, Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs, U.S. Department of Labor,
Washington, D.C. 20216, (202) 523-6915, or Gregor B. McCurdy, Plan
Benefits Security Division. Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor,
Washington, D.C. 20216, (202) 523-8634.
Supplementary information: On April 25, 1978, notice was published in
the Federal Register (43 FR 17480)1 that the Department has under consideration
a proposal to adopt a regulation. 29 CFR § 2550.404a-1, under section
404(a)(1)(B) of the Act relating to the investment duties of a fiduciary of an
employee benefit plan. Section 404(a)(1)(B) of the Act provides, in part, that
a fiduciary—shall discharge his duties with respect to an employee benefit
plan with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and
with like aims (the “Prudence” rule).2
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Public comments were received, in response to the proposal, that generally
supported the tentative views of the Department reflected therein, although
many suggestions for specific revisions were offered. A few comments opposed
the adoption of the proposed, or of any, regulation concerning these matters.
Among the reasons given in opposition to the adoption of the proposed regulation
were: (1) that the courts, rather than the Department, should determine how
the “prudence” rule is to be interpreted; (2) that the Department’s views
regarding the requirements of the “prudence” rule, as reflected in the proposed
regulation are incorrect; (3) that it is impractical to attempt to define “prudence”
by regulation; and (4) that the proposal did not accomplish its stated objectives.
The Department has considered the comments opposing adoption of the
regulation, but has not been persuaded that its interpretation of the requirements
of “the prudence” rule set forth below is incorrect. It believes, moreover, that
adoption of a regulation concerning the investment duties of fiduciaries under
the “prudence” rule is appropriate because such a regulation would provide
guidance for many plan fiduciaries in an important area of their responsibilities
under the Act.
Counsel for one group of interested persons, while supporting the proposed
regulation in principle, asked that they be given an opportunity to express
their views at a public hearing on the proposed regulation. They also suggested
that the regulation should, in any event, be republished to give interested
persons additional opportunity for comment. The Department has considered
these requests, but has determined that neither a public hearing nor republi
cation of a proposed regulation is necessary or appropriate.
Accordingly, after consideration of all the written comments received, the
Department has determined to adopt the proposed regulation as modified and
set forth below.

Discussion of the Regulation
The legislative history of the Act indicates that the common law of trusts,
which forms the basis for and is federalized and codified in part 4 of Title I
of the Act, should, nevertheless, not be mechanically applied to employee
benefit plans.3 The “prudence” rule in the Act sets forth a standard built upon,
but that should and does depart from, traditional trust law in certain respects.
The Department is of the opinion that (1) generally, the relative riskiness of
a specific investment or investment course of action does not render such
investment or investment course of action either per se prudent or per se
imprudent, and (2) the prudence of an investment decision should not be
judged without regard to the role that the proposed investment or investment
course of action plays within the overall plan portfolio. Thus, although securities
issued by a small or new company may be a riskier investment than securities
issued by a “blue chip” company, the investment in the former company may
be entirely proper under the Act’s “prudence” rule.
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Accordingly, paragraph (b)(1) of the regulation, as adopted, provides generally
that, with respect to an investment or investment course of action taken
pursuant to a fiduciary’s investment duties, the requirements of the “prudence”
rule have been satisfied if the fiduciary has acted in a manner consistent with
appropriate consideration of the facts and circumstances that the fiduciary
knows or should know are relevant, including the role that the investment or
investment course of action plays in that portion of the plan’s investment
portfolio with respect to which the fiduciary has investment duties. Paragraph
(b), as adopted, has been modified in response to certain comments received
on the regulation as originally proposed.
As a general observation, the comments received by the Department indicated
that many commentators were uncertain of the scope of the proposed regulation.
In particular, some commentators appear to have viewed the various factors
and conditions set forth in the proposal as a statement of requirements that
must necessarily be met in order to satisfy the requirements of the “prudence”
rule. In this regard, it should be noted that the regulation reflects the views of
the Department as to a manner of satisfying the requirements of the “prudence”
rule, and does not purport to impose any additional requirements or constraints
upon plan fiduciaries. It should also be noted that the Department does not
view compliance with the provisions of the regulation as necessarily constituting
the exclusive method for satisfying the requirements of the “prudence” rule.
Rather, the regulation is in the nature of a “safe harbor” provision; it is the
opinion of the Department that fiduciaries who comply with the provisions of
the regulation will have satisfied the requirements of the “prudence” rule, but
no opinion is expressed in the regulation as to the status of activities undertaken
or performed that do not so comply.
With regard to more particular matters, a number of comments suggested
that one condition of the proposal—that a fiduciary give appropriate consid
eration to “all” relevant facts and circumstances—could be read as establishing
an impossible standard, especially for fiduciaries of small plans, because (1)
no fiduciary has unlimited resources to develop all the information that one
might deem to be relevant to a particular investment decision, and (2) no
fiduciary can be expected to consider all the relevant facts and circumstances,
whether or not of material significance.
Because section 404(a)(1)(B) of the Act provides that it is the fiduciary’s
duties with respect to the plan which must be discharged in accordance with
the “prudence” rule, it appears to the Department that the scope of those
duties will determine, in part, the factors which should be considered by a
plan fiduciary in a given case. The nature of those duties will, of course,
depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, including the nature of the
arrangement between the fiduciary and the plan. For that reason, the regulation,
as adopted, does not distinguish among classes of fiduciaries with respect to
what particular duties may be involved. The Department recognizes, however,
that a fiduciary should be required neither to expend unreasonable efforts in
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discharging his duties, nor to consider matters outside the scope of those
duties. Accordingly, the regulation has been modified to provide that consid
eration be given to those facts and circumstances which, taking into account
the scope of his investment duties, the fiduciary knows or should know are
relevant to the particular investment decision involved. The scope of the
fiduciary’s inquiry in this respect, therefore, is limited to those facts and
circumstances that a prudent person having similar duties and familiar with
such matters would consider relevant.
Several commentators asserted that the regulation, in recognition of the Act’s
provisions permitting delegation of investment duties to, and their allocation
among, several fiduciaries, should permit a fiduciary who is responsible for
the management of plan assets to rely on information supplied by appropriate
other plan fiduciaries, and to act in accordance with policies and instructions
supplied by those persons in making decisions on the investment of plan assets.
Those comments, generally, addressed the situation where several investment
managers are involved in managing the assets of a plan, each being responsible
for a portion of the plan’s investment portfolio.4 Under those circumstances, it
would not, in the view of the commentators, be appropriate to require a fiduciary
who is responsible for only a portion of the plan’s portfolio to take into
consideration facts and circumstances relating to the balance of the portfolio
in making an investment decision. The Department agrees, in part, with those
comments. Accordingly, paragraph (b)(1) of the regulation as adopted also
provides that such a fiduciary need give appropriate consideration to the role
the proposed investment or investment course of action plays in that portion
only, of the plan’s investment portfolio, with respect to which the fiduciary has
investment duties.
However, the Department cannot state that, under the foregoing circum
stances, a fiduciary is entitled blindly to rely upon instructions or policies
established by other plan fiduciaries. Similarly, the regulation does not provide,
as requested by one commentator, that the assets of a pooled investment fund
may be invested in accordance with its published investment objectives and
policies without requiring that consideration be given to the particular needs
of any individual plan that has an interest in the fund. It would appear that,
where authority to manage part (or all) of the assets of a plan has been delegated
to one or more investment managers pursuant to section 402(c)(3) of the Act,
the primary responsibility for determining that the delegation is appropriate
rests with the named fiduciary or fiduciaries effecting the delegation. Never
theless, the Department considers that each such manager’s investment duties,
under section 404(a)(1)(B) of the Act, includes (among other things) a duty not
to act in accordance with a delegation of plan investment duties to the extent
that the manager either knows or should know that the delegation involves a
breach of fiduciary responsibility.5 Once the manager has considered factors
otherwise necessary to assure himself that the delegation of investment authority
and related specific instructions are appropriate, he may, in exercising such
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authority and carrying out such instructions, rely upon information provided
to him in accordance with the provisions of new paragraph (b)(3) of the
regulation. That paragraph provides that an investment manager responsible
for the management of all or part of a plan’s assets pursuant to an appointment
described in section 402(c)(3) of the Act may, for purposes of complying with
the provisions of the regulation, rely upon certain information supplied to him
by or at the direction of the appointing fiduciary, provided that the manager
neither knows nor should know that the information is incorrect.
Paragraph (b)(1) of the proposed regulation has also been revised in order
to make clear that the fiduciary’s acts do not satisfy the “prudence” rule solely
because the fiduciary had previously given consideration to relevant facts and
circumstances. Some comments questioned whether, under the regulation as
originally proposed, a fiduciary might be deemed to be “immunized” once he
had given such consideration, notwithstanding the nature of his subsequent
acts. The regulation, as adopted, provides that it is the “investment” or
“investment course of action” in question that will satisfy the requirements of
the “prudence” rule if the criteria set forth in the regulation are met.
Paragraph (b)(2) of the regulation sets forth factors that are to be included,
to the extent applicable, in an evaluation of an investment or investment course
of action if a fiduciary wishes to rely on the provisions of the regulation. They
are: (1) the composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification; (2) the
liquidity and current return of the portfolio relative to the anticipated cash flow
requirements of the plan; and (3) the projected return of the portfolio relative
to the funding objectives of the plan. These factors are adopted substantially
as proposed, except that the first factor has been revised, in response to
questions raised by some of the comments, to make clear that the word
“diversification” is to be given its customary meaning as a mechanism for
reducing the risk of large losses; that factor, as originally proposed, referred
to “diversification of risk.” The second factor has also been modified in order
to make clear that its principal subject matter is all anticipated cash requirements
of the plan, and not solely those arising by reason of payment of benefits. A
fourth factor set forth in the proposal, which related to the “volatility” of the
portfolio, has been eliminated as a factor specifically to be considered because,
although paragraph (b)(2) as adopted sets forth factors which must be considered
in all cases in order to comply with the provisions of the regulation,6 the
reference to “volatility” may be read, according to some comments, as suggesting
that only certain portfolio management techniques are appropriate. Moreover,
as discussed more fully below, the subject of risk and opportunity for gain—
which subsumes consideration of “volatility” in some respects—is now addressed
in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (b)(2). A former fifth factor, which read “the
prevailing and projected economic conditions of the entities in which the plan
has invested and proposes to invest,” is also dealt with in that subparagraph.
Several commentators suggested that inclusion of that fifth factor in the
regulation would be contrary to the intent of the proposal because it focuses
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attention on the individual investment, rather than on the aggregate plan
portfolio. Others objected to its inclusion on the ground that it is antithetical
to the theory of operation of certain “passive” investment media (such as
“index” funds) that acquire portfolios designed to match the performance of
various investment indices and that, accordingly, have little or no discretion
in altering the composition of their portfolios.7
The regulation, however, is not intended to suggest either that any relevant
or material attributes of a contemplated investment may properly be ignored
or disregarded, or that a particular plan investment should be deemed to be
prudent solely by reason of the propriety of the aggregate risk/return charac
teristics of the plan’s portfolio. Rather, it is the Department’s view that an
investment reasonably designed—as a part of the portfolio—to further the
purposes of the plan, and that is made upon appropriate consideration of the
surrounding facts and circumstances, should not be deemed to be imprudent
merely because the investment, standing alone, would have, for example, a
relatively high degree of risk. The Department also believes that appropriate
consideration of an investment to further the purposes of the plan must include
consideration of the characteristics of the investment itself. Accordingly,
paragraph (b)(2) of the regulation provides that, for purposes of paragraph
(b)(1), “appropriate consideration” shall include a determination by the fiduciary
that the particular investment or investment course of action is reasonably
designed, as part of the portfolio for which the fiduciary is responsible, to
further the purposes of the plan, taking into account the risk of loss and the
opportunity for gain (or other return) associated with the investment or investment
course of action.8
In the case of “passive” investment funds, referred to above, it would seem
that, to the extent the fund manager is managing plan assets,9 the investments
made by the fund, as well as the plan’s investment in the fund, must meet the
requirements of the “prudence” rule. However, to the extent that an index
fund, including the screen or filter process described at note 7, is reasonably
designed to fulfill the fund manager’s fiduciary obligations with respect to a
plan whose assets are managed therein, such manager, acting in accordance
with the fund’s objective and its filter or screen process, generally would be
in compliance with the provisions of the “prudence” rule, as described in the
regulation, with respect to that plan.
The terms “investment duties” and “investment course of action” are defined
in paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) of the regulation. No comments were received
regarding these definitions, and they have been adopted substantially in the
form proposed. New paragraph (c)(3) has been added, defining the term “plan”
to mean an employee benefit plan to which Title I of the Act applies.

Discussion of Certain Other Comments
Counsel for one group of commentators characterized the factors set forth in
paragraph (b)(2) as relating solely to the “investment merit” of a particular
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investment or investment course of action. Because, in the view of those
commentators, the prudence of the acquisition or retention of a contract issued
by an insurance company may involve factors besides “investment merit,” they
suggested that the regulation should contain a separate provision that would
set forth two factors to be considered by a fiduciary in evaluating the prudence
of the acquisition or retention of such a contract: the risks assumed, and the
services provided, by the insurance company. The Department is unable to
concur with the commentators’ view that the regulation as proposed dealt only
with matters of “investment merit” as narrowly perceived in the comment. The
Department agrees that such factors as the risk to be assumed and the services
to be provided under a contract are pertinent to any investment decision
involving such contract. The regulation as adopted specifically provides that,
in order to come within the scope of the regulation, a fiduciary shall consider
the facts and circumstances the fiduciary knows or should know are relevant
to the investment decision, and that the factors set forth in paragraph (b)(2)
are not intended to be exclusive. Accordingly, the Department believes that it
is unnecessary to set forth additional factors with respect to insurance contracts
or other specific types of investment.
Two commentators suggested that the Department clarify that the adoption
of the regulation would not result in fiduciaries being required to invest in
expensive systems or analyses to make investment decisions. Under the
“prudence” rule, the standard to which a fiduciary is held in the proper
discharge of his investment duties is defined, in part, by what a prudent person
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would do. Thus, for
example, it would not seem necessary for a fiduciary of a plan with assets of
$50,000 to employ, in all respects, the same investment management techniques
as would a fiduciary of a plan with assets of $50,000,000.
Numerous comments were received with respect to the factors set forth in
paragraph (b)(2). Several persons requested that the Department clarify or
define terms such as “diversification of risk,” “risk,” “volatility” and “liquidity.”
For example, some persons asked what specific measurements of volatility,
risk and liquidity should be utilized by fiduciaries in making investment
decisions for a plan. The Department believes that, in view of the modifications
(discussed above) made in the regulation as adopted, it is neither necessary
nor appropriate for the regulation to contain such definitions.
Several commentators asserted that certain specified types of investments,
such as, for example, investments in small or recently formed companies, or
non-income-producing investments that are not securities (such as, for example,
certain precious metals and objects of art) have not been viewed with favor,
traditionally, as trust investments. Those comments urged that the regulation
specify the extent to which such investments are permissible under the
“prudence” rule. Other commentators made reference to the traditional principle
that trust investments should be income-producing, and suggested that the
appropriate measure of investment “return” should be defined to mean “total
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return”—that is, an aggregate return computed without regard to whether a
contributing factor thereto consists of income or capital items. Although the
Department considers that defining “return” would be beyond the appropriate
scope of this regulation, it believes that the “prudence” rule does not require
that every plan investment produce current income under all circumstances.
As indicated above and in the preamble to the proposed regulation, the
Department believes that the universe of investments permissible under the
“prudence” rule is not necessarily limited to those permitted at common law.
However, the Department does not consider it appropriate to include in the
regulation any list of investments, classes of investment, or investment
techniques that might be permissible under the “prudence” rule. No such list
could be complete; moreover, the Department does not intend to create or
suggest a “legal list” of investments for plan fiduciaries.
The preamble to the proposed regulation stated (as does this preamble) that
the risk level of an investment does not alone make the investment per se
prudent or per se imprudent. Comments were received which asserted that such
proposition is inappropriate and would promote irresponsibility on the part of
plan fiduciaries. Other commentators not only agreed with the proposition, but
also suggested that it should be incorporated in the regulation. The Department
believes that both of these concerns are addressed by the modifications,
discussed above, made to paragraph (b)(2) of the regulation as adopted.
The Department has determined that this regulation is not a “significant
regulation” as defined in the Department’s guidelines (44 FR 5570, January
26, 1979) implementing Executive Order 12044.

Statutory Authority
The regulation set forth below is adopted pursuant to the authority contained
in section 505 of the Act. (Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 894 [29 U.S.C. § 1135].)
Although the regulation is an “interpretative rule” within the meaning of 5
U.S.C. § 553(d), the effective date of the regulation is July 23, 1979, consistent
with the statement of the Department, in connection with the regulation as
proposed, that such regulation would be effective 30 days after its adoption.

Final Regulation
Accordingly, Part 2550 of Chapter XXV of Title 29 of the Code of Federal
Regulations is amended by inserting in the appropriate place to read §
2550.404a—1 as set forth below:

§ 2550.404a—1 Investment Duties
(a) In general. Section 404(a)(1)(E) of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (the Act) provides, in part, that a fiduciary shall discharge
his duties with respect to a plan with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
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under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims.
(b) Investment Duties. (1) With regard to an investment or investment course
of action taken by a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan pursuant to his
investment duties, the requirements of section 404(a)(1)(B) of the Act set forth
in subsection (a) of this section are satisfied if the fiduciary (A) has given
appropriate consideration to those facts and circumstances that, given the
scope of such fiduciary’s investment duties, the fiduciary knows or should know
are relevant to the particular investment or investment course of action involved,
including the role the investment or investment course of action plays in that
portion of the plan’s investment portfolio with respect to which the fiduciary
has investment duties; and (B) has acted accordingly.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection, “appropriate consid
eration” shall include, but is not necessarily limited to, (A) a determination
by the fiduciary that the particular investment or investment course of action
is reasonably designed, as part of the portfolio (or, where applicable, that
portion of the plan portfolio with respect to which the fiduciary has investment
duties), to further the purposes of the plan, taking into consideration the risk
of loss and the opportunity for gain (or other return) associated with the
investment or investment course of action, and (B) consideration of the following
factors as they relate to such portion of the portfolio:
(i) The composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification;
(ii) The liquidity and current return of the portfolio relative to the anticipated
cash flow requirements of the plan; and
(iii) The projected return of the portfolio relative to the funding objectives
of the plan.
(3) An investment manager appointed, pursuant to the provisions of section
402(c)(3) of the Act, to manage all or part of the assets of a plan, may, for
purposes of compliance with the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this
subsection, rely on, and act upon the basis of, information pertaining to the
plan provided by or at the direction of the appointing fiduciary, if—
(A) such information is provided for the stated purpose of assisting the
manager in the performance of his investment duties, and
(B) the manager does not know and has no reason to know that the information
is incorrect.
(c) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
(1) The term “investment duties” means any duties imposed upon, or
assumed or undertaken by, a person in connection with the investment of plan
assets which make or will make such person a fiduciary of an employee benefit
plan or which are performed by such person as a fiduciary of an employee
benefit plan as defined in section 3(21)(A)(i) or (ii) of the Act.
(2) The term “investment course of action” means any series or program of
investments or actions related to a fiduciary’s performance of his investment
duties.
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(3) The term “plan” means an employee benefit plan to which Title I of the
Act applies.

Signed at Washington, D.C., this 20th day of June 1979.
Ian D. Lanoff, Administrator, Pension and Welfare Benefit Programs. LaborManagement Services Administration. United States Department of Labor.

NOTES
1. See also 43 FR 27208 (June 23, 1978), in which notice was given of an extension of the
original comment period.
2. The regulation pertains only to the investment duties of a fiduciary of an employee benefit
plan. Section 404(a)(1)(B) of the Act, however, requires that a fiduciary discharge all his duties
in accordance with the “prudence” rule.
It should also be noted that, although the proposed regulation made reference to an additional
requirement of section 404(a)(1)—that the fiduciary discharge his duties solely in the interest of
plan participants and beneficiaries—that reference has been deleted from the regulation as adopted.
This was done to avoid suggesting that satisfaction of the “prudence” rule with respect to an
investment or investment course of action necessarily implies satisfaction of that additional
requirement.
3. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974).
4. See sections 403(a)(2) and 402(c)(3) of the Act.
5. Further, section 405(a) of the Act provides, in part, that a plan fiduciary shall be liable for a
breach of fiduciary liability of another fiduciary with respect to the same plan if, among other
things, he has knowledge of such a breach and does not make reasonable efforts to remedy it, or
he has enabled such other fiduciary to commit a breach by his failure to comply with the
requirements of section 404(a)(1) of the Act in the administration of his specific responsibilities
which give rise to his status as a fiduciary.
6. Paragraph (b)(2) of the regulation, as proposed, stated that the factors which should be
considered “may” include those listed. In order to reduce uncertainty, reflected in the comments,
regarding the application of the regulation, and in view of the fact that the regulation is in nature
of a “safe harbor” provision, paragraph (b)(2) has been restructured so as to indicate the factors
which should under all circumstances be considered by any fiduciary who wishes to rely on the
provisions of the rule.
7. It should be noted that index funds typically include a “screen” or “filter” process by which
portfolio investments for any such fund may be changed to reflect significant, adverse financial
developments affecting any potential or existing portfolio company, notwithstanding the continued
inclusion of the company in the index against which the fund is measured.
8. The term “risk” is used here in its ordinary sense, and refers to any and all types of risk
applicable to a particular investment or investment course of action.
9. See, e.g., section 401(b) of the Act.
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APPENDIX B
DISCUSSION GUIDE
Prepared by Mark Rollinson, Esq.,

I.

Rollinson, Nucci & Grabell

Technical Framework
A.

Types of Plans

There are basically four types of retirement plans, and it is a mistake
to treat them all the same. They are listed below in roughly descending
order of importance, measured by assets under management.

1.

Defined Benefit Plans

Under defined benefit plans the employer is more of an insurer
than anything else, and the largest single asset of most plans
is, in effect, an “account receivable” from the employer—the
unfunded liability. (Is this “prudent”?)

A strong argument can be made that these plans should be
regulated as if they were in fact insurance companies. Following
the Wisconsin model now used in many states, allowance would
be made for size, experience, and maturity, with decreasing
gradations of regulation of investment practices.

Like insurance company shareholders, the sole beneficiary of
superlative investment performance, and the first victim of
adverse performance, is the employer. Actuarial ability to keep
promises is the sole legitimate social/regulatory concern.
2.

Defined Contribution Annuities
Each time a contribution is made to these plans an annuity is
purchased for each beneficiary from an insurance company.
ERISA regulation of these plans is ritualistic, formalistic, and
unnecessary.

3.

Defined Contribution Plans, Group

These plans are in the nature of closed-end mutual funds. Yet
the shareholders are not allowed to vote and there is no stated
investment policy.
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These plans, arguably, should most benefit from the new
definition of “prudence”—mandating a diversified risk policy.

4.

Defined Contribution Plans, Individual Record
These plans are like small trust accounts or IRAs with a common
trustee and no beneficiary control. These usually end up becoming
defined contribution annuities because corpus is never large
enough to develop a diversified investment strategy.

B.

Reasons for Investment Phenomena

Before trying to induce pension managers to invest in small enter
prises, it is mandatory to identify the perceived present restraints.
While most seem to point to the “prudent man rule,” this may not
be (and probably is not) the real reason. After all, roughly 40 percent
of all large pension funds now have at least one significant investment
in venture capital partnerships. It is unlikely that there are this many
professional pension managers who misread the prudent man rule.

The principal reason probably is lack of skill! If so, a 5 percent
safe-harbor basket would do more damage than good. If so, a tight
“plan asset” rule would be counterproductive.

II.

Social Policy Issues
A.

Allocation of Resources Function

In a capitalist society, an extremely important function, arguably, is
allocation of capital resources.
Pension and profit-sharing managers are far removed from the “front
line” and essentially have abdicated their responsibility. “Index
investing” is the most flagrant example of abdication. (The subtleties
of “plan asset” arguments are ludicrous in a regulatory framework
where “index investing” is possible.)
B.

Allocation of Resources Application
Small enterprises are significant contributors to the corpus of pension
resources. Yet the large competitors of small enterprises are the
principal beneficiaries of the allocation of these resources.

C.

Free Market

Experience seems to teach that tampering with free market forces is
counterproductive in all instances except some natural monopolies
and except for a moral framework, for example, the fraud of promising
a defined benefit without being able to deliver.
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III. Possible Change
A.

Wrenching Change

1.

Taxation
If it is deemed desirable that more pension and profit-sharing
plan resources be allocated to smaller enterprise, the simplest,
easiest, and most effective way to achieve the objective is through
taxation of corpus. For example, one might levy a 2 percent tax
on corpus of all plans and allow a credit of 10 percent of corpus
invested in small business and 10 percent of corpus invested in
medium-sized business.

2.

Free Choice
It may make sense to allow beneficiaries of defined contribution
plans to vote upon whether they want a more conservative or
more liberal investment policy.

3.

State Regulation Model

It may make sense for defined benefit plans to be regulated
along the model of state regulation of insurance companies.
B.

Modest Change
1.

Plan Assets
The single most needed change, arguably, is a plan asset policy
that permits third-party management of small enterprise invest
ment without disruption to proven effective activities in that
business, for example, leverage and incentives.
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Fringe and
Retirement Benefits
Equity

RETIREMENT BENEFITS
EQUITY
by John S. Nolan, Esq.,

Miller & Chevalier, Chartered

Tax Treatment of Retirement Plans for
the Self-Employed
Prior to 1962, self-employed persons were not eligible to participate in
qualified retirement plans. Although deductible contributions by selfemployed persons were permitted after the enactment of H.R. 10, they
were conditioned upon a host of special restrictions. In 1974, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) liberalized the
original H.R. 10 rules somewhat by increasing the limits on deductible
contributions and authorizing the establishment of defined benefit plans
for self-employed persons, but the special restrictions applicable only
to H.R. 10 plans remained intact.
While the changes made by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
(ERTA) fell short of achieving full equality of treatment for self-employed
persons, they went a considerable way in closing the gap between the
self-employed and their corporate counterparts. Most of the amendments
apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1981.1
Three changes of particular significance are discussed herein.

1. Self-employed persons were permitted to make deductible vol
untary contributions to H.R. 10 plans and Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRAs).
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2. The dollar limitations applicable to an employer’s H.R. 10
contributions were increased.

3. The prohibition on plan loans was extended to all self-employed
persons (not merely owner-employees).

The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA)
dramatically altered the tax treatment of retirement plans for selfemployed persons by (1) repealing some of the special restrictions
imposed on H.R. 10 plans, (2) extending other H.R. 10 rules to all
qualified plans, including corporate plans, and (3) applying many of
the remaining restrictions only to plans that primarily benefit key
employees (whether employed by corporate or noncorporate employers).
Most of the provisions relating to parity between corporate and noncor
porate plans apply to years beginning after December 31, 1983.
When the provisions of TEFRA take effect, the tax benefits of a
retirement plan will no longer turn on the form of business organization
maintaining the plan; rather, the crucial factor will be whether the plan
is a top-heavy plan, which primarily benefits “key employees.” A
defined benefit plan is top-heavy if, as of the last day of the preceding
plan year, the present value of the cumulative accrued benefits for key
employees exceeds 60 percent of the analogous sum for all employees.2
A defined contribution plan is top-heavy if, as of the last day of the
preceding plan year, the aggregate of the accounts of key employees
exceeds 60 percent of the analogous sum for all employees.3
If several plans of the same employer must be aggregated, each of
the plans will constitute a top-heavy plan if the “aggregation group” is
a “top-heavy group.”4 On the other hand, if the aggregation group is
not a top-heavy group, no plan in the group will be treated as a topheavy plan.
A “key employee” is any plan participant (including a self-employed
individual) who, at any time during the plan year or any of the four
preceding plan years, was one or more of the following:5
•

An officer of the employer, as determined by reference to duties
rather than title, but in no event will more than fifty employees
(or, if lesser, the greater of three employees or 10 percent of the
employees) be treated as officers6
One of the ten employees actually or constructively owning the
largest interests owned by employees in the employer
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•

A 5 percent owner of the employer (including constructive own
ership)

•

A 1 percent owner of the employer having an annual compensation
(or earned income, in the case of a self-employed individual) of
more than $150,000.

Voluntary Contributions to H.R. 10 Plans
and IRAs
One of ERTA’s most important provisions has not been significantly
affected by the enactment of TEFRA; deductible contributions may now
be made to an IRA even though the individual is an “active participant”
in a qualified H.R. 10 plan or corporate plan.7 Alternatively, an
individual may make voluntary deductible contributions directly to a
qualified plan, if the plan so permits.8 A self-employed person may
make these deductible contributions without making additional contri
butions on behalf of common-law employees.
A self-employed person may make a voluntary deductible contribution
of up to $2,000 per year to an H.R. 10 plan or an IRA.9 The deductible
amount may be as much as $2,250 if contributions are also made to an
IRA for the self-employed person’s spouse.10 If the spouse also has
earned income, the spouse may contribute up to $2,000 per year to a
separate IRA (or to his or her employer’s qualified plan).
As under prior law, distributions from an IRA must commence no
later than age 701/2 and must be made within a prescribed time after
the individual’s death.11 Similar rules will apply to deductible voluntary
employee contributions (as well as employer contributions) in plan years
beginning after December 31, 1983.12 Other IRA rules have also been
extended to deductible voluntary employee contributions, such as—

•

Distributions made prior to age 591/2 will be subject to a 10
percent excise tax penalty, except in the case of death or
disability.13

•

If an employee borrows from the contributed funds, or pledges
them as security for a loan, the transaction may be treated as a
taxable distribution.14

•

Similarly, if such contributions are applied toward the purchase
of life insurance, the amount so applied will be treated as a
taxable distribution.15
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•

Deductible voluntary contributions and the earnings thereon will
not qualify for ten-year forward averaging or capital gains treat
ment, although they will qualify for the estate tax exclusion.16

Employer Contributions to H.R. 10 Plans
Advantages Obtained Under ERTA
Congress reduced the extent of discrimination against self-employed
persons in 1981 by liberalizing the special rules governing employer
contributions to H.R. 10 plans. The changes described below affect all
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1981, and before January
1, 1984.
ERTA increased the deduction limit for employer contributions to
defined contribution H.R. 10 plans from $7,500 to $15,000 per year,
but, as under prior law, the deductible amount was limited in any case
to 15 percent of earned income.17 The level of benefits permitted under
a defined benefit plan that includes self-employed persons was also
increased.18
ERTA increased the limit on the amount of a self-employed person’s
compensation that may be taken into account under an H.R. 10 plan,
but imposed corresponding restrictions on the rate at which contributions
must be made for common-law employees. In general, the rate at which
contributions are made for self-employed persons in relation to their
compensation has not been permitted to exceed the rate of contribution
for common-law employees (except to the extent integration with social
security is permitted).19 Under ERTA, a self-employed person may take
his actual earnings into account up to $200,000—an increase of
$100,000 over the old limit.20
However, to insure that plans would not reduce contributions that
would otherwise have been required for common-law employees, ERTA
prescribed minimum contribution levels; if compensation exceeding the
old limit of $100,000 was actually taken into account for a particular
plan year, contributions on behalf of a common-law employee would
have to be made at a rate not less than 7.5 percent of compensation
(the rate required, under old law, to obtain the maximum deduction of
$7,500).21 At present, section 401(j) of the Internal Revenue Code
imposes a comparable limitation on the benefit that may accrue on
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behalf of a self-employed person under a defined benefit H.R. 10 plan
in a single year.
An employer’s social security contributions may be considered in
determining whether integrated H.R. 10 plans satisfy these minimum
contribution or benefit requirements. Similarly, if “comparable” plans
are maintained for self-employed persons and common-law employees,
the contributions and benefits under the plan for common-law employees
may be taken into account.

Equal Treatment Under TEFRA
Effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1983, Congress
abandoned most of the special restrictions governing employer contri
butions to H.R. 10 plans. The $15,000 deduction limit for contributions
to an H.R. 10 plan on behalf of a self-employed individual was re
pealed.22 The special limitation on benefit accruals under defined benefit
H.R. 10 plans was also repealed.23 In addition, TEFRA repealed the
special restrictions on the amount of a self-employed person’s compen
sation that may be taken into account under H.R. 10 plans.24 As a
result of these changes, employer contributions to H.R. 10 plans will
be subject to virtually the same limitations as corporate plans.
A new set of special restrictions on employer contributions will apply
to top-heavy plans, beginning in 1984.
For any plan year in which a plan is a top-heavy plan, only the first
$200,000 of an employee’s compensation (or earned income) may be
taken into account in determining contributions or benefits under the
plan. Beginning in 1986, this $200,000 limit will be adjusted for costof-living changes.25
A top-heavy plan must provide to each participant who is a non-keyemployee a minimum contribution or minimum benefit based on the
participant’s compensation.26 These minimum amounts are to be provided
without regard to any social security contributions or benefits.27 But if
a non-key-employee participates in both defined benefit and defined
contribution plans of the employer, the employer is not required to
provide the employee with both the minimum benefit and the minimum
contribution.28
A top-heavy plan must vest an employee in his accrued benefit
attributable to employer contributions in accordance with either a threeyear full vesting schedule or a six-year graded vesting schedule.29 With
certain exceptions, if a key employee participates in a defined benefit
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plan and a defined contribution plan, both of which are included in a
top-heavy group, the aggregate section 415 limit on benefits and
contributions is reduced to 1.0, rather than 1.25.30

Loans to Plan Participants
Added Restrictions Under ERTA
ERTA extended the prohibition on plan loans to all self-employed
persons (not merely owner-employees, as under prior law).31 Thus, prior
to TEFRA, any loan from an H.R. 10 plan or a pledge of an interest
in the plan as security for a loan, was treated as a currently taxable
distribution, regardless of the bona fides of the transaction. In contrast,
prior to the enactment of TEFRA, the law did not preclude a participant
in a corporate plan from borrowing from the plan.32 Nevertheless, loans
from a corporate plan of amounts transferred from an H.R. 10 plan to
the corporate plan after January 1, 1982, presumably would be treated
as a taxable distribution under ERTA.33

Equal Treatment Under TEFRA
TEFRA established a new general rule: A loan from any “qualified
employer plan,” or a pledge of an interest in the plan, will be treated
as a taxable distribution to the recipient.34 The new provisions apply to
any loan, pledge, or assignment made after August 13, 1982, as well
as any loan that is renegotiated, renewed, or extended after that date.35
However, a transition rule mitigates the harsh impact of this effective
date.36 The restrictions imposed by ERTA on loans from H.R. 10 plans
have been repealed, effective after August 13, 1982, and the new rules
described herein are applicable to such loans.37
New section 72(p) of the code contains an exception to the general
rule, which provides that a loan meeting the following requirements will
not be treated as a taxable distribution:

•
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The loan cannot exceed the lesser of $50,000 or 50 percent of
the present value of the employee’s nonforfeitable accrued benefit
under the plan (but not less than $10,000). The dollar limitation
is applied cumulatively; thus, all prior outstanding loans, including
those made on or before August 13, 1982, must be taken into
account.

•

The loan must, by its terms, be repayable within five years, unless
it is used to acquire, construct, or rehabilitate any dwelling unit
that is to be used as the principal residence of the participant
within a “reasonable time.”

If the loan exceeds the limits described above, the excess will be treated
as a taxable distribution under taxable section 72. However, to the
extent that the participant has made nondeductible employee contri
butions to the plan, the loan may be treated as a nontaxable return of
the participant’s basis.
For purposes of the income tax rules governing distributions, repay
ments of amounts previously taxed as distributions will be treated as
nondeductible employee contributions. Thus, the repaid amounts may
subsequently be distributed tax-free. However, the repaid amounts will
not be deemed employee contributions for purposes of those rules
limiting nondeductible employee contributions and annual additions on
behalf of an employee or those rules allowing the employee to make
deductible voluntary contributions to a qualified plan.38
If a loan from a top-heavy plan to a key employee is treated as a
distribution, it may be subject to the 10 percent excise tax imposed on
premature distributions.39 A loan that is treated as a distribution will
be subject to the new withholding provisions.40
The conference report (but not the statute) states that “plan investments
(including investments in residential mortgages) which are made in the
ordinary course of an investment program will not be considered as
loans if the amount of the mortgage loan does not exceed the fair market
value of the property purchased with the loan proceeds.”41 A loan made
at the direction of a participant will not be considered a loan made as
part of an investment program. Moreover, no loan that benefits an
officer, director, or owner will be treated as an investment.

Incorporation: The Relative Advantages
Prior to the enactment of TEFRA, numerous tax benefits were available
to professionals who chose to practice in corporate form. Many of the
advantages of incorporation will continue to exist for another year or
more, and these are discussed below. Nevertheless, it must be noted
at the outset that TEFRA has drastically reduced the number of
advantages to be gained from incorporation.
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Limit on Employer Contributions. Before TEFRA, valuable tax
deferral advantages arose from the fact that larger contributions could
be made to a qualified corporate retirement plan than to an H.R. 10
plan. In 1982, employer contributions to a defined contribution plan on
behalf of any corporate employee were limited to the lesser of 25 percent
of compensation or $45,475.42 This far exceeded the $15,000 ceiling
established by ERTA for H.R. 10 plans. Furthermore, the disparity was
expected to grow with inflation, since only the limit on corporate plan
contributions had been indexed to cost-of-living changes.43 The larger
contributions permissible under corporate plans also increased the
benefit of the estate tax exclusion.44
Under TEFRA, employer contributions to H.R. 10 plans will even
tually be subject to the same indexed limits as employer contributions
to corporate plans. The dollar limit for contributions to profit-sharing
plans and other defined contribution plans maintained by corporations
has been reduced to $30,000, effective for all years beginning after
December 31, 1982.45 The dollar limit applicable to H.R. 10 plans will
be increased to the same level after December 31, 1983.46
The cost-of-living adjustments to the dollar limits have been suspended
until 1986, at which time the limits will be adjusted for post-1984 costof-living increases (as measured by the social security benefit index).47
Section 245 of TEFRA imposes a $100,000 cap on the estate tax
exclusion otherwise applicable to amounts payable under qualified
retirement plans. The new limit applies to estates of decedents dying
after December 31, 1982.

Limit on Annual Benefits. Before TEFRA’s enactment, the max
imum benefit permitted under a defined benefit pension plan was also
greater for corporate employees than for their self-employed counterparts.
In 1982, a corporate employer was allowed to fund an annual pension
benefit of as much as $136,425, a figure that has been adjusted annually
for cost-of-living changes.48 Benefits available to self-employed persons
were substantially smaller, due to special restrictions based upon the
participant’s age when first covered by the plan. Special limitations on
annual benefit accruals under H.R. 10 plans have prevented older selfemployed persons from taking advantage of short-term funding arrange
ments permitted under corporate plans.49
Under TEFRA, defined benefit plans that cover self-employed indi
viduals will, by 1984, be subject to the same rules applicable to other
defined benefit plans. The dollar limit for annual benefits has been
reduced to $90,000, effective for all years beginning after December
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31, 1982, and the cost-of-living adjustments have been suspended until
1986.50 The special limitations in section 401(j) of the code have been
repealed, effective after December 31, 1983.51
The 1.4 Rule. Before TEFRA, corporate employees could partic
ipate in both a defined contribution plan and a defined benefit plan,
provided that the combined benefits of both plans did not exceed 140
percent of the otherwise applicable separate dollar or percentage limits.
This advantage, commonly known as the 1.4 rule, was not, as a practical
matter, available to self-employed individuals.52
With respect to plan years beginning after December 31, 1982,
TEFRA reduced the aggregate limit from 1.4 to the lesser of 1.25 (as
applied only to the dollar limits) or 1.4 (as applied to the percentage
limits).53 The new limits will affect self-employed persons to the same
extent as corporate employees, but participants in top-heavy plans will

be subject to special rules.54
Plan Loans. Until August 14, 1982, employees of professional
corporations were permitted to borrow from a corporate plan or pledge
the plan interest as security for a loan.55 As discussed earlier, however,
TEFRA imposed restrictions on loans from all “qualified employer
plans,” including corporate plans and H.R. 10 plans.

Special Restrictions on Certain Employees. H.R. 10 plans that
cover an “owner-employee” (self-employed person holding a greater
than 10 percent interest in the capital or profits of the business) have
been subject to additional restrictions that are not applicable to corporate
plans. These include the following:

•
•

•
•

All common-law employees participating in the plan must be fully
vested at all times.56
No payments may be made, without penalty, to an owner-employee
prior to his attaining age 591/2, but payments to an owner-employee
must begin by age 70 1/2.57
Integration with social security is not permitted in most cases.58
Plan assets must be held by a bank.59

Most of the special restrictions on plans covering owner-employees have
been repealed, effective for plan years beginning after December 31,
1983.60 They have been replaced with special restrictions on top-heavy
plans covering key employees. For example, no payments may be made,
without penalty, to a key employee in a top-heavy plan prior to his
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attaining age 591/2.61 In addition, payments to a key employee in a topheavy plan must commence by age 701/2, regardless of whether he has
separated from service by that time.62 Nevertheless, several rules of
special applicability to owner-employees have not been changed.63
Corporate Surtax Exemption. Professional corporations have
benefitted from the corporate surtax exemption; ERTA substantially
reduced the composite rate of tax on the first $100,000 of corporate
income.64 This advantage may be short-lived, due to the enactment of
section 269A of the code.65

Fringe Benefits. Self-employed lawyers and accountants have
never been able to obtain certain tax-free fringe benefits available to
employees of professional corporations, such as group-term life insur
ance, disability income insurance, health insurance, and benefits under
qualified medical expense reimbursement plans.66 TEFRA made no
significant changes in this regard;67 thus, by 1984, the availability of
fringe benefits will be one of the few remaining advantages to be gained

from incorporation.
Social Security Taxes. The social security taxes paid by incor
porated professionals are somewhat higher due to the fact that professional
corporations bear the burden of both the employer and employee FICA
taxes. Inasmuch as the employer portion is tax-deductible, however,
the net burden is only slightly heavier than the wholly nondeductible
self-employment FICA tax paid by unincorporated lawyers and account
ants.68
Limited Malpractice Liability. The primary nontax advantage of
incorporation is the reduced exposure to malpractice liability. In many
jurisdictions, a professional’s liability for the negligence of others is
limited to the assets of the professional corporation (although the
professional still has unlimited liability for his own negligence).69

Administrative Costs. The administrative costs of incorporation
tend to be minor: filing fees, state registration fees or taxes, cost of
preparing charter, bylaws, employment agreements, shareholder agree
ments, and so on.
Multistate Practice. Since many states require shareholders of a
professional corporation to be licensed to practice in the state of
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incorporation, some multistate firms may find it necessary to practice
as a partnership of corporations separately established in each state.
Alternatively, the firms may decide to permit individual partners to
incorporate. Some professionals believe that the increased autonomy
that accompanies a partnership of professional corporations may cause
the partnership to disintegrate.70

Single-Shareholder Professional
Corporations: Special Tax and Nontax
Considerations
Flexibility in Plan Design
The principal advantage of permitting individual partners to incorporate
has been that each lawyer or accountant may adopt the type of plan
that best suits his or her needs. For instance, older partners may choose
to defer a greater portion of their current earnings than younger partners
facing cash flow problems, but all common-law employees must receive
benefits on a nondiscriminatory basis by reference to the richest plan
in the group.71 If the partners individually incorporate, each can be
made to bear the full burden of his or her own retirement plan costs.
If the firm is incorporated as a whole, this result can only be approximated
by treating the pension costs as an overhead item, then making
appropriate adjustments in salaries and bonuses.

Multiple Corporate Surtax Exemptions
The low rates of tax on the first $100,000 of corporate income have
worked to the advantage of individually incorporated lawyers. Incor
porated attorneys and accountants have been able to retain their capital
accounts upon incorporating and have then built up those accounts
through earnings not withdrawn as compensation or dividends. Such
amounts have been taxed to their corporations at rates as low as 15
percent.
To a limited extent, some professional corporations have accumulated
additional earnings—representing amounts not needed for current
consumption—but such amounts will be taxed again at the shareholder
level upon distribution.72 Capital gains rates may apply if these amounts
are distributed in complete liquidation of the corporation.73
If an individual lawyer or accountant owns most of the stock of
another corporation, the additional corporate surtax exemption may be
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denied.74 In light of the enactment of section 269A of the code, it is
questionable whether the surtax advantage remains viable.

Limited Liability
In many jurisdictions, a partner who incorporates individually is liable
for partnership liabilities (not arising from his own negligence) only to
the extent of his corporation’s assets; unincorporated partners would
remain personally liable for partnership liabilities. Although indemni
fication agreements may be used to achieve more equitable results, such
agreements may undercut the business purpose for incorporating and
increase the likelihood of attack by the IRS.75 To the extent that firms
carry substantial insurance coverage, the issue may be largely academic.

Administrative Costs
The creation and maintenance of a single corporation or partnership
and single set of plans is obviously more cost-efficient, from an
administrative standpoint, than the establishment of separate corpora
tions with separate plans.
The failure of one incorporated partner to conform to the requisite
corporate formalities could have an adverse impact on other incorporated
partners as well. Accordingly, firms that permit their partners to
incorporate will have to bear the administrative burden of ensuring that
each partner observes all corporate formalities.
Thus, the incorporation of individual partners can be justified
economically only if the partners anticipate very significant tax deferrals.
The unique tax risks associated with individual partner incorporation
require careful consideration.

Tax Risks Associated With Single-Shareholder
Professional Corporations
Section 250 of TEFRA added new section 269A to the code in response
to several recent Tax Court opinions that recognized the validity of oneman professional corporations despite the IRS’s multifaceted attacks. A
summary of those cases is provided below, as a necessary preface to
the discussion of section 269A.
There have been only limited attempts to attack professional corpo
rations under the “sham corporation” theory, except where corporate
formalities have not been observed.76 In arguing that a professional
corporation is a sham or alter ego of its shareholders, the IRS has had
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to reckon with the Supreme Court’s ruling that a corporation is a
separate, viable entity if it was organized for a legitimate business
purpose or if it is engaged in substantial business activity.77 It is worth
noting, however, that the dissenters in Keller suggested that a one-man
corporation must have a business activity of its own; in the case of a
law partnership of professional corporations, the dissenters would argue
that the law practice is the partnership’s business, rather than the
business of an incorporated partner.
Where the primary motivation for organizing a professional corporation
was to obtain the tax benefits of retirement plans, the IRS has sought
to disallow the deductions under section 269 of the code on grounds
that the corporate acquisition was made for the purpose of avoiding
taxes.78 To date, the courts have firmly rejected the IRS’s attacks under
section 269 in this context: “Once a corporation is formed and all
organizational and operational requirements are met, it should be
recognized for tax purposes regardless of the fact that it was formed to
take advantage of the richer corporate retirement plans. ”79
In cases involving individually incorporated partners, the IRS has
mounted attacks based on section 482 of the code and the assignmentof-income doctrine.
Where corporate formalities have not been observed, a professional
corporation’s income may be reallocated to its shareholder under section
482 or under the general authority of section 61.80 Assignment of income
principles may be applied if the corporation lacks the power to control
the earning of the income. In IRS Letter Ruling 8031028, the IRS
listed seven factors it considered in determining whether the shareholder
was the true earner of income under section 61:
1. A written partnership agreement naming the corporation as a
partner
2. Assignment of the partnership interest to the corporation
3. An employment contract between the corporation and the share
holder
4. Modification of insurance policies to provide coverage for the
corporation
5. Employment by the corporation of individuals other than the sole
shareholder
6. Indebtedness incurred by the corporation (other than retirement
plan costs)
7. Failure of the corporation to distribute all of the earnings as salary
or dividends
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If the formalities have been observed, the courts have held that
section 482, rather than the assignment of income doctrine, is the
appropriate mechanism for reallocating income.81 Under section 482,
the IRS may reallocate income and deductions among commonly
controlled businesses if such adjustments are necessary to clearly reflect
the income of such businesses. Several recent cases have suggested
that a one-man professional corporation may be vulnerable to reallocation
under section 482 to the extent that it retains income that the shareholder
employee would have received absent incorporation.
In Keller, a partnership of physicians included a one-man professional
corporation. The Tax Court recognized the professional corporation as
a separate, viable corporate entity. With regard to the section 482 issue,
the question was whether the physician and the professional corporation
would have entered into the same transactions had they been dealing
at arm’s length; specifically, the court asked whether the total compen
sation, including qualified plan contributions, paid to or on behalf of
the incorporated physician was essentially equivalent to the amount he
would have received absent incorporation. Since the question was
answered in the affirmative, the majority concluded that the reallocation
of income was improper (except with respect to income received by the
corporation from a laboratory after incorporation but before the corpo
ration was legally substituted for the individual in the contract with the
laboratory). The dissent in Keller argued that assignment of income
principles should have been applied to the professional corporation,
since the corporation existed as an empty shell with none of the attributes
of an ongoing business (assets, debts, employees other than the sole
shareholder). In the dissenters’ view, the partnership conducted the
business.
In Pacella, the IRS conceded that an incorporated psychiatric practice
was a viable entity, but attempted to invoke section 482 to reallocate
income from the corporation to its sole shareholder and a hospital owned
by the sole shareholder. Following Keller, the Tax Court ruled that the
IRS’s allocation was arbitrary and capricious; the psychiatrist’s com
pensation from the corporation, including the pension plan contributions,
closely reflected the amount of compensation he would have sought for
his services from an unrelated entity.
In Foglesong, the taxpayer split the income derived from the services
he performed as a sales representative between himself and his personal
service corporation. By manipulating corporate dividends, he attempted
to shift income to members of his family who owned preferred shares.
The corporation did not adopt any retirement plans. The Tax Court
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originally applied assignment of income principles to tax virtually all
of the income to the taxpayer personally. The seventh circuit reversed,
holding that the assignment of income doctrine could not be used to
defeat a personal service corporation where corporate formalities had
been observed. On remand, the Tax Court reallocated most of the
income to the taxpayer under section 482. Citing Keller, the court ruled
that the taxpayer would have received nearly all of the income personally
had he not incorporated; had he dealt with the corporation at arm’s
length, he would not have accepted less.
The Tax Court stated expressly in Foglesong that it did not intend to
discourage the use of the corporate form for personal service businesses
where one of the purposes of incorporation is to take advantage of
certain tax laws relating to employee benefit plans.
The purpose of new section 269A of the code is “to overturn the
results reached in cases like Keller, where the corporation served no
meaningful purpose other than to secure tax benefits that would not
otherwise be available.”82 Section 269A is essentially a synthesis of
sections 269 and 482. The new provision authorizes the IRS to allocate
all income and other tax benefits—deductions, credits, exclusions, and
the like—between a “personal service corporation” and its “employee
owners” (any employee who actually or constructively owns more than
10 percent of the outstanding stock) if the following conditions are
satisfied:

•

Substantially all of the corporation’s services must be performed
for or on behalf of one other organization, including another
corporation or a partnership.

•

The principal purpose for forming or availing of the corporation
must be to avoid or evade taxes by reducing the income of, or
securing the benefit of any allowance for, any employee-owner
that would not otherwise be available.

•

The reallocation of income or allowances must be necessary to
prevent avoidance or evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the
income of the corporation or any of its employee-owners.

Section 269A is applicable to all taxable years beginning after December
31, 1982; it takes effect one year before the parity rules for retirement
plans do.
Senator Dole has stated that “a personal service corporation will not
be considered to be formed or availed of for the purpose of evading or
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avoiding Federal income tax solely because, for 1983, the qualified
plan rules will permit higher contributions and other advantages for
corporate employees. Thus, in applying section 269A, the Secretary of
the Treasury will not take a corporation’s retirement plan into account.”83
Nevertheless, section 269A may prove to be a potent weapon against
certain professional corporations formed primarily for the purpose of
taking advantage of the corporate surtax exemption.

Other Tax Issues Pertaining to
Professional Corporations
Reasonable Compensation
Where lawyers practice in partnership form, all of the distributable net
income of the partnership is automatically taxable to the partners.84 In
the context of the 50 percent maximum tax on earned income, the IRS
took the position that all partnership income attributable to legal fees
was personal service income.85
In contrast, a professional corporation is taxable on its gross income
less allowable deductions.86 Compensation paid to shareholder-employ
ees will not be deductible if the payments are more than a “reasonable
allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services
actually rendered” or are “disguised dividends.”87 In determining
whether compensation is reasonable, all compensation, including fringe
and deferred benefits, is considered.
The disappearance of the maximum tax on earned income under
ERTA eliminated one of the primary motivations for inflating the
compensation figure. Nevertheless, disallowance of the compensation
deduction will still increase the corporate-level tax and reduce the plan
contributions made on the shareholder-employee’s behalf.
Yet, the IRS has rarely challenged the reasonableness of law firm
compensation.88
•

Although capital investment is an increasingly important element
in law practice, most income is still attributable primarily to the
personal services of the lawyer-principals.89

•

Whether a law firm has goodwill is very questionable; in general,
the practice of law is still characterized by highly personal
relationships.90
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•

The income attributable to legal fees should be treated consistently,
regardless of whether the firm practices in partnership or corporate
form.

Distribution of a regular, even though modest, dividend (representing
at least a minimum return on the lawyer’s capital account plus a share
of the corporation’s investment earnings) may ultimately prove to be the
most persuasive evidence that any amounts paid as “compensation”
were indeed reasonable.

Personal Holding Company Status
If a professional corporation undertakes to accumulate income in the
corporation, the accumulated earnings may be subject to a stiff personal
holding company penalty tax unless they are distributed as dividends.91
A small, closely held corporation may be regarded as a personal holding
company if a significant portion of its income is derived from personal
service contracts that provide that some person other than the corporation
has the right to designate the particular individual who is to render
services on the corporation’s behalf.92 The IRS has ruled that a mere
solicitation or expectation that a particular person will perform the
services is insufficient in the absence of evidence that the services are
so unique as to preclude substitution.93
In the case of an incorporated firm, personal holding company status
can be avoided by specifying in the instruments that no particular
shareholder-employee is obligated to perform or supervise professional
services on the corporation’s behalf.
The personal holding company tax may be of more serious concern
to partnerships of professional corporations. If the partnership agreement
itself is regarded as a personal service contract and the agreement
either explicitly or implicitly designates the shareholder-employee of a
corporate partner as the person to perform services for the partnership,
then the corporate partner could be characterized as a personal holding
company. Nevertheless, the IRS’s position has been that the client,
rather than the partnership, is the person for whom services are
performed; thus, the partnership agreement is not a personal service
contract. Therefore, a corporate partner is not likely to be considered
a personal holding company so long as the governing instruments provide
that the corporation has the authority and duty to replace the services
of its shareholder-employee with those of other lawyers as needed.94
To the extent that the application of sections 482 or 269A of the
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code precludes one-man professional corporations from accumulating
significant amounts of income, the question of whether such corporations
risk personal holding company tax liability is rendered moot.

Accumulated Earnings Tax
In general, professional corporations may accumulate up to $150,000
without risk of imposition of the penalty tax on income that is accumulated
beyond the reasonable needs of the business.95 (Note: The increase in
the minimum accumulated earnings credit under section 232(a) of ERTA
did not apply to professional service corporations.) If an incorporated
attorney or accountant also owns a substantial interest in another
corporation, a single accumulated earnings credit must be divided
between the two corporations.96
As a practical matter, demands for cash compensation by the principals
will render this issue moot in most cases. Furthermore, the application
of sections 482 and 269A of the code may effectively preclude
professional corporations from accumulating substantial amounts of
income.

Liquidation of Personal Service Corporations
Congress recognized that a number of personal service corporations may
wish to liquidate when the parity provisions of TEFRA take effect, and
accordingly provided some temporary tax relief. Section 247 of TEFRA
provides that a personal service corporation may, during 1983 or 1984,
undertake a complete liquidation under section 333 of the code without
exposing itself to the risk that the corporation will incur tax on its
unrealized receivables.97 Nevertheless, the distributee shareholder will
recognize ordinary income upon subsequent collection or other dispo
sition of the receivables.
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FRINGE BENEFITS
EQUITY
by Thomas P. Brock, CPA,

Brock, Cordle and Associates

Our federal tax laws contain inequities in the treatment of small
businesses. This is true even though continuing efforts have been made
to make the laws as fair as possible. Perhaps the most pervasive and
financially significant of these discriminations against small businesses
exists in the area of fringe benefits, including health and accident plans,
group life insurance plans, and employee death benefits. Retirement
plans, such as pension, profit-sharing, and annuity plans, are not within
the scope of this paper.
The discrimination against small businesses in the fringe benefit area
is directly connected to the distinction made between incorporated and
unincorporated businesses. Incorporated businesses obviously include
almost all of the largest businesses in this country, and unincorporated
businesses include almost all of the smallest businesses.
In a nut shell, corporations can deduct the cost of health and accident
plans, group life insurance, employee death benefits, and similar fringe
benefits paid to all of their employees including stockholder-employees.
Unincorporated businesses can generally deduct these same costs only
to the extent that they relate to their employees; they cannot deduct
these costs if they relate to the owners of the businesses (sole proprietors
and partners). Certain other types of fringe benefits may be deducted
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for both owners and employees but are subject to special limitations
imposed on owners that are not imposed on other classes of employees.
As a result, there is a flagrant inequity in the tax treatment of owners
of businesses, especially unincorporated businesses, as opposed to the
treatment of employees. Owners are treated differently from all types of
employees, including employees of businesses, governments, and non
profit entities. There seems to be no rational justification for this
difference. It is so inconsistent with the general thrust of our tax laws
that it seems almost inadvertent.
According to income tax return information compiled by the Internal
Revenue Service for the year 1977, there were about 3,700,000
proprietorships and partnerships in the United States with receipts of
$25,000 or more. Of this total, about 800,000 were in the agriculture,
forestry, and fishing industries and 2,900,000 were in nonagricultural
industries. Information released by the Small Business Administration
(SBA) indicates that business receipts totaled $488 billion for all
proprietorships in 1979 and $208 billion for all partnerships in 1978.
The size of these numbers makes the importance of these unincorporated
businesses to our total economy evident. A further indication of the
importance of small business is found in other SBA figures, which show
that 66 percent of the total new jobs generated between 1969 and 1976
were in firms with twenty or fewer employees.

Fringe Benefits That Discriminate
Against Unincorporated Businesses
The main fringe benefits that are required to be treated differently by
unincorporated businesses are discussed below.
Accident and Health Plans. Section 105 of the Internal Revenue
Code provides that most payments by employers for the costs of medical
care are not taxable to the employees receiving the payments. Neither
are payments to compensate for permanent injury or disfigurement and
certain payments to the permanently and totally disabled. Under section
162, these payments are deductible by the businesses making the
payments. For these purposes, self-employed individuals are not con
sidered to be employees, so unincorporated businesses cannot deduct
these kinds of payments to the self-employed. (Certain nondiscrimination
rules apply to self-insured medical reimbursement plans.)
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Group-Term Life Insurance Section 79 of the code provides that
the cost of up to $50,000 of group-term life insurance may be paid for
and deducted by employers without creating income taxable to the
employees receiving the coverage. Proprietors and partners are not
considered to be employees for this purpose; thus, payments made on
their behalf for group life insurance are not deductible. The Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, which was recently passed,
applies new nondiscrimination rules in this area beginning in 1984.
Qualified Transportation. Section 124 allows employers to deduct
transportation costs of employees between their residences and places
of employment in commuter highway vehicles without generating taxable
income reportable by the employees. Once again, because self-employed
individuals are not considered employees, owners of unincorporated
businesses do not qualify for this fringe benefit.

Meals and Lodging Furnished for the Convenience of the
Employer. Section 119 allows certain employees to exclude from

gross income the value of meals or lodging furnished for the convenience
of their employers. While there is some conflict in related court decisions
(see G. A. Papineau, 16 T.C. 130 (1951)), the IRS and several circuit
courts hold that self-employed individuals may not exclude these items
from their gross incomes.
Employees’ Death Benefits. Section 101(b) of the code provides
for the exclusion from employees’ incomes of employees’ death benefits
of up to $5,000 paid and deducted by employers. Self-employed
individuals are not considered to be employees for this purpose; therefore,
death benefit payments to them by unincorporated businesses are not
deductible. However, Congress, in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1982, has changed this provision to allow up to $5,000 of tax-free death
benefit payments to self-employed individuals after 1983 if made from
retirement plans or annuity contracts, thereby eliminating a part of the
discrimination against unincorporated businesses.

Other Fringe Benefits
The change in the death benefit provision is evidence of a growing
recognition by Congress of the inherent unfairness of the fringe benefit
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rules described above. Perhaps because of this change in thinking,
most recently adopted fringe benefit programs have provided that selfemployed individuals should be treated the same as employees. But, a
new type of discrimination against smaller businesses involving restric
tions on payments for the benefit of business owners has been introduced.
Recently adopted fringe benefits are described below.

Section 120 of the code provides for
employer-funded group legal service plans effective for years beginning
after 1976. Employees are not taxable on deductible employer contri
butions. Self-employed individuals are treated as employees. Discrim
ination in favor of employees who are officers, shareholders, selfemployed or highly compensated individuals is forbidden. However,
payments for the benefit of all the more-than-5-percent shareholders
and owners are limited to not more than 25 percent of the total amount
contributed to the plan.
Group Legal Service Plans.

Educational Assistance Programs. Section 127 permits em
ployer-funded, tax-deductible educational assistance programs, which
pay for such things as tuition, fees, and books for employees for years
beginning after 1978. Employees are not taxed on these payments. Self
employed individuals are treated as employees. Discrimination in favor
of owners and others is forbidden. Payments for the benefit of all the
more-than-5-percent shareholders and owners are limited to not more
than 5 percent of the total amount paid to all participants under a
program.

Dependent Care Assistance Programs. Section 129 provides for
dependent care assistance programs for years beginning after 1981.
Employees do not have to pay tax on certain limited tax-deductible
amounts paid by employers for the care of dependents. Employees
include self-employed individuals. Discrimination in favor of owners
and others is prohibited. However, not more than 25 percent of the
total amount paid by an employer can benefit all the more-than-5-percent
shareholders and owners.

The thrust of these three provisions is obviously different from that
of the other fringe benefits previously described. Both incorporated and
unincorporated businesses are treated in generally the same way. All
three of these new types of fringe benefits contain rules preventing
discrimination in favor of officers, owners, and highly compensated
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employees and their dependents. This kind of rule is not philosophically
objectionable because it applies equally to all businesses regardless of
size. However, in all three of the programs, a new type of discrimination
against small businesses is introduced by further limiting the total
dollars that can be spent on behalf of more-than-5-percent shareholders
and owners to a specified percentage of total expenditures. This type of
discrimination seems to be totally unwarranted.
One other rather strange example of fringe benefit discrimination
against small business owners appears in section 217. Both employees
and self-employed persons are allowed to deduct certain expenses of
moving to a new principal place of work. However, employees must
work full-time for at least thirty-nine weeks in the twelve months
following their moves, and self-employed individuals must work fulltime for seventy-eight weeks in the twenty-four months following their
moves.
The key question that all of these provisions raise is whether there
is any real justification for the various types of discrimination that our
tax laws have created. Suppose an individual who has worked for a
large corporation starts his own unincorporated business doing a similar
kind of work (and perhaps creating new jobs for others) and makes a
similar amount of money. Is there any compelling reason why fringe
benefits are tax-free and unlimited in one case and taxable or limited
in the other? Should the fact that he worked for a large business in one
case and owned a small business in the other have any bearing on the
outcome of this question? If the corner grocer operates as a proprietorship,
is there any reason why he should be denied the deduction for medical
insurance premiums that he could unquestionably obtain if he incor
porated? Is there any broadly acceptable reason why partners and
proprietors in particular and business owners in general deserve to be
treated differently from their employees or from the employees of
governments and nonprofit organizations? The answer seems to be that
there simply is no fundamental justification for these differences.

A Proposal for Fringe Benefit Equity
None of the fringe benefit programs previously described are completely
free of bias against small business. All either do not allow deductions
by proprietors and partners or limit payments or deductions for the
benefit of self-employed individuals and other key persons. This is true
even though the payments do not discriminate in their favor. Obviously,
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a limited deduction is fairer than no deduction at all, but the only really
fair result would be to treat owners and employees exactly the same.
Generally speaking, it seems clear that a start towards a reasonable
course in the fringe benefit area has been provided by the drafters of
the newer fringe benefit provisions. For example, section 120(d), which
relates to qualified group legal service plans provides that “the term
‘self-employed individual’ means, and the term ‘employee’ includes, for
any year, an individual who is an employee within the meaning of
section 401(c)(1) (relating to self-employed individuals).” If this concept
were uniformly applied throughout the fringe benefit area, much of the
long-standing discrimination in the treatment of unincorporated business
would be eliminated.
As noted, certain fringe benefit sections contain language precluding
discrimination in favor of officers, shareholders, and highly compensated
employees. Where this type of limitation is felt to be necessary, it could
appropriately be extended to self-employed individuals. However,
percentage limitations on payments for the benefit of such persons as
those applicable to group legal service plans, educational assistance
programs, and dependent care assistance programs are simply not
appropriate because they generally affect only small businesses.
One problem that needs to be addressed involves the smallest of
unincorporated businesses. IRS figures indicate that there were nearly
9 million proprietorships and partnerships that filed income tax returns
in 1977 and reported gross receipts of less than $25,000. To limit fringe
benefits only to legitimate operating businesses, consideration might be
given to extending the fringe benefit rules described earlier only to
those unincorporated businesses having at least one full-time employee
or to unincorporated businesses where the owner works full-time in the
business.
The revenue effect of such a proposal is difficult to estimate. However,
the tax savings for a single self-employed person could easily be in the
$500 to $1,500 yearly range. Since as many as 4 million proprietors
and partners might be involved, the annual revenue effect could
conceivably be from one to several billion dollars. These numbers would
no doubt be increased further as a result of the extension of fringe
benefits to employees of unincorporated businesses and other small
businesses who are not now receiving these fringe benefits.
However, regardless of the exact cost, it is exceptionally important
to note that the provision of fringe benefit equity also provides a very
specific and targeted reduction in income taxes for the owners of truly
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small businesses. It does not seem likely that any other proposed change
in our tax laws would so specifically and significantly help the small
business sector of our economy.

Social Effects of a Change in the Status
of Fringe Benefits
While it is risky to predict the social effects of changes in our tax laws,
certain observations can be made that probably are reasonably relevant.
One of these is that our present tax laws partially subsidize the cost of
fringe benefits. Presumably, fringe benefits are subsidized by the tax
laws because they meet a social need. Through our tax laws, for example,
we encourage the purchase of medical and life insurance. However, the
effect of our present tax laws is to provide more encouragement to
incorporated businesses than to unincorporated businesses. This is so
because officers and employed owners of incorporated businesses can
benefit from the fringe benefits, while the owners of unincorporated
businesses cannot. Thus, there is less incentive for owners of unincor
porated businesses to provide fringe benefit coverages for their employees
than for the owners of similar incorporated businesses.
A second observation is that it is likely that unincorporated businesses
employ a disproportionately large share of those in the lower economic
levels of our work force. Small businesses generally pay lower wage
rates than large businesses and thus hire more marginal workers. Since,
among other things, there is less tax incentive for the owners of
unincorporated businesses to provide fringe benefits for these workers,
the level of benefits provided is probably significantly lower than the
level provided by corporate employers. Yet, because of lower compen
sation levels, the employees of unincorporated businesses probably are
more in need of fringe benefits such as medical and life insurance than
are corporate employees.
Finally, if these assumptions are generally true, it appears that
encouraging the owners of small and unincorporated businesses to take
advantage of various fringe benefit options and to provide the same
fringe benefits for their employees on a nondiscriminatory basis would
tend to meet a real need in our society. It can be speculated that the
resulting additional coverage by medical and life insurance plans alone
might significantly reduce the need for and the cost of various “safety
net” programs provided for both the owners and the employees of small
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businesses. The relationship of these cost savings to added costs
resulting from increased tax deductions for fringe benefits might be
surprising.
The effect of the inequities in our present tax law has been generally
to encourage incorporated businesses to provide fringe benefits to their
employees and to discourage unincorporated businesses from doing the
same. It seems likely that eliminating this inequity would have the
effect of extending medical, life, and other types of protection to many
of the people in our small business community and in our total work
force who need them the most. The cost to our government might be
less than expected.
The allowance of fringe benefits is probably the greatest single
inequity in the tax treatment of small businesses. This inequity is not
philosophically justifiable, and serious consideration needs to be given
to rectifying the situation. Providing tax equity in this area would
probably be more meaningful for the really small businesses in this
country and their employees than any other change that could be made
in our tax laws.
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